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Economic and security ties comprise the fundamental links in US-Japan relations,
which have become strained by criticisms from both sides of the Pacific. As our two
nations continue to pursue prosperity and security, rates of domestic consumption,
trade balances, overseas investment, and technology development have become tests of
bilateral cooperation.
Domestic demand, capital formation, trade and development of science and
technology are fundamental concerns of the economy which contribute to Japan's
national security posture. With the formation of Comprehensive Security, economic
assets, more than military spending alone, have become the pillars of Japan's national
security framework. To the Japanese, a strong economy is essential to Japan's
national security.
This thesis analyzes the various programs the Japanese have pursued through the
postwar period to build a stronger economy and the role they have played in the
development and implementation of Comprehensive Security. Additionally, this thesis
examines comprehensive security as it contributes to mutual US-Japan regional
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of world war, few envisaged the economic recovery and
prosperity that followed in Japan. Shortages in the basic necessities such as food and
shelter dominated the nation as poverty appeared to be Japan's returns for the Great
Pacific War. With Japan's surrender, the immediate security objective was to
implement political reforms in Japan with hopes of rehabilitation and recover}-. The
link between security and economic issues was not immediately apparent as a US-
Japan relationship formed to overcome war's devastation.
The Cold War which followed the close of World War II, formed a bi-polar
environment bringing the need for a US ally in Asia and by 1952, the economic
relationship between the US and Japan was formally joined by a security tie. The
Yoshida Doctrine expressed the national interest as it established Japan's policy for the
nation's development under the premise of US-Japan security arrangements.
Protection provided by the US nuclear umbrella was essential to Japan's prosperity and
national security as economic diplomacy became a central theme in Japan's foreign
policy. As economic growth progressed and the superstate 1 predicted by Herman
Kahn became apparent, economic factors assumed a greater role in protecting Japan's
national interest by shaping security policies.
The economic progress after World War II proved to be Japan's second
industrial revolution, however, as with its development during the Meiji government.
the problems of resource scarcity burdened economic progress. Although endowed
with some coal deposits, technological progress during the 1950s and sixties shifted
industrial fuel from coal to petroleum, exacerbating Japan's problem of resource
scarcity. Despite these limitations. Japanese industries became successful by using the
momentum of domestic markets for economic growth. With economic success came
prosperity and as a result, purchasing power, or the ability to buy resources absent in
the domestic economy, became a principle to secure the national interest.
The risks of this strategy were apparent as dependency on foreign materials
became the premise to economic growth and the Arab oil-producing nations of the
Middle East curtailed petroleum supplies for political reasons. Suddenly, Japan's
'Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970).
national goals were linked to its political position in the Middle East and prosperity
was held hostage by a foreign land known only for its abundant supply of crude
petroleum.
Japan's comprehensive security policy emerged as a result of the oil embargos of
1973 and 1979, the apparent decline of US influence in international relations, and
Japan's global status manifested by economic success. The policy addressed economic
issues in light of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and rapprochement with China,
and moreover, the protection of national interests by economic assets such as
technology and financial resources. Through its economic strengths, Japan improved
its ability to protect national interests and assumed a role more independent of its US
link.
Rapid economic progress brought tensions between the United States and Japan
as a drop in crude petroleum supplies and climbing commodity prices forced Japan to
increase exports. Interdependence with the global economy was essential to the
nation's welfare since natural mineral resources were domestically scarce and foreign
markets were vital to economic growth. Interdependence grew in terms of trade
volume, overseas capital investments and technology transfers, but a growing current
account surplus with the US brought trade friction between the two security partners.
Economic concerns were highlighted in US-Japan relations as Americans criticized
Japan for taking a "free ride" in security matters. United States current account
deficits and Japanese trade barriers mobilized some American industrial leaders and
legislators to prepare trade war strategies and protectionist trade legislation,
threatening Japan's economy and more specifically, its prosperity and concept of
comprehensive security.
Japan and the United States viewed economic tensions from different
perspectives. Several Japanese enterprises and government officials blamed US
government and private deficit spending as well as a decline in US industrial
competitiveness for trade imbalances, while many Americans viewed an antiquated
Japanese distribution system and other nontariff trade barriers as the basis of the
problem. Both agreed that mis-aligned currency rates contributed to trade problems.
Monetary adjustments beginning in September 1985 have made few significant gains in
correcting US-Japan trade imbalances. To address domestic economic pressures and to
assuage tense relations with its primary economic and security partner, Japan quickly
formed plans to restructure its economy from export-led growth, to one based on
domestic demand.
After two years monetary realignment, falling interest rates and growing overseas
investments following the September 1985 agreement, Japan is beginning to show signs
of economic growth led by domestic demand. Despite this transition. US-Japan trade
tensions remain high manifested by congressional determination for protectionist
legislation and retaliation for unfair trade practices. Should general protectionist
legislation directed against the economies of nations with large trade surpluses become
a reality, it is likely that the effect of such action will in fact challenge the security
position of its closest ally in Asia, while exacerbating global economic slowdown
similar to the years following passage of other protectionist bills such as Smoot-
Hawley.
A. HYPOTHESIS
The hypothesis of this thesis is that Japan, in order to to sustain a viable
national security posture, must maintain a strong economy manifested by good
economic relations with the global community, particularly with the United States.
Since Japan's Constitution and current political culture prohibits the use of military
force outside its national boundaries, military capabilities assume a lesser role in overall
national security affairs. In terms of economic instruments however, Japan is among
the most influential nations of the world as it fosters conditions favorable to its
national interests.
Security and prosperity are essential elements of Japan's national interest since
these conditions facilitate global economic and political links necessary for the nation's
survival. A significant aspect of Japan's national security affairs is its security
relationship with the United States and the nuclear deterrence that this relationship
affords Japan. However, the US nuclear umbrella alone is no panacea to all of Japan's
security needs since nuclear military deterrence cannot guarantee peace nor bring
prosperity. As a result the US-Japan economic relationship, which affords Japan its
largest export market, access to advanced science and technology, and investment
opportunities, are also important aspects of Japan's national interest. With the
climbing importance of economic factors in national security affairs, Japan has
embraced comprehensive security policies to secure national interests and, through its
employment of economic and technological assets, relies upon its miracle economy to
contribute its share to US-Japan mutual security.
This thesis will analyze the various programs the Japanese pursued through the
postwar period to build a stronger economy. It will show how advances in military
capabilities have sometimes been sacrificed. In each stage of Japan's development, the
Japanese have been convinced that their emphasis on the economy have been as
effective in contributing to mutual security as a greater emphasis in military
capabilities.
The following chapters discuss economic factors in terms of Japan's domestic
demand, capital assets, trade, and development of science and technology, to determine
the extent to which economic factors have influenced Japanese security policies in the
past; to determine the role of economics in present security policies; and to examine
how Japan's security policies are likely to evolve in the future in the light of current
economic realities.
B. OPERATIONAL TERMS
National security policies are implemented to protect national interests. For the
United States, these policies have been a combination of efforts encompassing both
national defense and foreign relations." Although a military or defensive advantage
over an adversary nation or group of nations has been a significant aspect of US
security policies, Japan's concept of national security places less emphasis on military
defense. Instead, the economic prosperity which has developed since the close of world
war, bolsters national security, making Japan more influential in global relations.
Economics in this study refers to the ability to effectively use available assets,
such as land, labor, capital and technology, to meet domestic demands as it relates to
national security. Domestic demands are the needs of the nation's consumers, which
comprise private households, industries, and government. Statistically, domestic
demand is obtained by subtracting exports from Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
The following chapters analyze the development of Japan's national security
policies in terms of its economic development, specifically in the areas of domestic
demand, exports, capital formation and flows, and technological applications from
1945 to 198S. Chapter Two examines the years during which Japan was under US
occupation. Japan's postwar years from 1945 to 1952 witnessed the economic despair
of poverty and starvation, in addition to a new relationship with the United States
manifested by economic aid and a security treaty. Chapter Three analyzes the years
Department of the Defense. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 1, 1979), p. 22S.
from 1952 to the first oil crisis in 19"? during which time Japan underwent rapid
economic growth and the transformation from a Western liability to asset, by
becoming the model to which developing nations aspired. Although Japan's economic
miracle developed during these years, the period also witnessed the beginning of trade
tensions between the two allies with US pressure for Japan to contribute more to the
security of Asia. Chapter Four then analyzes the years after the 1973 oil crisis to 1988,
focussing on the passing of Pax Americana, the security of Japan's prosperity in light
of the two oil crises, economic tensions with the United States, and Japan's
contributions to security affairs as an international leader. This study concludes with a
chapter on likely near term developments in US-Japan security issues, in light of
current trends.
II. SECURITY AND ECONOMIC FACTORS 1945-1952
After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, Japan's Imperial military forces fueled
ultra-nationalism which urged hegemony over Asia. The Pacific War, in pursuit of
Greater East Asian Co-prosperity goals, eventually drained Japan of its economic
wealth, military might, and vision as leader of an international hierarchy. 3
The security and economic factors in Japan between 1945 and 1952 were effects
that followed over a decade of conflict in Asia and economic stress of supporting
military actions. At war's end in September 1945, Japan bore an economy that was in
ruins and the stigma of an aggressive, irresponsible military power.
The Supreme Command Allied Powers' (SCAP) occupation of Japan, headed by
General Douglas MacArthur, sought to disarm Japan so that it would no longer
threaten peace and security in Asia, and encourage the development of responsible
government supported by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people. The
Occupation's purpose in Japan can be best described in its two distinct phases; from
1945 to 1947 the occupation's mission focussed on political and military reforms, so
that Japan never again be a menace to peace in Asia, while the phase from 1948 to
1952 aimed to assist Japan in its efforts toward economic recovery, so that Japan could
join the forces committed to stability and peace.
Japan's security development during the final years of occupation are evident in
its Constitution of 1947, the multilateral peace settlement and mutual security
arrangements with the United States established by the Treaty of 1952. After national
security measures were provided, Japan addressed the problem of its own economic
recovery. Recovery was systematically pursued in its policies of meeting the consumer
demands of its people; providing the capital and labor assets required for continued
growth, while concentrating on its export industries; and making adequate provisions
for research and development to apply new technological innovations toward economic
growth. While Japanese leaders concentrated on economic recover} -
,
Cold War
conditions convinced General MacArthur that an economically stable and prosperous
Japan would best serve US interests in Asia.
-Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. (Boston, MA: The
Riverside Press, 1946), p. 20-42.
A. SECURITY DEVELOPMENT
By the close of World War II the negative effects of Japan's political character
and military power on international order were staggering. MacArthur's immediate
goal after Japan's surrender in September 1945 focussed on establishing political
reforms and dismantling Japan's military power. While institutionalizing concepts of
democracy, he guided the emperor's government, denouncing violence as an instrument
of foreign policy.
The new constitution, effective May 3, 1947, was a reflection of MacArthur's
political reforms as it reshaped Japan's perspective toward international relations.
Article 9. the anti-war clause, established the new pacific character of postwar Japan,
shaping the framework of national security policies by stating:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
Although the Chinese and Southeast Asian victims of militaristic Japan viewed this
renunciation of war with much skepticism, Article 9 appealed to many Japanese who
were forced to "bear the unbearable" as the outcome of Japan's WTar of Greater East
Asia.
MacArthur's zeal for political reform however, worried US officals in
Washington since, in their view, rapid political alterations precipitated instability
leaving Japan susceptible to Communist subversion. As a result, the architect of
American's containment strategy, George Kennan. was sent to Japan in February 1948
to express Washington's latest concerns. Upon arriving in Japan, Kennan was
surprised to find relations between Washington and America's Occupation
headquarters more distant than anticipated. He later wrote: "so distant and so full of
mistrust that my mission was like nothing more than that of an envoy charged with
opening up communications and arranging the establishment of diplomatic relations
with a hostile and suspicious foreign government."4 Despite existing conditions,
4George Kennan, Memoirs: 1929 to 1950 (Boston, MA: Little and Brown and
Co.. 1967), p. 36S-96.
Kennan and MacArthur stood on a common ground as both men recognized a rising
Communist threat in Asia.
As the international environment became absorbed in Cold War. the L'S
emphasis on security objectives in Japan became more apparent. American interests in
Asia began to see Japan as a strategic territory of critical importance to its own
security as the communist revolution in China approached its climax." Events of 1949
heightened US concerns as Mao Zedong succeeded in establishing communist rule in
China. In the same year communist military power increased tensions as the Soviet
Union detonated its first nuclear device. Outbreak of the Korean War a year later
brought the return of US troops to Asia. Instability in the region and America's need
for an Asian ally served to bolster Japan's nascent alliance with the United States. 6
The Korean War influenced Japan's direction in security affairs and accelerated
US efforts for a peace settlement with Japan. In response to America's containment
strategy, MacArthur pressured Japan to establish a 75.000 man National Police
Reserve (NPR) in July 1950. Formation of a self-defense force did not conflict with
Prime Minister Ashida's interpretation of Article 9 since its intention was to protect
Japan from external threats, and was restricted to national boundaries. The "Ashida -
Kiyose Interpretation," as it was later called, became the founding argument
legitimizing Japan's maintenance of Self Defense Forces. The NPR was renamed the
National Safety Force and was increased to 110,000 men when the San Francisco
Peace Treaty and Mutual Security Treaty with the US became effective in 1952. 7
The Cold War environment and outbreak of the Korean War served to
emphasize US security interests in Asia and accelerated the process of incorporating
Japan into the company of the free world against communist expansion. As a result,
US interests called for measures to end the occupation and restore sovereignty to the
Japanese government; these interests served to accelerate a peace settlement and meld
the United States and Japan as security partners in Asia.
Chalmers Johnson, MIT1 and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial
Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), p. 189.
6James C. Thomson, Peter W. Stanley and John C. Perry, Sentimental Imperialist:
An American Experience in East Asia (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers,
1981), p. 250.
'Satoh Yukio The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy Adelphi Paper No. 178
(Dorking. Great Britain: Bartholomew Press, 19S2) p. 2.
On September S. 1951 in San Francisco, effects of the Cold War were evident as
the fifty-five powers at war with Japan concluded a multilateral peace
treaty: Communist powers refused to sign. The peace treaty recognized Japan's right
of self-defense and within hours after its conclusion, to the surprise of the Soviet
Union, the Mutual Security Treaty (MST) was signed reinforcing US-Japan security
interests in Asia. s
As the peace treaty became effective on April 28, 1952. the mission of US forces
in Japan changed from domestic regulation to mutual national security. The MST
changed the . I US military presence in Japan as it allowed American forces to
remain for an unspecified period to assume indefinite responsibility for Japan's defense.
B. ECONOMIC FACTORS
Japan's new character established by its Peace Constitution, the security
implications of Cold War. economic despair, and the newly formed alliance with the
United States all shaped a foreign policy which pursued Japan's primary national
interest of economic recovery. Although pacific idealism was strong among the
Japanese after enduring the hardships of world war. formation of a self-defense force
and a security arrangement with the United States was a prudent compromise
considering the realities of the global climate. In light of Cold War tensions. Prime
Minister Yoshida bore the responsibility of resuming trade with the United States.
Western Europe, and Southeast Asia, without which economic recover." was
impossible.
The Yoshida Doctrine formed under the above conditions, established three
foreign policy principles for Japan. 9 The first principle maintained a Japanese foreign
policy concept established by the Meiji leaders in 186S called boeki rikkoku or "building
a nation by expanding trade." Renamed keizai gaiko, or "economic diplomacy."
Yoshida sought to achieve economic recovery by accelerating trade and hoped to wield
international influence by economic means. Through economic diplomacy. Japan
hoped to focus on the economic aspects of international relations, thereby separating
trade issues from political issues. By making such a separation. Japan hoped to
become an enemv with no nation, while conducting trade with even" country.
8Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (NY.
New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969). p. 539-50.
9Nishihara Masashi, "How Much Longer the Fruits of "the Yoshida Doctrine"?
Journal of Asiatic Studies: 22 (1979) 1. p. 79-80.
Economic diplomacy reflected Japan's pacific nature by emphasizing
international relations in economic terms. The principle of economic diplomacy was
especially significant to Japan's domestic economy in light of the security arrangement
with the US. By forming a security agreement with the world's foremost superpower.
Japan could fully tend to economic recovery. In exchange for providing US military
bases, Yoshida and many of his successors minimized defense concerns, particularly in
terms of defense appropriations, and focussed their efforts on economic growth.
To address the communist challenge presented by the Cold War environment,
Yoshida's second principle was with a futuristic vision of contributing to a more
economically viable Asia capable of resisting communist influence. In addition to
resisting communist influences, a free Asia would also best serve Japan's economic
interests by promoting regional trade.
The third principle focussed on supporting a strong United Nations. Not only
did the UN parallel the pacific sentiment of Japan, the organization served to
reintroduce Japan to the international community. Close international relations was
vital since Japan sought economic recovery as a market-oriented democracy. For these
reasons Yoshida hoped to obtain membership immediately after regaining sovereignty.
As the US was interested in security, the Japanese emphasis went to nurturing its
economic development. It is evident that Japan's national interest to rebuild its war
torn nation was heavily dependent on global economic interaction and support from
the United States. Japan's security development was a function of US guidance and as
sovereignty was restored, security matters were linked to the United States by the
MST. Since the Japanese Constitution and economic ruin limited the nation's ability
to provide for its own security, the link formed by the MST demonstrated Japanese
dependence on the US for a security umbrella.
World war destroyed much of the economic foundation which had developed
since Meiji Japan. Twenty percent of Japan's homes were destroyed by air raids: in the
major population centers of Japan, Tokyo and Osaka lost over 50 percent of their
dwellings. More crucial to the nation's economy, the war left 30 percent of Japan's
industrial capacity and 80 percent of its shipping in ruins. At war's end, industrial
production stood at scarcely 10 percent of the normal prewar level. 10 Coal production,
vital to Japan's economy, fell drastically after the war as output fell from over
4,000,000 tons per month to 554,000 tons in November 1945. During this economic
Mikiso Hane, Modem Japan: A Historical Survey (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 19S6), p. 341.
the Japanese people underwent a bitter struggle for survival remembered
as the prison of hunger." 11 Although the goal of economic recover}" was vital,
recovery policies were much in contention.
1. Recovery Policies - Production vs. Stabilization
SCAP and Japanese government officials encountered their first major
disagreement of the postwar period over the problem of economic recovery policies.
Debate focussed on whether reconstruction policies should give priority to production
::su) as a means toward recover}-, or price stabilization and control of inflation
setsu).
a. Priority Production
As Finance Minister in the first Yoshida cabinet (May 1946-May 1947).
Ishibashi Tanzan argued for increased production as a strategy for economic recovery
wiih the following logic:
The current economic crisis is not one of inflation, but rather a surplus of unused
labor and production facilities. The only way to get out of it is to increase
production. 12
. called for financial support of industrial production facilities through war
claims payments and price support subsidies; inflationary effects were to be limited by
issuing new currency. The priority production plan incorporated this logic as Japanese
officials implemented their plans for economic recover}- .
The priority production policy, implemented by Japan's Ministry of
Commerce and Industry 'MCI) in 194". concentrated economic assets in three strategic
sectors: coal, steel and fertilizer production. Japanese policy makers believed overall
industrial production would increase as a result of government support for coal and
steel production. Fertilizer production was added to the policy to increase domestic
food production.
Japanese officials were cognizant of the detrimental effects of this policy to
civilian consumption and inflation. To support production and increase demand,
government corporations (kodan) purchased major commodities from producers at high
prices and sold them to consumers at low prices, covering the difference through price
subsidies from the government's general account. 13 As Table 1 indicates, the priority
n Johnson. p. 177.
p 178.
^Johnson, p. 1S3.
production policy caused government subsidies and losses to increase at an alarming
rate, peaking in 1949. Deficit spending aggravated inflationary conditions which
became evident in rocketing prices. In 1946 the wholesale price index increased 364
percent, in 194S it increased 196 percent and 1948 experienced an increase of 166
percent. 14
TABLE 1
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES AND INDEMNITIES , 1946-1952
Year Total General Subsidies Indemnities
Account for Losses
1946 115.207 3.731 (3.2%)
28.178(13.7)
22,661 (20.0%)
1947 205.841 8.566 (4.2)
16.632(3.2)1948 461.974 93,118 (20.2
1949 699.448 179,284 (25.6) 31.838(4.6
1950 633.259 60.162 (9.5) 7,830(1.2
1951 749. S 36 26.975 3.2 9.560(1.3
1952 873.942 40,30S (4.6 8.183 0.9
Inflationary conditions finally peaked in 1949 when MacArthur imposed the Economic
Stabilization Plan.
b. Economic Stabilization Plan - "The Dodge Line"
By 1948, SCAP shifted its efforts from political reform to economic
recovery. Determined to see Japan transform from liability to economic asset for the
free world, SCAP formed the Economic Stabilization Plan. The Plan, issued on
December 19, 1948, sought to control inflation and stabilize prices through stringent
fiscal controls. The significant aspects of the policy were:
• Balance the nation's budget
• Strengthen the tax collection process
• Limit Reconstruction Finance Bank (RFB) loans
• Improve controls over foreign trade and US aid
• Increase production
Edward F. Denison and William K. Chung. How Japan's Economy Grew So
Fast: The Sources of Postwar Expansion (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute,
1976), p. 11.
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.
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rocketing
By June 15 Korean forces attacked across the the
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2. Demand
i tic demand For essenl luring 1945 tc 1947 was the
immediate problem in Japan as food supplies vanished and Japan approached mass
starvation. As US assistance aver tei foreigr Jemand
products toposl
Qg control of occupied areas. Japan's terntory and sources for
raw matei ... Millions of Japanese repatriated from
Manchuria, Kcrea. Taiwan and Southeast Asia returned to the already crowded
Japanese :erbatmg dei ands on food supplies. By the spring of 1946. when
ritie n ghi food to the starving nation, food rations limited
consumption to 1.050 calories pei individual per day, and ever, this was a level that few
though United States assistar.ee in 1946 averted mass
starvation in Japan, it was not until intervention in the Korean War that US demand
for Japanese goods significantly aided recovery efibrts.
US intervention in the Korean War extended logistical lines across the Pacific
Ocean which increased transportation costs and reduced supply responsiveness to
forces on the Korean peninsula. Japan's growing industrial capacity, cheap labor, and
proximity to US combat forces were factors which merged United States' and Japan's
immediate interests. As the Korean War dragged on, US demand for Japanese goods
brought the two countries closer together. Japanese production became a vital link for
US logistical support as orders were placed with Japanese firms for ammunition,
uniforms, communications equipment and other military related products.
During the four years that followed the outbreak of the Korean War, US
special procurements brought S2.37 billion to the Japanese economy. 16 US demand for
Japanese trucks alone during the Korean War brought orders for 7,079 vehicles, worth
SI 3 million; these orders typified the boost to Japan's economy as US demand
provided the necessary stimulis to revive Japan's automobile industry. 17
3. Capital
Capital was essential to priming the economic pump and methods to
overcome its shortage were fundamental in the effort to fuel economic recovery.
Japan's capital assets had been squandered as a result of its wartime economy.
However, even after its surrender the Japanese government upheld its commitments to
wartime contracts in an attempt to maintain its fledgling industries. Government
obligations were met by disbursing new yen notes which brought the inflationary
conditions of 1946-194S. In mid-1946. SCAP took drastic action. It ordered the
government to stop payments and default on its wartime commitments. But even this
failed to stop rising inflation as Japan's Reconstruction Finance Bank flooded the
economy with new currency.
With the shift toward economic recovery in 1948, SCAP sought to provide the
necessary capital by drawing on US appropriated aid. Introduction of SCAP's
stabilization plan brought a gradual end to inflationary conditions which would have
evaporated the value of these politically sensitive funds. The Government
Appropriations for Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) and Economic Rehabilitation
of Occupied Areas (EROA) provided US funds necessary for Japan's incipient




limited to the provision of aid to prevent social unrest and sickness; much of thee
funds were used for the distribution of food and medical supplies. EROA Funds
however, provided Japan with raw materials needed for economic recovery and the
rehabilitation of Japan's industry and export trade. 18
These funds were instrumental in reestablishing Japan's industries and were
therefore largely responsible for the nation's successful recovery and subsequent
"economic miracle." Funds were necessary to purchase essential capital goods for
factories, raw materials for industrial production, and foreign technology to fill the gap
of industrial "know-how" between Japan and the most advanced nations. By importing
new equipment. Japan was able to incorporate the latest technologies in industry and
by re-tooling its production facilities, become more efficient. As a developing country,
Japan discovered it was more efficient to license or buy new technology from the most
developed countries than to domestically develop technology under economically
austere conditions. Due to America's financial aid directed toward capital facilities,
Japan quickly became an industrial-efficient country. 19
4. Labor
Japan entered the postwar period with few economic assets; the greatest
exception to this however, was an abundance of unemployed, cheap, and highly skilled
labor. Japanese strengths in education were largely responsible for this abundance
while the war production economy of the 1930s had already shaped the psychological
framework and necessary expertise for the nation's recovery. MacArthur's vision of
Japan's future however, caused fundamental changes in the nation's attitudes toward
labor.
While many of the senior officials in both Washington and SCAP
Headquarters held lingering spite for the Japanese. MacArthur's vision of his role in
Japan was to bring the defeated nation into the modern era as a successful democracy.
In March 1943. MacArthur was already thinking of his plans for postwar Japan,
knowing that Japan's defeat would make America the most powerful nation in Asia.
In this light, he said: "If we exert that influence in an imperialistic manner, or for the
sole purpose of commercial advantage, then we shall lose our golden opportunity; but
18Yoshida Shigeru. (Yoshida Kenichi, trans.), The Yoshida Memoirs: The Siory
of Japan in Crisis (Boston. MA: Houghton Mifflin Co.. 1962). p. 204-10.
19John K. Fairbank. Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig. Easi Asia:
Traditions and Transformation - Sew Impressions (Boston. MA: Houghton Mifflin,
24-30.
15
if our influence and strength are expressed in terms of essential liberalism we shall have
the friendship and the cooperation of the Asiatic peoples far into the future." With
this vision. MacArthur and his staff aggressively implemented reform measures to
create a free and democratic Japan; among the areas most aggressively pursued was
labor.
Labor reform began with the elimination of the zaibatsu, organizations where
government and industrial interests merged to wield economic power. In addition to
the elimination of zaibatsu organizations SCAP placed several prewar industrialists on
its purge list to ensure a successful reform, and to preclude the chance of power once
again falling into their hands. The right to organize was the most radical change for
Japan's labor institution. Union membership grew at a fantastic rate, from 400,000 in
1945 to 2.7 million by May 1946. While the right to organize was readily accepted by
the Japanese, Japan's lack of experience in trade unions left a vacuum in these
organizations, filled by communist leadership.
MacArthur's determination to allow unions to flourish troubled Yoshida as he
represented all that was conservative in Japan, less its military past. Yoshida's goal as
prime minster was to preserve the Japan that the militarists had lost, a goal made more
difficult by SCAP's reform policies and subsequent infiltration of communist leaders in
the labor ranks. To Yoshida, MacArthur's naivete was disturbing to the point that it
seemed reforms were "revolution for revolution's sake."21
Among the leftists that Yoshida despised most was Tokuda Kyuichi. head of
the Communist Party who was eager to use Japan's labor unions as a vehicle for
communist revolution. As the economic situation became worse with government
deficits, inflation, and food shortages, the radicalism and unrest in these newly formed
labor unions grew, challenging Yoshida's position and the tolerance of US leadership. 22
By raising protests for more food, higher wages, and other demands during a
time of economic despair, Tokuda hoped to conduct his revolution by rallying Japan's
working class behind him and bringing the business of the nation to a halt. In light of
these plans, he called for a nationwide walkout of all government union members
(approximately 2,600,000) for February 1, 1947. It was not until nine-and-one-half
hours before the scheduled walkout that MacArthur moved to prevent the strike. With
2JDavid Halberstam, The Reckoning (New York, NY: William Morrow and Co.,





the nation's food and gas supplies down to only three days. MacArthur decided to
prohibit the use of "so deadly a social weapon in the present impoverished and
emaciated condition of Japan." Forced to intervene in behalf of Japan's welfare,
MacArthur s liberal attitudes toward labor suddenly adopted a more cautious eye
toward communism.
In 1949, Japan with the help of SCAP began the "Red Purge;" going to the
heart of Japan's far left movement, the Japanese arrested communist labor leaders and
several thousand workers. As these leftist labor unions fell and Japan's domestic
economic policies solidified with the Economic Stabilization Plan and the Dodge Line, a
new more productive relationship formed between workers and Japanese management.
Unlike American labor unions where workers have been organized by occupation or
trade spanning several corporations. Japanese labor unions formed within companies.
Under these circumstances, the union's welfare was intimately linked to the success of
the company, not the entire industry, and therefore close cooperation between union
and management formed with overall success of a particular company as their common
goal. 23
Although the initial years of labor reform under SCAP began with significant
turmoil. Japan's labor force reorganized between 1947 and 1950. and was prepared to
seize the economic benefits of US special procurement orders realized by the Korean
War. Labor's contribution to economic recovery was vital as Japan's economy was
based on labor-intensive light industries and preparing to once again, shift into heavy
industry production. As demand for Japanese goods increased, so did production rates
bringing greater employment opportunities to the developing economy. It was during
these years of increased productivity that lifetime employment became institutionalized
by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry's (MCI) Industrial Rationalization Council.
In addition to the relationship between workers and management realized in an intra-
company union, the concept of lifetime employment contributed to a unique character
in Japan's economy which improved productivity through efficiency.
5. Exports
As a result of two years operation under the Dodge Plan, Japan was prepared
to meet the demands of US procurements in support of the Korean War. US demand
during the Korean War years poured money into Japan's industries bringing greater
productivity, nurturing production capacity toward a status capable of producing
goods for export to other countries. Japanese light-industry exports grew and were
-\JEI. JEI No. 2A, January 15. 19SS, p. 1-3.
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eventually sent to the US and West European markets as Japan's industries regained
strength.
Compelled to relinquish its colonial possessions and the resources they
provided, exports became a vital means of earning hard currencies to purchase scarce
raw materials from foreign sources. Southeast Asia, subjugated by Co-prosperity
policies of the 1930s and early 1940s for its abundant natural resources, was again
looked upon as Japan's solution for raw materials.
United States initiatives made significant contributions to Japan-Southeast
Asian economic relations; policies toward Southeast Asia incorporated concerns for
Japan's economic recovery which formed a triangular relationship among the US,
Japan, and Southeast Asia.24 In July 1952, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff
established the following policy:
United States objectives with respect to Southeast Asia and United States
objectives with respect to Japan would appear to be inseparably related.
Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Stall are of the opinion that Japan's security and
Western orientation are of such importance to the United States position in the
Pacific area that (1) in the implementation of NSC 125 1 and NSC 124 2 the
United States must take into account Japan's dependence upon Southeast Asia
for her economic well-being, and (2) the loss of Southeast Asia to the Western
World would almost inevitably force Japan into an eventual accommodation with
the Communist controlled area in Asia. 2>
US protection of Southeast Asia and Washington's concern for Japan's
economic "well-being," offered Tokyo a golden economic opportunity. Prime Minister
Yoshida Shigeru's businessman's approach to international relations proved to be a
complementary medium as Southeast Asia was still viewed as a region of abundant
Sudo Sueo, "Nanshin, Superdomino, and the Fukuda Doctrine: Stages in
Japan-Southeast Asia Relations," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies: 5 (Fall 1986) 35,
p. 36.
25Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, XIV,
part 2 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1985). p. 1290.
26Sudo Sueo, p. 36.
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natural resources and lucrative markets for Japanese products. 26 As a result. Yoshida
instituted "economic diplomacy" {keizai gaiko) in a November 1952 speech:
With respect to trade promotion, the government shall earn- out economic
diplomacy i.e. conclusion of commercial treaties, broaden and develop trade
opportunities by increasing overseas merchant ships, strengthening export
industries, and utilizing foreign currency reserves. In so doing, we will
particularly develop economic linkages with Southeast Asian countries. 27
While economic diplomacy sought raw materials, particularly from Southeast Asia, it
focussed on the more affluent markets of the US and West Europe for its light-industry
exports. Although Japan's industries were oriented toward light products, technology
from the West later allowed Japan to shift toward an economic strategy based on
heavy and chemical industries.
6. Technology. Research and Development
Research and Development was assigned low priority during this period since
most efforts were directed to achieve immediate economic returns. In spite of this low
priority, the time from 1948 through 1952 were years that research and development
gave birth to Japan's lucrative electronics industry.
While MacArthur and his occupation staff brainstormed Japan's economic
recovery, a section of the Japanese Ministry of Commerce and Industry (members of
the Electrical Basic Research Laboratory) studied technical papers in the Occupation
Headquarters' library in Tokyo 2S Their attentions were drawn to a July 12, 194S Time
magazine article inserted in the Science section entitled "Little Brain Cell." The article
highlighted Bell Laboratories' revolutionary development in the electronics field: the
transistor. The article concluded with a description of Bell Labs' demonstration and a
prediction for the transistor's "practical" application:
Transistors are not in production yet, but Bell scientists, to show what their little
brain cells can do. demonstrated a radio receiver with vacuum tubes replaced by
Transistors. Though not very powerful, it worked fine. Probably the transistor's
first practical assignment will be to amplify currents in telephone circuits, a job
now done by vacuum tubes.'
27Yoshida Shigeru, Kaiso Junen vol. 4 (Tokyo Shincho Sha, 1958) p. 250, as
found in Sudo Sueo, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies vol. 5, No. 3, Fall 86.
28 Sheridan Tatsuno, The Technopolis Strategy: Japan, High Technology, and the
Control of the Twenty-First Century (New York. NY: Prentice Hall Press. 19S6) p. 4.
29
"Little Brain Cell." Time 52: (July 12, 1948) 54.
In late 194S. the MCI team headed by Professor Watanabe Hiroshi of Tokyo
University, formed a study group comprised of individuals from Japan's infant
electronics industry: Kobayashi Masaji and Osafune Hiroe of NEC, Masami Tomono
of Hitachi, Kobayashi Akio of Toshiba, and Yamasaki Jiro and Honda Namio of
Tokyo University. Although the Bell transistor was constructed of germanium, a
scarce resource in Japan, the electronics study group eventually developed a silicon
transistor in 1950. 30
As with most research and development achievements, MCI's success had
implications for future economic development. The significance of transistor research
and development from 1948 to 1952 provided the necessary technology for Japan's
electronics industry which later focussed on producing consumer items for export sales.
US research and developments in this field established the basic technology and in later
years transferred the technology for transistor production and integrated circuits to
Japan's electronics industries.
C. SUMMARY 1945-1952
The security and economic factors of 1948 to 1952 Japan were shaped by
relations with the United States. With US assistance in management and capital,
Japan witnessed the transformation of its starving population from economic liability
to vital resource for light-industry production. Japan's economic and political
foundation was laid under the Yoshida Doctrine, and US security interests in Asia were
responsible for their rapid formation. In the development of demand, capital, labor,
export and technological issues which sought economic recovery, a security partnership
was formed.
It was during these years that the Cold War developed, and as MacArthur's
initial plan to form a Japanese democracy through liberal reforms took shape, Japanese
society swung to the left under the influence of communist labor leaders. Communist
leaders surfaced in labor ranks using Japan's poverty as a vehicle for social instability
and the communist cause of revolution. It became apparent to Japanese and American
leaders that a viable economy was essential to attain democracy, moreover it was
perhaps the best defense against communist influence under Cold War conditions.
With the help of George Kennan, William Draper, and Joseph Dodge, MacArthur's
focus shifted from political reforms to economic stabilization, as recovery became the
fundamental task embraced by both SCAP and Japanese officials.
30Tatsuno. p. 5.
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While Japan brought inflation under control and reorganized labor, the US
injected capital into the recovering economy first to save the Japanese people from
starvation, then to re-start the engines of Japan's industries. As a nation whose
technology survived world war and accelerated with aggressive research and
development, the US was a primary source of advanced technology for Japan's
recovering economy. Although most of these technology transfers were though
outright purchases or licensing agreements by the Japanese, the relationships formed
under these conditions proved to be instrumental in obtaining more advanced
technology in later years which contributed to the rapid economic growth rates of the
late 1950s and sixties.
III. SECURITY AND ECONOMIC FACTORS 1952-1973
As the US occupation came to a close, Japan continued to pursue economic
recovery as its primary national goal. Although recession followed the armistice
agreement between United Nations forces and North Korea, Japan's economy regained
momentum through economic restructuring. Structural adjustments to Japan's
economy facilitated rapid economic growth; industrial sectors promising rapid growth
were given government assistance and fiscal policies were adjusted to increase
disposable income. Both government and private enterprise sought economic growth,
and a cooperative, if not coordinated effort was made to achieve economic goals.
From 1952 to 1973 the international community witnessed Japan's economy evolve
from a developing country to industrial superstate.
By 1973 Japan was a thriving economic power about to experience the
vulnerability of foreign resource dependence. The scope of Japan's economic and
security concerns formed a broad spectrum as its economy became more dependent on
foreign resources and markets. Security interests incorporated economic concerns for
continuous flows of industrial supplies from foreign sources since Japan's prosperity
was fundamentally based on stable overseas supplies of energy, food, minerals and
technology. Although these concerns were expressed by diplomatic means, little else
was done to protect or limit the vulnerabilities of Japan's dependence on foreign
supplies.
A. SECURITY DEVELOPMENT
1. US-Japan Treaty Revision
The international climate upon restoration of Japan's sovereignty continued to
be overshadowed by Cold War; the bi-polar world of communist versus free nations
focussed on activities of superpower nations: the Soviet Union and United States. In
light of these conditions and tensions on the Korean peninsula, the US pressured Japan
to contribute more to its own security, ie. to increase the strength of its defense force.
In support of US desires to enhance defense capabilities, and receive
continued military aid under the MST, Prime Minister Yoshida submitted the Defense
Agency Establishment Bill and the Self Defense Force Bill to the Diet in 1954. Passed
by the Diet, these Bills established the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self- Defense Forces
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under the Defence Agency with responsibility to defend the peace and independence of
Japan. 31
By 1958 Japanese concern over US-Japan Security Treaty arrangements and
rising US-Soviet tensions brought the need for realigned responsibilities. The 1952
Treaty allowed American use of bases in Japan for subsequent military actions in Asia.
The Treaty also authorized the use of US troops to quell large scale internal riots and
disturbances in Japan at the request of the Japanese government. Due to massive
demonstrations by primarily Socialist Party opposition wanting to totally abolish the
arrangement, the Treaty was rammed through a special late night session of the Diet
by Prime Minister Kishi resulting in additional protests and his subsequent resignation.
The renegotiated Treaty of 1960 gave more favorable conditions to the
Japanese. By the new treaty, follow-on military action in Asia from US bases in Japan
and introduction of nuclear weapons into the country required prior consultation with
the Japanese government. A major aspect of the renegotiated MST was Article 5,
which stated:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories
under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and
safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional provisions and processes.
In effect, the Treaty was no longer a mutual arrangement. Although an attack against
either party in Japan was considered an attack against both, an attack against the US
outside of territorial Japan would not necessarily constitute an attack against Japan.
2. Japan's Return to International Affairs
Although Japan was influenced by the effects of Cold War, return of
sovereignty and trade opportunities urged Japan to become better integrated with the
international community. Japan opted to normalize relations with the Soviet Union
rather than focus on differences presented by Soviet occupation of the Southern Kurile
Islands; normalization between the two countries was settled in October 1956 without
a formal peace treaty leaving the Northern Territories issue for later debate. In the
same year Japan was admitied to the United Nations as a full member, a fundamental
goal toward Japan's concept of peaceful international relations.
'Hane. p. 35S.
Measures to return to an international position included efTorts to reconcile
the past, particularly with its Southeast Asian neighbors. These countries became
increasingly important to Japan since they supplied the raw materials essential to
economic recovery. From 1948 to 1952, Japanese imports from its Asian neighbors
increased from 16.6 percent to 31 percent, comprised mainly of materials such as
rubber from Indonesia and Malaysia, lumber, hemp and iron ore from the Philippines,
and tin. also from Malaysia. 32 With encouragement from the United States, these
countries were urged to minimize reparation demands with Japan. The first agreement
was reached with Burma in 1954 and was followed in the next few years by similar
agreements with Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and South Vietnam.
Efforts to normalize relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea
(ROK) were hindered by mutual animosities. Syngmun Rhee, convinced that Japan
was still Korea's principle enemy, served to obstruct progress in negotiations, while
Yoshida's personal dislike for the Korean leader made progress for the two nations
impossible.
Since the nation had not been at war with Japan, the Republic of Korea could
not be treated as one of the belligerent powers and therefore not represented at the San
Francisco Peace Conference in September 1951. Syngmun Rhee however, was eager to
negotiate with Japan in hopes of securing several objectives. Among the most
significant were:
1. Securing the rights of 600.000 Koreans who remained in Japan.
2. Preventing Japan from developing armaments that would threaten the security
of the Korean Peninsula.
3. Secure a territorial agreement for commercial Fishing purposes where both
nations would observe a boundary line drawn midway between the waters of
Korea and Japan. The boundary was initially established by SCAP in October
1945 and was then called the MacArthur Line.
4. The most urgent item on Syngmun Rhee's agenda with Japan however, was a
financial claim against Japan for its occupation of Korea.
Six weeks after the signing of the San Francisco Treaty, ROK and Japanese
officials met on October 20, 1951 to begin negotiations toward normalized relations.
Since Japan was still under SCAP control, US officials urged the ROK to not press for
reparations, knowing that if such an arrangement was reached, US funds would
undoubtedly be required for Japanese reparations. Japanese interests in negotiating
"Office of the Prime Minister, Bureau of Statistics. Japanese Statistical Yearbook
1955.
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with the ROK government centered on repatriation of Koreans in Japan while refusing
into acknowledge remorse for its occupation of the Korean Peninsula. Korean
demands for an apology often provoked Japanese disbelief for Korean ungreatfulness.
In the eyes of these officials. Japanese occupation of the Korean Penninsula
significantly improved a region where its inhabitants were incapable of development
and prosperity. Moreover, they believed Japanese guidance protected Korea, which
would otherwise have been lost to Western influences eager to take advantage of a
helpless region and people. Cruelty imposed during the occupation was rarely a
consideration or reality from the Japanese perspective.
Mutually antagonistic sentiments continued throughout negotiations, and
during the third conference in October 1953. tempers raged as the chief Japanese
negotiator. Kubota Kanichiro. issued statements in defense of Japan's previous rule
over the Korean people. Kubota told Korean negotiators that the independence of
ROK before the signing of a peace treaty was not normal. Additionally, he criticized
the Aliied powers for disposing Japanese property in Korea before the treaty was
signed, and therefore. Japan had the right to claim property in Korea. But perhaps the
most inflammatory statement made by Kubota was that the thirty-six year rule by the
Japanese in Korea was not altogether bad, and in fact, it was helped the Korean people
by bringing advances in such areas as education, health, transportation, and
agriculture. Infuriated, the Korean delegation walked out of the negotiations, not to
meet again for four years, when the Japanese government officially withdrew Kubota 's
statement (December 31. 195").
Even after this incident, damaging statements by Japanese officials were not
uncommon. Statements such as the following, continued to slow the progress of
negotiations:
To the ROK. normalization of ROK-Japan relations is a matter of life or death.
Therefore, the ROK is primarily responsible for bringing about normalization of
relations. (Ohira Masayoshi. Foreign Minister. 1962.)
Ultimately, the emphasis of Japanese diplomacy should be given to close
cooperation with America. In order to do this, the ROK and Formosa will have
to be closely related. If feasible, it would be nice to form the United States of
Japan with ROK and Formosa. (Ono Banboku, Vice-President of the Liberal
Democratic Party, 1958.)
Japan should penetrate into Korea, following the example of Ito Hirobumi (the
Japanese Resident General in Korea who masterminded the annexation of
Korea t. (Ikeda Ilayato. Prime Minister. 1962.)
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Managing Formosa, annexing Korea, and dreaming of cooperation and peace
among the live races in Manchuria--if this was Japanese imperialism, it was an
honorable imperialism. (Shiina Etsusaburo, Foreign Minister, 1962.)
It would have been better had Japan ruled Korea twenty more years. Even
though it was a colony, Japan did good things for Korea. (Takasuki Shinichi,
chief delegate to the seventh ROK-Japan conference, 1965.
)
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During Syngmun Rhee's leadership of the ROK, it was animosities such as these and
his strong sense of nationalistic hate for the Japanese formed since 1905, that plagued
the relationship between the two nations.
In the absence of Japan-ROK progress during negotiations, several decisions
were made by both governments which exacerbated tensions. On January 18. 1952.
Rhee unilaterally proclaimed a boundary which extended 60 miles from Korea's shores
and established a policy to capture Japanese vessels violating the proclamation.
Viewed by the Japanese as an act of war, it served only to distance the two Asian
nations. In March 1959, the Japanese cabinet under Prime Minister Kishi allowed
voluntary repatriation of Korean residents to North Korea. Still technically at war
with this northern neighbor, Syngmun Rhee viewed the decision as collusion with the
enemy. It was not until Rhee finally left office in April 1960 that Japan-ROK relations
had an opportunity to reverse its course, although progress toward normalization
continued to be extremely slow.
Korea's subsequent leaders. Chang Myun and Park Chung-Hee, had both
worked under the Japanese, the former as a Catholic school principal and latter as a
graduate of the Manchukuo and Japanese military academies and a first lieutenant in
the Japanese army. 34 The US also played a role in bringing the two nations closer
together as the American of economic aid to Korea shrank and the United States was
increasingly preoccupied with growing tensions in Indochina during the early 1960.
Cognizant of their nation's need for economic assistance, Rhee's successors
looked to Japan more as a model than an enemy. Although US economic aid reached
a high of S368.8 million in 1957, US aid to the ROK dropped to S219 million in 1959,
regaining a little in 1960 to S245.2 million. As a result of deficit trade accounts and
slower growth, the US underwent fiscal austerity to stem growing budget deficits and
Kwan Bong Kim, The Korea-Japan treaty Crisis and the Instability of the
Korean Political System (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 48-9.
Chong-Sik Lee, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension (Stanford, CA:
Hoover Institute Press, 1985), p. 45.
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called on its allies in Europe and Japan to help contribute to developing nations.
Japan's economic recovery was apparent to Korea and the potential of additional aid.
even if from Japan, was attractive to Korean leaders.
Economic necessities alone did not drive America's interest to see the ROK
and Japan regain normal relations. Rising communist influences and tensions in
Southeast Asia presented an obvious threat to the US allies still consumed with
historical differences. John M. Allison, former assistant secretary of state for Far
Eastern affairs and ambassador to Tokyo between 1953 and 1957 articulated US
concerns as he wrote:
...we must face up to the fact that Korea is a small nation surrounded by three
powerful neighbors, only one of which. Japan, was friendly to the free world, and
it is therefore essential that Korea realize that its safety and future progress, as
well as that of the West, depends upon the renewal of friendly relations with
Japan, and this can only come about through compromise and cooperation on
both sides. 33
America's security interests in Korea are in part, hinged to its most important
ally in Asia: Japan. An unstable Republic of Korea, weak and incapable of defending
itself from the North, would be detrimental to Japan's security posture, forcing greater
defense outlays with adverse effects on Japan's economy. 36
Although the benefits of a speedy Korea-Japan normalization process were
apparent to US officials, progress toward this goal was hampered by domestic political
difficulties in both countries. In 1960, Kishi's treatment of the renegotiated MST
resulted in his resignation, causing his successor, Ikeda Hayato, to approach the issue
of normalization with caution not to increase political upheaval. A year later, rising
domestic political pressure confronted Chang Myun, resulting in a successful coup led
by Park Chung-Hee. Opposition parties in both countries maintained pressure on their
incumbent leaders in several issues, making progress toward normalization difficult.
Continued encouragement by the US helped bring the two American allies
together and as domestic political turbulence somewhat subsided (although never
completely removed), the leaders were better able to cooperate and compromise during
their negotiations. The two countries made their first major step toward normalization
35John M. Allison. Ambassador From the Prairie or Allison Wonderland (New
York. NY: 1973), p. 259 as found in Chong-sik Lee, p. 44.
36James W. Morley. Japan and Korea: America's Allies in the Pacific (New York.
NY: Walker and Co.. 1965). p. 52-66. These facts were well appreciated by Japanese
leaders.
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after reaching an agreement on the Treaty on Basic Relations. It was during the
process of negotiating this Treaty that Korean desires for an official Japanese apology
were finally met. On February 17, 1965. as Shiina Etsusahuro arrived in Seoul to
initial a tentative draft of the Treaty on Basic Relations, he uttered the first official
words toward an apology of Japan's past as he said: "I . . . really regret that an
unfortunate period existed in the long history of the two nations, and deeply reflect on
such a past."37 Japan, according to Article III of the Treaty, recognized the Republic
of Korea as the "only lawful government in Korea as specified in the Resolution 195
(III) of the UN General Assembly." While the ROK government hoped to be the only
legitimate and sovereign government of all Korea, the second part of this Article
included a proviso which, in effect, limited recognition of the ROK as the government
of South Korea. Although this understanding left room for later tensions between
Japan and the ROK, the cooperative, compromising spirit of these negotiations
enabled the two nations to make gains on a grander scale. On April 3, 1965. Korean
negotiators, headed by Foreign Minister Yi Tong-won, and the Japanese, headed by
Foreign Minister Shiina Etsusaburo, reached agreements satisfying both governments
which eventually led to normalized relations between the two governments.
Negotiators agreed:
1. The Rhee Line was to be replaced by a twelve-mile fishing zone.
2. To satisfy property claims by Korea, Japan was to provide S45 million over a
ten year period. In addition to a S300 million grant of Japanese products and
labor toward Korean economic development, also over a ten year period. Japan
agreed to provide S200 million in credit toward Official Development Assistance
loans and S300 million in credit toward commercial loans.
3. Japan agreed to return several Korean books and art objects of cultural and
historical value.
4. Koreans residing in Japan prior to August 1945 and their descendents were to
be granted permanent resident status.
On June 22 the Treaty on Basic Relations and four agreements were signed by the two
countries and active bilateral economic relations soon followed. In spite of the fact
these two nations were able to put their historical differences aside, they were not
forgotten and a cautious friendship developed between the two Asian allies of the
United States. As during the fourteen years prior to formal normalization, economic
factors were significant in Japan-Korean relations after 1965. In the wake of
'Kim, p. 50.
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normalization, with the help of Japanese assets, Korea's economy rocketed bringing
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Figure 3.1 Republic of Korea-GNP: 1960-1973.
3. Sino - Japanese Rapprochement
On March 5, 1953, Joseph Stalin died bringing to an end the leadership which
brought the Soviet Union world power and the apparent basis of close relations with
the People's Republic of China known as the Sino-Soviet honeymoon. In his place, a
cantankerou-s and irascible Nikita Khruschev became Party Chairman, denouncing the
former Soviet leader's practices and policies. The Sino-Soviet split which began with
Khruschev's de-Stahnization speech in 1956, served to facilitate Japan's normalization
with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in later years. Although Japan's formal
ties were with the Republic of China (ROC) government on Taiwan (which served
Japan's economic interests well), political and economic merits of normalization with
the PRC were considerable.
At the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, Japan had hoped to maintain an
ambiguous position regarding the two-China issue. John Foster Dulles, architect of
the Treaty, became concerned that Japan's ambiguity vis a vis the China issue would
preclude passage of the peace treaty in Congress, and therefore, pressured Prime
Minister Yoshida to normalize with the ROC government. The ROC government in
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return, acknowledged the peace treaty and declined reparation payments from Tokyo.
Although considerable trade developed between Japan and the ROC. this relationship
made it difficult if not impossible, for the Japanese government to conduct its
economic diplomacy with the PRC government. PRC rhetoric of the US-Japan
Security Treaty and development of Japan's Self-Defense Forces, made relations even
more difficult as it condemned Japan as a re-emerging military threat to Asia.
In spite of this rhetoric, cyclical economic relations took place as the PRC
entered its economically unstable periods. Frustrated with the performance of a Soviet
styled planned economy, China's leaders embarked on a policy to attain economic
parity with the advanced nations of the world. During the second session of the
Eighth Party Congress in May 1958, China's leaders announced that the Great Leap
Forward will force the nation to press "ahead consistently to achieve greater, faster,
better and more economic results." While these goals were necessary for China's well-
being, the plans to affect them were unrealistic as priority rested in the agricultural
sectors and national leaders entrusted peasant farmers with execution of the nation's
goals. The Great Leap Forward was a failure, however China was to experience yet
another national movement only to end in chaos: The Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution beginning in 1966.
The Cultural Revolution, again led by Mao Zedong, his wife Jiang Qing. Lin
Biao, and Chen Boda, was in effect a call for creative study and application of Mao's
thought. The movement was also a purge of the existing bureaucracy on a grand scale
with hopes of returning control to a more popularly-based system, led personally by
Mao. Although politically and culturally motivated, turbulence of such magnitude
naturally had extreme negative effects on the nation's economy which Japanese
businesses approached with caution and often avoided completely.
Japanese businesses, through commercial trade, prospered between these
periods of political upheaval and by 1970, the momentum for closer PRC-Japan was in
full swing as private business and political groups drew pressure on the Japanese
government for normalization with the PRC. The Dietmen's League for Promoting
Restoration of Japan-China Diplomatic Relations, comprised of business leaders and
political groups, was instrumental in challenging Prime Minister Sato's anti-PRC
position and initiated a change in direction for Japan's foreign policy vis a vis the PRC.
Even before Nixon's July 1971 announcement that Special Assistant Henry Kissinger
made a secret visit to Beijing, the domestic momentum in Japan was overwhelmingly in
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support of normalized relations with the PRC. The Nixon shock made this pressure so
pervasive that no responsible Japanese leader could afford to ignore it. 38 In September
1972, a Joint Statement signed by Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Zhou Enlai
established diplomatic relations between the PRC and Japan giving promise to greater
economic, political and cultural exchange.
B. ECONOMIC FACTORS
Integration into international affairs and economic growth were twin interests in
Japan from 1952 to 1973. The incipient years of this period were characterized by
continued economic recover}- which temporarily lapsed with the decline of US military
procurements after the Korean War. Japan's re-emergence to the international
economy was that of a developing country seeking economic assistance and
cooperation. Through greater economic cooperation, Japan hoped trade would
stimulate its domestic production and bring continued growth.
In the mid-1950s Japan restructured its economic system to achieve greater
growth and address the problem of growing current account deficits. The new
economic strategy focussed on the demand of affluent-industrialized countries and
Japan's domestic demand. The restructuring was based on the premise that as
individual incomes rise, their demand for light-industry goods (such as food and
textiles) changes very little, however demand for heavy-industry goods (products such
as appliances and automobiles) increases proportionally. 39 Economic planners
concluded that as Japanese current account deficits grew, the government could curtail
domestic demand and accelerate exports. According to this strategy, industrial
production would continue throughout all phases of business cycles. To achieve
continued growth based on income elasticity of demands, Japan restructured its
economy to one based on heavy industries, a change contrary to its comparative
advantage in low-cost and abundant labor.
The Comprehensive Policy for Economic Expansion {Keizai Kakudai Sogo
Seisaku Yogo) and Outline of the New International Trade and Industry Policy (Shin
Tsusho Sang\o Seisaku Taiko) adopted by the cabinet in September and October 1954,
established Japan's new economic focus. Designed by Aichi Kiichi, Minister of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) during the Yoshida government, and
38Chae-Jin Lee, China and Japan: New Economic Diplomacy (Stanford, CA:
Hoover Institute Press. 19S-4), p. S-9.
39Johnson. p. 228.
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implemented by his successor Ishibashi Tanzan of the Hatoyama cabinet, the policy
aimed to achieve economic growth by the following means:
1. Increase export volume by reducing costs.
2. Enlarging production to affect economies of scale, thereby reducing production
costs and prices for export goods.
3. Utilize domestic demand to stimulate the economy and enlarge industrial
production.
The new economic plan included efforts to restore economic ties with Southeast Asia
for natural resources, tax reform to stimulate domestic demand, and programs to
facilitate import substitution to reduce current account deficits.
With increased industrialization and economic growth. Japan enhanced its
position in international economic organizations and world affairs. In 1953 Japan
received its first International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan as a developing country. As
economic growth rose at a 10 percent average, the nature of Japan's participation took
on a new form; in 1961 Japan became member of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). and thereby became an official contributor to developing countries. Five
years later in 1966, Japan became a member of the OECD and the Asian Development
Bank (ADB).
Japan's economic successes were evident in its standard of living, accumulation
of capital, industrial production, volume of trade, sophistication in technology and
other economic aspects characterized in the aggregate statistic of Gross National
Product (GXP) growth. In addition to these achievements, the 1964 Olympics in
Tokyo proved to be a watershed event in terms of the Japanese self-image. Because of
their smooth and successful execution of that event, the Japanese convinced themselves
that Japan was indeed an advanced nation. Moreover, "to the self-conscious surprise
of the Japanese, foreign visitors seemed impressed by modern Japan."40
Economic success through industrialization and international commerce brought
a new spectrum of security challenges to a nation rich in labor and managerial skills,
however poor in mineral resources. Japan's growing industrial-based economy became
more dependent on foreign energy, food, and raw materials; continuous flows of these
commodities were vital to Japan's national interests which did not become fully
apparent until the Arab oil embargo of late 1973.
Leonard II. Lynn, "Japanese Technology at a Turning Point," Current History
84 (December 19S5): 506, p. 432.
The following sections of this chapter show the rapidly expanding nature of
Japan's domestic demand, capital formation and flows, exports, and technology. The
effects of this economic expansion will be seen in economic growth, primarily GXP and
industry; Japan's contribution to developing countries through Official Development
Assistance (ODA) and private capital flows; dependence on foreign energy sources; and
dependence on foreign sources for food.
1. Demand
a. Domestic Demand in Support of Growth
Economic restructuring to heavy industries produced consumer goods in a
country weary of hardships imposed by war and economic recovery. Industries
produced consumer goods that were common in practically even- household. Japan's
industrial base of the early 1960s was evident in Japanese homes as practically every
household demanded the "three sacred treasures": televisions, washing machines, and
refrigerators. As economic development progressed, the three sacred treasures became
the "three C's" of the late 1960s: cars, coolers, and color televisions. 41
Domestic demand not only elevated the standard of living through more
sophisticated products, it served to expand heavy industry sectors and contribute to
overall growth. With greater domestic demand, industries expanded to facilitate
economies of scale and produce goods at lower costs. Although Japan's exports were
vital to the economy, it was Japan's domestic demand from 1960 through 1973 that
facilitated economic growth. Figure 3.2 indicates this as it compares the growth rates
of domestic demand and exports to GXP; while domestic demand's growth paralleled
that of GXP. exports grew at an unstable rate contributing less to GXP growth in
1963, 1967, and I 1)
-
:.
b. Demand for Energy
As Japan's economy became more heavy and chemical-industry oriented
through the 1960s and 1970s, the nation became more dependent on foreign energy
supplies. Annual crude petroleum imports grew from 31,116 million kiloliters in 1960
to 83,280 million kiloliters in 1965, an average annual increase of over 33 percent. By
the close of fiscal year 1973, crude oil imports grew to 286,670 kilo liters. While both
economic growth and overall energy requirements in 1973 increased six times from the





































































By 1973 Japan's energy consumption had increased over 600 percent from
1952. Primary energy,42 or the sum of several sources of energy producing means to
include hydroelectric power, coal, petroleum and natural gas (excluding minor fuels
such as peat, shale, and fuehvood) had evolved to meet Japan's energy demands. In
1953. domestic energy assets contributed much to Japan's coal-fueled economy as
domestic coal production comprised over 46 percent of the total primary energy
supply, while petroleum products contributed only 17 percent and only 23 percent of
Japan's energy needs were from foreign sources (see Table 2). By 1973, primary energy-
composition was drastically changed as domestic coal supplied only 3.8 percent of
primary energy supplies, petroleum products and crude contributed 77.6 percent. As a
result. S9.9 percent of Japan's primary energy supplies were from foreign sources.
Japan's petroleum based industry now depended heavily on the Middle East as 80
percent of all imported crude came from the Middle East, 43 percent from Arab oil-
exporting countries and 37 percent from Iran alone.4 Although the economic policies
implemented in 1954 under the Yoshida government had great success in expanding
industrial production, exports, and capital flows, Japan's vulnerability in energy
dependence which evolved under these policies became apparent as the petroleum
supplies which fueled this economic miracle were drastically reduced by the Arab-oil
embargo of November 1973.
c. Demands for Food
Japan's prosperity and rising income levels had an effect on the nation's
demand for food as well as energy. Although quantitative increases are noted in
individual diet, qualitative changes in food demand were even more significant to
Japan's economic outlook as consumption of more nutritious foodstuffs required more
sophisticated agricultural assets. The nature of Japan's food consumption changed
with its growing prosperity and population. As Japan evolved from a developing to
industrial nation, caloric intake and diet composition became more diversified. Caloric
intake increased while levels of proteins and fats assumed greater portions of the total
diet (see Table 3).44 The Japanese diet included larger quantities of domestically
produced meat which raised the demand of imported feed grains. Rice, the national
42CIA. Handbook of Economic Statistics - 1986 (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, September 1986), p. 130.
430kita Saburo. "Natural Resource Dependency and Japanese Foreign Policy,"
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staple food, reached self-sufficiency due to government subsidies of rice production
while the Japanese markets for meat were protected from foreign suppliers. As the
demand for higher quality diets increased, feed grain imports of maize and sorghum
grew proportionally.
The limitations of Japan's topography and dietary' improvements compelled
Japan to increase its foreign dependence on agricultural commodities. Total import
volumes of major agricultural commodities, wheat, soybeans, maize and sorghum
amounted to 18.1 million tons in 1973. Dependence on these commodities rested
primarily with the US: the American share of Japanese imports was 67 percent for
wheat, SS percent for soybeans, 92 percent for maize and 75 percent for sorghum.45
As Japan became more prosperous, demand for foreign raw materials and
several agricultural products increased. Although prosperity improved the standard of
living. Japan's dependence on overseas sources also grew in variety and quantity.
TABLE 3


















d. Demand as a Factor in Japan's Security Affairs
During the years that followed conclusion of the US-Japan Mutual Security
Treaty. Japan's national objectives focussed on economic growth as outlined in its
Comprehensive Policy for Economic Expansion and the New International Trade and
Industry Policy of 1954. Still too poor and underdeveloped to provide for its own
-Ibul, p. 717.
defense, security issues, in the minds of most Japanese, were the responsibility of the
United States.
With national efforts focussed on economic growth, Japan viewed the Cold
War environment and many security issues as obstructions and sometimes nuisances to
its national goals. The bi-polar world formed by the nuclear superpowers seemed too
confining to a nation eager to expand international relations and trade. Although the
MST linked Japan with the Western half of this bi-polar split, Japan, with its sense of
economic diplomacy hoped to satisfy its domestic demands for natural minerals and
petroleum supplies from the most economic suppliers.
This was especially evident in relations with the Soviet Union as many
Japanese viewed the communist nation as a potential supplier for its resource needs.
In spite of differences over the northern territories, absence of a peace treaty, and the
prevailing Cold War environment, Japanese interest in Soviet resources overruled
American cautions of dealing with the adversary nation as Japanese and Soviet officials
initiated negotiations for trade. Throughout the sixties and seventies, most Japanese
viewed the Soviet Union in a more favorable light than the United States. Afterall. the
Soviet Union was also an Asian nation heavily endowed with natural resources; had
advanced technology demonstrated by sending the first rocket into space; and, perhaps
most important, a vast population with export market potential. Although feu-
agreements were reached between the Soviets and Japan, these negotiations illustrate
Japan's attitudes toward security issues prior to 1973 and the willingness to exercise
economic relations in spite of political and ideological differences potentially
detrimental to security matters.
The shift to heavy and chemical industries facilitated by increasing domestic
demand accelerated economic growth and its economic integration in global affairs. As
the economy continued to accelerate, international relations expanded to ensure a
constant supply of resources and to seek additional export markets. Southeast Asia
was an integral aspect of Japan's economy for several natural resources such as rubber,
tin, palm oil, fruits and forestry products. The Arab states in the Middle East had an
increasing role in Japan's economy as crude petroleum demands not only increased in
volume, but also formed a greater portion of primary energy supplies. Although Japan
relied heavily on the US for several products, particularly agriculture, dependence on
its security partner formed little cause for concern until the Nixon "soybean shock"
which, as its name indicates, caught most Japanese by surprise.
Demand for foreign commodities from 1952 to 1973 was a manifestation of
Japan's rapid growth and industrialization. While relations with Southeast Asian
nations were often strained due to lingering suspicions from the Pacific War and
complaints for greater economic assistance, economic demands formed a symbiotic
relationship among these Asian neighbors. Although these relations can be best
characterized as ambivalent in political terms, Japan's relations with Southeast Asian
countries experienced relatively uninterrupted flows of vital natural resources. As
Southeast Asia provided Japan with supplies for its growing economy, the Soviet
Union with its vast quantities of untapped natural resources and close proximity to
Japan was a potential supplier of energy and minerals that never fully came to fruition.
(1) The Soviet Union. Despite Japan's policy of nurturing economic
relations through economic diplomacy, minimal advances in Tokyo-Moscow relations
were made in exercising comparative advantages of Soviet raw materials and Japanese
industry. The Soviet Union had been supplying oil to Japan since 1958, however little
progress was made on Soviet desires for Japanese assistance in the development of
Eastern Siberia. Initial elTorts to expand energy sources into the Soviet Union were led
by Japanese businesses in 1962, however US Cold War sensitivities were easily offended
which compelled Tokyo to block business hopes of joint development plans. Proof of
this came in December, 1962. when the Idemitsu Industrial Company, which was
importing approximately 30 percent of its oil from the USSR, was suddenly notified by
the US Department of Defense that procurement of jet fuel from the firm would be
discontinued because the oil was red.46
Business frustrations vis a vis Cold War political obstructions were
echoed by Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Chairman of Toyo Can-Manufacturing Company
and former minister of Mill:
As long as the Cold War continues, the US will not welcome Japan establishing
close relations with either the USSR or the PRC. The US does not have to
promote trade with these countries because it can meet all its demands on its
own. Japan, however, cannot survive without trade. ..It is therefore necessary for
Japan to explain its stand fully to the US and gain their understanding for
establishing trade relations with these two Communist countries.47
46\Vythe E. Braden, "Anatomy of Failure: Japan-USSR Negotiations of Siberian
Oil Development," The Tletcher Torum 5 (Winter 1981): 1, p. 77.
4 Quoted from a dialogue between Takasaki Tatsunosuke and Kitamura
Tokutaro. President of the Japan-Soviet-East Europe Trade Association in "No Need
tc Dread Trade with the USSR and China," Jiisugyo no Nippon 1 February 1962. as
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Japanese interests for economic cooperation with the Soviets re-
emerged in the mid-1960's as Japan suffered an economic slow-down and sought new
export markets. The changing international climate evident in the widening Sino-
Soviet split offered Japan more freedom in international commerce. Although both
China and the Soviet Union were potential export markets, the political instability and
economic turmoil of the Cultural Revolution in China made the Soviet Union a more
attractive market in the mid-1960's. Additionally, Moscow's desires to develop the
virtually untapped resources in Siberia served to encourage Japanese investments.
As the international climate changed with growing Sino-Soviet
differences, Japanese businesses made progress in negotiations with the Soviets. In
September 1965, the Japan-Soviet Joint Economic Cooperation Committee (JSJECC)
was established with the help of Keidanren and the Xihon Shoko Kaigasho (Japan
Chamber of Commerce). The JSJECC institutionalize annual meetings in pursuit of
joint Siberian development, the first of which was held at Tokyo in 1966.
From 1966 to 1973, several projects were proposed to excavate energy
resources from Siberia, however little progress was made toward joint development.
Among the proposed joint development projects were: the Tyumen to Nakhodka oil
pipeline construction, expansion of Nakhodka and other Siberian seaports, mining of
Udokan copper deposites, Siberian timber development along the Amur River, and
development of Sakhalin natural gas and coal excavation in Yakutsk. Of the proposed
projects, only Siberian timber development was realized as a joint Japan-Soviet project.
The other proposals failed as disagreements formed in:
1. Share of capital to be provided by Japan
2. Terms of deferred payment to be made by the Soviets
3. Insufficient quantities of mineral resources offered by the Soviets as a return on
Japanese investments
4. Japanese government's desire to re-open negotiations on the disputed Northern
Territories issue
Japan's demand for energy and mineral resources did not play a
significant role in improving relations with the Soviet Union. Although Japan was a
welcomed partner in joint Siberian development, the differences listed above
overwhelmed Japanese and Soviet negotiators resulting in little progress and much
frustration.
found in Braden, p. 77.
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In the wake of Okinawa's return to Japanese sovereignty, the Soviet
occupied northern territories became a growing emotional issue for the Japanese.
Domestic concerns over the Soviet occupation of Shikotan, Kunashiri, Etorofu, and
the Habumais surfaced above Siberian joint development in spite of Japan's doctrine of
economic diplomacy. In a politically unpopular decision during a meeting with
Secretary Brezhnev in January 1973, Prime Minister Tanaka conceded that the
northern territory issue was separate from the economic concerns of East Siberian joint
development. Tanaka overruled the standing Liberal Democratic Party position
demanding a quid pro quo arrangement: return of the northern territories for Japanese
cooperation in joint Siberian development. But even Tanaka's dramatic break from the
LDP position failed to reach an agreement with the Soviets. After Tanaka's statement,
Soviet negotiators altered their 1972 proposal of supplying 125 million tons of Tyumen
oil by 1975 and 130 to 250 million tons by 1980, in return for SI billion of Japanese
credits. The revised postion offered an annual supply of 25 million tons, while arguing
more Japanese credits were necessary due to cost increases manifested by inflation and
exchange rate fluctuations.
In March 1974. the JSJECC Directors meeting convened in Moscow
where Soviet representatives estimated the new cost of Siberian development to be
approximately S5 billion. Discussions included the possibility of US participation in
light of rising costs and a US Trade Bill proposed by the Nixon administration which
extended most favored nation status to the Soviet Union. Although the Bill and
extension of US credits were later blocked by Congress, Soviet initiatives made
Japanese and US consideration of the Tyumen oil project a moot concern. On the last
day of the Moscow meeting, to the surprise of Japanese directors, Kosygin announced
cancellation of the pipeline project and the new Soviet plan to build the Baikal-Amur
Mainline as Siberia's multi-purpose transport system and new center piece for Siberian
development.
Japan's attempts to participate in Siberian development hoped to
diversify foreign energy sources and nurture an export market in the Soviet Union.
Neither of these goals came to fruition. Relations between the Soviet Union and
Japan remained cool and by November 1973, Japan's dependence on the Middle East
oil supplies reached its peak.
(2) Foreign Oil Suppliers in the Middle East. The relationships among
domestic demand, capital formation, exports and foreign energy imports were key
ingredients to Japan's rapid economic growth. Each factor represented a fundamental
aspect of Japan's economic miracle.
In November 1973. the Arab oil-producing nations of the Middle East
announced that oil supplies to non-Arab nations would be cut be 25 percent based on
September 1973 supply levels. In the United States, Arab oil represented 12 percent of
the total oil supplies and only two percent of the nation's primary energy requirement.
Although several inconveniences resulted, the economic significance of Arab oil was
marginal.48 The situation in Japan however, was much more severe.
Since oil provided 74.6 percent of the primary energy requirement of
which over 99 percent was from foreign sources, the Arab-imposed oil reduction
represented a cut of 10 percent of Japan's primary energy supplies (see Table 2). In
terms of maintaining economic growth as a national interest, the Arab reduction was a
significant blow to the nation. A drop in oil supplies presumed reductions in industrial
production, exports, domestic demand, capital and employment. In short, the
Japanese translation of "Arab oil reductions" meant negative economic growth,
something not experienced since the early post-war years.
Since the US occupation, Japan accepted several risks to achieve
economic recovery, while maintaining the positive momentum which brought
international recognition. Until the 1973 Arab oil embargo. Japan's growing demand
for foreign energy supplies represented a major aspect of its economic risk-taking which
was left largely unguarded. While accepting this risk and providing relatively no
security, Japan endured the vulnerability of foreign pressures on its economic demands.
As Japan's economy grew, so did the nature of its domestic demand and dependence in
the international economy. As in July 1941 when the US imposed its oil embargo,
Japan's economy outpaced its sense of security for economic national interests in the
postwar years until 1973.
2. Capital
Capital assets rapidly accumulated between 1952 and 1973, and as private
capital increased, much of it was reinvested which fueled the ever growing economy.
This cycle of capital flows operated not only in the domestic arena, but also
throughout Asia as most Japanese viewed capital flows overseas as investments to




Capital assets were used to develop economic growth both domestically and
overseas. Private savings contributed heavily to domestic gross capital formation
which provided capital assets for industrial investments. Economic aid and private
overseas investments also contributed to Japan's prosperity by maintaining favorable
economic links with Japan's trade partners.
a. Domestic Capital
Although several factors of prosperity contributed to capital accumulation,
private savings were largely responsible for its rapid growth. The magnitude of
Japanese private savings can be realized when compared to that of the United States.
Gross private savings in Japan and the United States were similar in the
early postwar years; both countries maintained approximately 16.5 percent from 1952
through 1954. Since then. Japan's private savings rate climbed to over 31 percent in
1971. From 1961 through 1971 Japan's private savings rate averaged 2S.8 percent; the
US average during the same period was 15.8 percent.49 Several factors were responsible
for the Japanese propensity to save, some of which were:
• The Japanese bonus system, paid twice a year, comprised a large portion of
wage and salary income. This system encouraged households to save for future
expenditures as bonus payments were received.
• The Japanese government offered meager social security benefits which also
contributed to a willingness on the part of Japanese to save for future
retirement.
• A shortage of liquid assets relative to rapidly rising income encouraged
Japanese workers to save for unexpected cash requirements.
• The high cost of housing precipitated by the price of land is perhaps the most
significant force which compelled the Japanese to save at high levels.
Averaging 100 million people from 1960 to 1973, Japan had a population half
the size of the United States' living in an area only 4 percent as large. Nearly
three-fourths of the country is mountainous which further limits the availability
of land for housing, forcing housing costs even higher. This financial burden
bore by all Japanese has had no prospect of resolve, leaving few alternatives for
most workers but to save their earnings for housing requirements, particularly
for retirement.
Government fiscal policies have also contributed to Japan's propensity to
save as well as rapidly growing capital formation. To spur domestic demand and
increase disposable income, the Finance Ministry under Ikeda Hayato called for tax
reforms to inject more money into the economy. According to Ikeda, "a 100 billion
yen tax cut is a 100 billion yen of aid."50 The reforms were implemented in the 1957
49Chung. p. 69.
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fiscal budget which resulted in the economic boom which lasted from July 195S to
December 1961, during which Ikeda became Prime Minister and launched his
ambitious "income-doubling plan."
Savings played a key role in Japan's rapid economic growth. Large
amounts of household savings provided low-cost capital to industry, allowing business
investment to increase at a 14.4 percent annual real rate over the 1952-73 period. By
maintaining high savings rates, Japanese industries and the overall economy expanded
without heavy reliance on foreign capital. 51 Capital formation contributed to Japan's
goal of continued economic growth, however it also brought strength to economic
diplomacy by bolstering its ability to influence other nations through economic means.
b. Economic Cooperation and Aid
Economic Cooperation (Keizai Kyoryoku) became the vague and all-
encompassing term used by MITI, the MFA, and the MOF for foreign economic
policy formulation. MITI sought to develop export markets for its interests in industry
and trade, while the MFA hoped to improve overseas relations with resource-rich
developing nations, particularly in Southeast Asia. The MOF played the role of fiscal
watchdog attempting to minimize government expenditures and encourage private
capital flows to overseas nations through tax incentives.
Economic policies of the postwar years attempted to coordinate domestic
and international strategies for economic growth. As domestic demand formed
economies of scale, economic cooperation in foreign policy addressed the strategic
concerns necessary for Japan's economic growth. Economic cooperation aimed to
nurture markets for Japanese exports and maintain continuous flows of foreign raw
materials for its industries through development planning, extension of credits, overseas
investments, procurement of resources and long term import policies for food and raw
materials.- 2
The first foreign policy review published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in 1957 acknowledged the significance of Asia to these goals by stating "Our own
development is not assisted by an Asia without peace, progress and prosperity."
Southeast Asia was a fundamental source for food and raw materials, as well as
"Johnson, p. 16.
51Japan Economic Institute (JEI), JEI Report No. 17A, May 1. 1987, p. 4.
-"Alan Rix, Japan's Economic Aid (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p.
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markets for Japanese exports. 53 Japan's prosperity was therefore directly related to the
development of its Southeast Asian neighbors.
TABLE 4
REPARATION PAYMENTS AND TERMS
Country Reparation Terms Beginning
Payments (in years)
Burma S340 million 10 1955
Philippines 550 10 1956
Indonesia 223 12 1958
South Vietnam 390 5 I960
Although reparations could hardly be considered economic aid, payments
to redress Japan's actions taken under the Greater East Asia Policy established
economic relationships which were later maintained through economic cooperation.
Southeast Asia comprised the mainstay of Japan's reparation recipients (see Table 4),
however economic aid arrangements were also concluded with a number of countries
that elected to waive reparation rights, including South Korea, Laos, Cambodia,
Singapore, and Micronesia. 54 Since reparation agreements were tied to procurement in
Japan they formed markets with steady demands for Japanese goods and spare parts.
Conversely, reparation payments contributed to economic stability and development in
these countries. The success of reparation agreements established a geographical bias
of official aid toward Southeast Asia as economic cooperation evolved into its next
stage.
5:>
Lacking military power, the 1960s and seventies proved to be a period
when economic cooperation developed from its infant stages based on reparation
payment relationships, to one based on private overseas capital investments. Official
Development Assistance, and technical aid flows to bolster its global influence. With
the economic growth that rocketed during sixties and seventies came capital assets
which, in developing nations, proved influential toward maintaining economic
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A variety of means were used to finance aid flows to developing countries,
the primary of which were: Official Development Assistance (ODA), of which
technical assistance is included; private flows; and other official flows (OOF). 56 Official
Development Assistance funds were distributed by the government and are comprised
of both grants and loans. Only nations officially recognized as developing and less
developed countries by the DAC are qualified for these development funds. Private
flows however, are overseas investments from private sources which Japan's Ministry
of Finance has encouraged with the use of tax incentives. While the government
supports its economic cooperation policy through such incentives, it benefits by not
having to provide government revenues. Finally, OOFs are bilateral transactions which
are primarily used to facilitate exports. They include credits issued by the Japanese
Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF).
Distribution of funds during this period show that Japan's economic aid
program was tied to its plan for continued economic growth and prosperity. By
contributing to the development of nations important to Japan's own economy, Japan
hoped to ensure constant flows of natural resources for its industries.
The distribution of Japan's ODA funds illustrates its focus on regional
concerns. As the predominant economy in Asia, practically all of Japan's ODA
contributions went to Asian countries, most of which to Southeast Asia. In 1963. 93.7
percent of these funds were distributed to Asia, of which 93 percent went to Southeast
Asia. Less than one percent reached countries in the Middle East. Tokyo maintained
its perspective of aid and the importance of regional economic affairs until the oil
embargo of 1973 when distributions to Asia were 88.1 percent of total ODA funds
while the Middle East received only .1 percent. OOF and private resources, the brunt
of Japan's economic assistance, were more diversified as only 30.4 percent of these
funds went to Asia, and 53.4 percent to Central and South America. Only 3.2 percent
of these resources however, went to the oil-supplying Middle East region (see Table 5)
Japan's economic assistance and financial flows from 1952 to 1973 were
instruments of its economic diplomacy. When Japan's economy began to surge ahead
in the 1960s, Japan's private businesses were already linked into other Asian
economies through overseas investments of private enterprises and OOF export credits.
Using first reparations and later financial flows in ODA, OOF and private funds,
Japan's policy goals aimed to coordinate its economic relations to facilitate its own
bThe category of OOF was first introduced in the DAC in 19
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TABLE 6
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL FLOWS FROM
JAPAN TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(in percent)
Year Asia SE Near/Mid Cen/South
Total Asia East Africa America Europe Other
1963 98.7 93.0
Official Development Assistance
0.3 0.3 0.4 nee 0.3
1965 9S.1 90.1 0.2 0.6 0.6 D.I 0.2
1967 97.6 71.5 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.6
1971 98.4 51.2 0.9 3.0 -2.6 -0.2 0.5
1973 SS.l 53.8 0.1 2.6 4.6 2.0 1.3
OOF and Private Flov>s
196? 33.5 22.
S
14.1 29.1 13.5 8.7 1.0
1965 32.3 26.4 3.2 37.6 17.0 9.9 0.1
1967 33.8 5.6 14.8 42.7 9.7 -1.0 nea.
1971 52.3 11.8 7.3 10.5 23.2 4.2 2.6
s
1973 30.4 15.8 3.2 8.5
Total Flov^s
53.4 3.0 1.4
1963 56.0 34.4 8.0 16.4 10.3 4.9 4.4
1965 53 A 27.8 1.9 22.4 13.4 5.9 2.9
1967 58.3 25
*
8.1 23.3 5.2 -0.4 5.3
1971 64.1 2LS 5.6 8.6 16.6 3.0 2.1
1973 39.1 21.5 2.7 7.6 46.1 3.0 0.2
Source: Alan Ri\. Japan's Economic Aid (New York, N\ : St. Martin's
Press. L980), p. 34.
economic growth, however neglected to adequately address the vital petroleum link
with the Middle East.
Although the Arab oil embargo may be viewed as Japan's failure in terms
of economic cooperation goals, its successes in maintaining regional economic links is
unquestioned. The Arab oil embargo forced Japan to quickly redistribute its financial




Coordinated economic policies were largely responsible for rapid growth
through the late 1950s, sixties, and seventies. Domestic demand formed economies of
scale for industrial production while exports contributed to economic growth and
earned revenue for foreign supplies. In 1951 the Japanese government, led by officials
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and MITI, implemented tax reforms in favor of
export industries. Revisions of the existing Taxation Special Measures Law exempted
up to 50 percent of a firms export earning. In 1955, in response to the Comprehensive
Policy for Economic Expansion established a year earlier, the Law was again revised
this time to exempt 80 percent of export earnings. 57 The strategy of exports to affluent
nations and Southeast Asian markets was successful in terms of economic growth,
however trade deficits vis a vis Japan's trade partners began to grow bringing new
challenges to Japan's economic diplomacy.
Japan's ability to use foreign and domestic markets for economic growth
can be attributed to its shift to heavy and chemical industries, relatively low oil prices
during this period and stable YemDollar exchange rates favorable to Japanese export.
Industrial production climbed rapidly from 1960 to 1973 with a 27 percent average
annual increase. As already discussed, Japanese industries were heavily dependent on
foreign oil which it imported at low prices until the oil embargo of November 1973.
The economic prosperity that ensued under these conditions brought capital
accumulation, much of which was reinvested in growing industries. Table 7 shows the
rapid rise in industrial production as an index starting at 18.7 and climbing to 84.6 in
1973. 58 Table 7 also outlines the stable price of crude oil which was suddenly altered by
the Arab oil embargo in late 1973.
Economic growth and capital reinvestments contributed to the development
of Japanese industries which is evident in its composition of exports. In 1960 light
industry goods comprised 46 percent of Japan's exports while heavy goods represented
44 percent. 59 By 1973, the shift in industry and emphasis on finished heavy products
brought these exports to 1,633,066 million yen or 79 percent of Japan's total exports,
light goods comprised only 16.3 percent of exports (see Table 8).
The shift to appliances and heavy industry products for export to affluent
overseas markets implemented by the Comprehensive Policy for Economic Expansion
proved extremely successful. Japan's exports comprised an average of 1 1 percent of its
57Johnson, p. 234.
"IMF, International Financial Statistics p. 421.
59Heavy-industry goods include textile machines, sewing machines, televisions,
radios, motor vehicles, motorcycles, aircraft, vessels, tape recorders, plywood, and toys
by the Office of the Prime Minister, Bureau of Statistics. Japanese Statistical Yearbook
197S. "Others" under heavy goods comprised an insignificant amount. Light industry
goods consisted primarily of textiles and apparel goods.
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1986.
TABLE 8
JAPANESE LIGHT AND HEAVY EXPORT GOODS IN MILLIONS OF
YEN AND PERCENT
Year Light Exports Heavy Exports Total
1960 681.368 47% 647.833 44% 1.459.633
1965 969.272 32 1886 602 62 3.042.627
1973 1633,066 16 7968,842 79 10,031.427
Source: Office of the Prime Minister, Japanese Statistical Yearbook-1978
GNP from the late 1960s and seventies compared to 5 percent of the US economy;
Japan's export volume increased at a rate over 16 percent annually from 1961 to 1973.
Although Japanese exports increased with Japan's economy, trade
imbalances with its security partner, the United States, did not become heated until
1968. Japan's economy had an exceptionally good year in 1965 when its GNP and
exports rose 13 and 23 percent respectively. Recession in the US overshadowed the
problem of rising Japanese exports in that year, particularly since the overall US
current account was a surplus figure.
49
US fiscal policies to support expenses for the Vietnam War, brought
inflationary conditions causing greater demand for Japanese goods. Japanese exports
to the US increased by 36 percent in 1968, 21 in 1969, 10 in 1970 and 27 percent in
1971. In 1971, the US trade deficit with Japan grew by over 480 percent from the
previous year, from -S450 million in 1970 to -S2615 million in and US pressure
mounted for Japan to revalue its yen. 60 Japan persistently refused on the basis that a
revaluation would hinder the nation's export industries while disturbing the value of
assets, debts, and other financial relations between Japan and its trading partners.
Moreover, many Japanese officials stubbornly refused revaluation on the grounds that
Japan's economic policies would appear as a failure before the Japanese people. US-
Japan trade friction became intense as many Americans blamed overwhelming
Japanese exports, a misaligned YemDollar exchange rate and Japanese trade barriers as
the cause for its first current account deficit in ten years. 61
In the wake of US initiatives for rapprochement with the PRC (the first
"Nixon Shock"), the move to devalue the dollar in 1971, broke the 22 year exchange
rate formed by the post-war Economic Stabilization Plan. Japan could no longer take
the US market for granted as this monetary initiative, later called the second "Nixon
Shock," forced the Japanese to reconsider its economic dependence on the US. Japan
was no longer a nation bordering on starvation and recovering from war. The
exchange rate, antiquated by Japan's economic successes, was allowed to float in late
1971 with hopes of bringing more equitable trade conditions.
4. Science and Technology
As Japan's economy prospered from the mid-1950's to the early 1970s,
striking changes in Japanese exports reflected more sophisticated goods and a steady
decline in the share of labor-intensive products. These developments were due to
constant infusion of the latest technologies.
Technology, or the design and manufacturing know-how required to produce
goods, was an integral aspect of Japan's economic successes. The shift to heavy
industries instituted by the Comprehensive Policy for Economic Expansion, thrived on
the infusion of technologies imported from the west, primarily the United States. As
^International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook
(Washington, DC: IMF, 1971 and 1978) p. 170 and p. 145 respectively.
61 Margaret Garritsen de Vries, The International Monetary Fund 1972-1978:
Cooperation on Trial, vol. I: Narrative and Analysis (Washington. DC: IMF, 1985), p.
70-5.
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Japan entered the high-growth years of the 1960's, the need for advanced technologies
became more important since remaining competitive in world markets meant keeping
up to date with the latest innovations. 62
Research and development, or the pursuit of knowledge in a specific area with
specific goals, has been the mother of technology. Although Japan's economic
recovery was evident by the late 1950s in terms of G\'P growth and production, its
research and development efforts had not experienced the same gains as Japan
continued to buy and license technology. The United States was clearly the world's
leader in research and development since the close of world war and American goods
were extremely competitive in world markets as advanced technologies were applied to
production, consumer products, military systems, and space exploration. As the US
was instrumental in Japan's economic recovery7 in the immediate postwar years, it was
also instrumental in Japan's technological recovery by supporting its research and
development progress with advanced technical information.
The most striking example of technical information sharing by the US to
Japan, was in the field of electronics. Japan's economic development required
technological growth to pull it away from resource intensive industries; electronics was
a means of reducing those industrial resource demands.
a. Japan's Technology Dependence on the US in Electronics
United States research and development assets emerged from the war years
relatively intact compared to those of Japan and Europe. This advantage and
America's thriving economy formed an environment in which United States technology
outpaced all other nations. Additionally, US research and development was driven by
two factors absent in Japan: the desire to maintain military superiority and a race
against the Soviet Union into outerspace.
As already discussed in the previous chapter, US research and development
established transistor technology which laid the foundation for Japan's electronics
industries in the early 1950s. Due to military necessities for advanced electronics, US
progress in this field continued at a tremendous pace. Advanced electronics evolved
from transistors, to integrated circuits, to sophisticated information processors. As US
research and development used the momentum of military and space efforts, Japanese
62Lawrence Klein and Kazushi Ohkawa, Economic Growth: The Japanese
Experience Since the Meiji Era (Homevvood, IL: Richard D. Irwin Inc., 1968), p. 28.
63Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, Asia's New Giant: How the Japanese
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industries sought foreign technologies for consumer goods and potential exports.
Japanese researchers and private enterprises were eager to receive technology in the
wake of US progress.
Japanese research and development goals contrasted markedly from those
of other industrialized nations as pertinent statistics indicate. In 1972, Japanese
government expenditures provided only 27.2 percent of total research and development
costs, while private enterprises bore the lion's share of the nation's investment with
over 72 percent. Compared to other industrialized nations, Japan's government
spending ranked low as the French government spent 62.3 percent of the nation's total
research and development costs, the United States 55.6 percent, and the United
Kingdom 50 percent. While these governments had heavier commitments to military
and space exploration development, the crux of Japan's investment went to industrial
technology and consumer goods development.
While Japan developed its transistors and produced pocket-sized radios in
the 1950's, the US research and development engineers had their goals set on different
objectives. The Department of Defense and NASA sought rugged, miniaturized
electronics for defense, and exploration of outer space. In 1959, Texas Instruments,
under contract by the US Air Force, developed integrated circuits for use in the
Minuteman II missile. Fairchild's "planar process" of etching integrated circuit designs
on chemically treated silicon wafers won it a NASA contract for the APOLLO space
program. Twelve key military and space contracts were awarded in the early 1960s
which totalled over S80 million and by 1963, international sales in integrated circuits
surpassed SI billion. 64
On the other side of the Pacific, Japan produced transistor products oriented
toward the consumer market. Lacking military demand and an indigenous space
program, Japan's break into integrated circuit technology would not have come
without help from the US. MITI played a major role in preparing the private sector
for Western technology.
In 1952 after MITI imposed restrictions on foreign investments and
American transistor imports, Japanese electronics producers signed agreements with
foreign firms to acquire transistor technology with the encouragement of MITI. 65 As a
Economy Works (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1976), p. 535.
64Tatsuno, p. 11.
'Due to balance-of-payment concerns, the Japanese Government imposed
controls over foreign investment via the Foreign Investment Act of 1950. Although
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result. Toshiba and Hitachi signed technology agreements with RCA and Western
Electric, and Matsushita with Philips and Western Electric. The relationship helped
Japanese industries develop their first generation computers. By the 1960s, an NEC -
Fairchild agreement was reached which licensed the planar technology to the Japanese
company. The sub-license was instrumental in, once again, bringing Japanese
electronics producers up to date with US technology. Mitsubishi Electric and NEC
were the first Japanese corporations to produce an integrated circuit in 1965, followed
by Toshiba in 1966, Fujitsu and Oki in 1967, and Sharp in 1969. The relationships
established between Japanese and American producers through the 50's paid valuable
returns in the 60s. The dichotomy between Japanese and US technology application
was repeated in the 1960s; Japan's electronics evolution went from radios to memory
calculators while US primary applications went from telecommunications to missiles
and spacecraft.
b. The Nature of Japan's Research and Development
Industry was the heart of Japan's economic miracle, however as Japan's
economy grew, it became more integrated in the international community and
dependent on foreign resources. Economic growth consumed the national interest and
failed to adequately recognize the vulnerabilities of overseas dependence for resources.
The nature of Japan's research efforts was a manifestation of its interests in economic
growth, not its concern over the vulnerabilities in foreign resource dependence.
Japanese industries were the primary beneficiaries of research, utilizing 65.9
percent of research expenditures in 1972. 66 Industrial technologies and product
development attracted most of the research funds in this field.
As already noted in Table 2, Japan's dependence on foreign energy
resources was 86.4 percent in 1972, while nuclear energy contributed only .7 percent of
the primary energy supplies. Despite this imbalance, Japan's commitment to nuclear
energy development was only 4.35 percent of total research and development
expenditures.
Merton Peck and Shuji Tamara, in Asia's New Giant: How the Japanese Economy
Works, state that this law had little influence in Japan's overall balance-of-payments
situation, it gave considerable power to MITI as the controlling authority over foreign
investments to include foreign technology imports.
66The Oriental Economist, Japan Economic Yearbook - 1974 (Tokyo, Japan: The
Oriental Economist, September 1973), p. 94.
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Rapid economic growth had detrimental effects on the environment as
pollution, congested transportation systems, and health problems emerged in the
mid-1960's.67 As a result, anti-pollution development received 3.2 percent of the
research and development funds. Other areas included information processing (3.2
percent), space development (1.9 percent) and marine development (.79 percent).
The Arab oil shock of November 1973 radically altered Japan's perception
of research and development as vulnerabilities in foreign resource dependence became
evident and greater efforts were taken to obtain advanced energy related technologies.
Research and development, diplomacy and economic cooperation, melded together to
form the primary instruments of Japan's national security policy.
C. SUMMARY 1952-1973
The US-Japan partnership formed from 1945 to 1952 established the backdrop
for Japan's postwar recovery. The Mutual Security Treaty ensured Japan the
protection of America's nuclear umbrella for its primary defense needs, while the
Yoshida Doctrine formed the foreign policy framework for Japan's economic umbrella.
In the years which followed the return of Japan's sovereignty, economic recovery-
evolved into an "economic miracle" as the Comprehensive Policy for Economic
Expansion guided the nation's economy to include global markets.
During the process of economic expansion, the evolution of economic security
issues can be viewed in the areas of domestic demand, capital formation, exports, and
technology. While domestic demand provided the momentum for production during
the recovery years, the nation's petroleum-based economy formed an insatiable
appetite for energy during the rapid growth years of the Income- Doubling Plan and the
1960's. Heavy dependence on cheap and plentiful oil supplies formed a blind trust with
the Middle East, leaving Japan vulnerable to oil supplies used as a political weapon.
Domestic industries and Japan's overall economy expanded as a result of capital
formation supported by extremely high savings rates. While these rates were markedly
higher than other industrialized nations and contributed to Japan's domestic and
overseas capital flows, the Japanese propensity to save and invest became a national
asset contributing to economic growth. Although the period can be viewed as Japan's
infancy in economic aid programs (from reparations to the beginning of Official
T. J. Pempel, Policy and Politics in Japan: Creative Conservatism (Philadelphia,
PA: Temple University Press, 1982), p. 222-3.
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Development Assistance and Other Official Flows), it marks the beginning of Japan's
global economic influence in the postwar period.
After concluding the US-Japan security arrangement, an economic relationship
developed which accelerated Japan's recover}' toward prosperity. In addition to
profitable markets, the US-Japan economic relationship offered secure flows of food,
mineral resources and modern technology for industrial applications and consumer
product improvements. As Japan's industrial production capacity grew, so did exports
and prosperity.
During the years from 1952 to 1973, Japan was a developing nation seeking
international recognition through economic success. By hosting the 1964 Olympic
Games and achieving membership to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development as an industrialized nation in 1966, Japan achieved the success it sought
and continued to maintain its focus on economic growth.
Prosperity became the key to Japan's economic security during this period. With
prosperity came purchasing power to procure vital natural resources for a nation rich
with skilled labor and management, and cursed with meager quantities of domestic
minerals and arable land. Although the economic miracle owed much to security
through purchasing power from the mid-sixties to 1973, Japan accepted risks in foreign
mineral dependency which did not become fully apparent until the Arab oil embargo of
November 1973. Although the 1973 oil embargo marks the end of this phase in
Japan's security and economic development, this event forced Japan to address its
greatest vulnerabilities and develop security policies to meet these threats.
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IV. COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY AND ECONOMIC FACTORS
1974-1988
Economic growth through the fifties, sixties, and seventies elevated Japan's
position in the international community, however 1974 marks the beginning of new
challenges for both Japan and the United States. The ingredients of Japan's "economic
miracle" were a combination of industrial production, exports to affluent markets and
accepting risks inherent in foreign mineral and energy dependence. The Arab oil
embargo challenged these risks and created the necessity of a new look for Japan's
economic security policies.
Heavily dependent on foreign resources and markets, and restricted from using
military means, Japan's well-being was subject to international developments largely
beyond its control. Furthermore, the United States began to show signs of declining
power in international affairs. From Tokyo's perspective, the fall of Saigon, and
incidents such as "Watergate" and the failure of "Desert One" to rescue US hostages in
Tehran indicated a decline of US power. Also, the US lead as the world's largest
economy gradually shrank as several countries continued to prosper after postwar
recovery. In 1950, the US economy bore 52 percent of the world's GXP, however by
1982 this statistic had dropped to 22 percent. Although the US portion of the world's
total economy is now smaller than during the immediate postwar years, there are at
least two significant reasons why this is not an accurate assessment. First, it belies the
fact that several developing countries of the 1950s and sixties are now developed,
industrialized nations sharing a much larger portion of the world's economy with the
US. Secondly, industrialized economies are how more integrated compared to the
immediate postwar years and, as multinational corporations harness the assets of
several countries, they actually make participating nations economically stronger.
Despite these contrary facts, Japanese policy makers such as deputy vice minister for
foreign affairs, Kitamura Hiroshi, have viewed the US economy as a "decline in
national power."68
68Kitamura Hiroshi, Murata Ryohei, and Okazaki Hisahiko, Between Friends:
Japanese Diplomats Look at Japan-US Relations (New York: NY, Weatherhill, Inc.,
1985), p. 3-17.
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External forces compelled Japan to make major policy changes in national
security affairs. 69 No longer struggling in postwar poverty, Japan had become a global
economic power lacking experience in postwar leadership. The nation has been
reluctant to seize "international responsibilities" commensurate to its economic
strength. Lacking military power, dependent on international trade, and allied to a
declining superpower with tense economic relations, Japan had a difficult time finding
creative solutions to complex problems. Economic success was less than a complete
asset for security. By 1980, the doctrine of Comprehensive Security was conceived
which embodied Japan's national security policy, placing greater emphasis on the
nation's technological, economic and diplomatic assets.
A. SECURITY DEVELOPMENT
The international environment of the seventies and eighties could no longer be
exclusively characterized as one of Cold War. International developments, particularly
vis a vis the superpower nations, led to a climate of detente. The focus of East-West
relations shifted from ideological differences and overall international relations
improved as political and military tensions were relaxed in the wake of the arms race.
During this climate of relaxed military tensions, Japan, under Prime Minister Miki
Takeo. established its three nuclear principles and one percent limit on defense
spending in 1976. In that year, Tokyo also announced it would "...take necessary
measures to refrain the public from all exports of arms and defense related equipment,"
in effect placing a self-imposed ban on arms exports, further distancing itself from
situations in armed conflict. 70
Japan's security development occurred in light of its relationships with the United
States, the PRC and Soviet Union. As its integration with the global community
strengthened through political and economic ties, Japanese values developed a deeper
concern for security issues. In addition to relations with the United States, Japan's
overall foreign and security policies further developed in light of its relationships with
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. While relations with the Soviet
Union since 1973 have lacked significant progress, developments in the Beijing-Tokyo
arena made tremendous gains to the benefit of Japan as well as its Western allies.
69 Richard J. Solomon Jr., Asian Security in the 1980's: Problems and Policies for a
Time of Transition (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain , Publishers, Inc.,
1979), p. 70.
/0Toshiyuki Shikata, "How Japan Buys and Sells Its Arms," Defense and Foreign
Affairs Digest! (July 1983): 26.
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While Japan's prosperity is largely responsible for these gains, US pressure for its allies
to assume greater responsibility is also a factor as America underwent political,
economic and security difficulties of its own.
1. Security Relations with the United States
The Japanese became concerned about the reliability of its security partner as
the United States showed signs of declining power. The US withdrawal from Vietnam
and subsequent fall of three Indochinese countries, ambiguous military support for the
Republic of Korea, and US failure to effectively act during the Iranian hostage incident
severely diminished America's image as the world's policeman and reliable ally.
Politically, the results of Watergate affected US international relations as presidential
powers were curbed, while those of Congress increased. Hampered by Congressional
legislation such as the War Powers Act, international relations became more difficult as
limitations were increasingly placed on presidential discretion and Congress began to
exert more of its will in foreign affairs. 71 Economically, many US industrial sectors
staggered after the second oil crisis, questioning America's economic power and
influence in global affairs. The automobile and steel industries were especially hard hit
in the early 1980s as Japan was compelled to reduce its competition in these areas
through self-imposed quotas to avoid the more detrimental alternative of protectionist
legislation threated by Congress. In other industries, US accusations of unfair,
predator}' trading practices fueled tensions between the two nations.
As the final US presence left Vietnam and Saigon fell on April 30, 1975, so did
Japan's fear of being drawn into the regional conflict. However with this withdrawal,
Japan pondered the level of US commitment to its region and strength of the Mutual
Security Treaty. These concerns were compounded by growing US criticism in the late
1970's that Japan's prosperous economy enjoyed a "free ride" in security matters at the
expense of the United States. The Yoshida Doctrine, particularly its concept of
minimal defense spending, was challenged by its security partner as rising Japanese
trade surpluses became a dominant issue in the US.
The 1973 oil shock, tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and the fall of three
Indochinese nations to communist control in 1975 all contributed to Japan's decision
to adopt a National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in 1976. Moreover, America's
withdrawal from Southeast Asia, candidate Jimmy Carter's campaign promises to
withdrawal forces from Korea, and strong US pressure to contribute more to its own
defense compelled Tokyo to adopt a program for improving its defense capabilities.
'Kitamura, Murata, and Okazaki, p. 3-17.
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The NDPO sought to achieve minimal levels of defense capable of defending the
Japanese homeland under the arrangements of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.
Quantitative measures were not the focus of the program as its primary objectives were
to implement major improvements to the quality and capability of Japanese forces. 72
The Carter administration took office in 1977 prepared to withdraw US forces
from Korea. The incipient departure of troops from the ROK suggested a diminution
of the US-Japan security arrangements as Tokyo perceived a decline in US security
commitments in Asia. Since troop reductions were announced without consulting
Japanese officials, relations were particularly strained. 73 After formally announcing the
US withdrawal, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Philip Habib was sent to
meet with President Park and Prime Minister Fukuda where Japanese officials
protested US troop reductions arguing it would create considerable danger to the
security of South Korea and Northeast Asia in general.' 4 Carter eventually reversed his
position which seemed to confirm Japanese suspicions of US uncertainty to its security
commitments.
As Reagan entered office in 1981, his administration focussed on the growing
Soviet presence in Asia as Japan's call to increase defense spending. Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger linked economic and security issues by suggesting to
Tokyo that unless its military capability was considerably and speedily increased,
opinion in Congress would most likely demand American restrictions on Japanese
imports. It has been Congress, under the influence of economic issues, most
dissatisfied with Japan's defense efforts. Using its power to legislate and issue
resolutions, Congress has been increasing pressure on Tokyo to raise its share of
defense burdens. In December 1982, angry over Japanese auto imports, the Senate
adopted a resolution proposed by Michigan Senator Levin calling for a rapid increase
in defense spending to between 1.4 and 2.0 of its GNP. 76 Although military
expenditures did not appreciably increase under Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko due to
/2Solomon, p. 100-1.
73Michael Leifer, The Balance of Power in East Asia (New York, NY: St.
Martin's Press, 1986), p. 34.
740nkar Marwah and Jonathon D. Pollack, eds., Military Power and Policy in
Asian States: China, India, and Japan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), p. 149-50.
,5
Leifer. p. 35.
,6 Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian Security-1983 (NY, New York:
Brassey's Defense Publisher, 1983), p. 43.
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his overriding concern for growing fiscal deficits, Japan's participation in security
matters made symbolic advances. Under Suzuki, RIMPAC operations (naval exercises
in the South Pacific) increased and Japan committed security efforts toward a 1000
nautical mile security sector south of Japan.
In 1982, Nakasone Yasuhiro became Prime Minister bringing to the office an
urgent concern for matters in foreign affairs and defense. As former head of Japan's
Defense Agency and Minister of International Trade and Industry, Nakasone was
more than familiar with defense and economic issues. His American-like approach to
politics was atypical of Japanese officials as he was outspoken, straightforward and
concerned with his media image. It was under his leadership and commitment to the
NDPO during times of slower economic growth that Japan abandoned the one percent
of GXP limit for defense spending.
As trade tensions increased in April 1987, the CIA revealed an illegal sale of
computerized milling machines to the Soviet Union by Japan's Toshiba Machine Corp.
(a subsidiary of Toshiba Corp.), in association with Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik of
Norway. The milling machines sold by the two companies between 1982 and 1983,
made supercontoured propeller blades, making US detection of Soviet submarines more
difficult. With these new propellers, Soviet submarines have become capable of almost
silent movement, reducing the US acoustic-detection distance from 200 miles to as
close as 10 miles. With these figures, Congressional estimates of the S17 million
transaction have placed the cost to the West at over S30 billion to regain the
superiority lost from the sale. 77 Although most Japanese were thoroughly embarrassed
as a security partner, several US congressmen seized the moment as a Japan-bashing
opportunity, demonstrating their sentiments by smashing Toshiba Corp. (the parent
company) consumer products on national television.
On March 28, 1985, prior to revealing Toshiba's illicit sales, the US formally
invited Japan and other allies to participate in the research and development of its
latest defense concept: the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The concept presented
to President Reagan by Edward Teller, architect of the first H-bomb and former head
of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, is to render nuclear weapons obsolete via a
space-based laser shield. Nakasone delayed his decision as his cabinet pondered its
commitment to the nonnuclear policy; the questionable outcome as to whether SDI
would escalate rather than eliminate the arms race; support of the UN resolution to
"Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Toshiba, Norway Unit Assailed in Soviet Sale," New
York Times, May 1, 1987, p. 26.
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use space for peaceful purposes, adopted by the Diet as early as 1969; and the problem
of US standards in security clearances. 78 Although Secretary Weinberger requested a
response in 60 days, Nakasone's first response came on January 2, 1986 when he
acknowledged an "understanding" of the SDI plan. Xakasone cited three points: first,
SDI was not an offensive but defensive system; second, it was nonnuclear; and third,
its purpose was the worthy goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. Domestic policies
based in these issues made Japan a hesitant partner in SDI participation. After
considerable deliberation while eager to strengthen ties with the US, Nakasone believed
the system to be compatible with Japan's ideals. The problem of security clearances
could be resolved by invoking the US-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
(MDA), the means by which military aid is provided to Japan under the auspices of the
US-Japan Security Treaty.' 9 On July 21, 1987, more than two years after the inital
invitation, an agreement was signed designating terms under which Japanese companies
could participate (see Appendix D).
In the eyes of many Congressmen, the Toshiba incident raised doubts as to
Japan's reliability as an ally and its ability to safeguard sensitive technology. Trade
friction between the two countries compounded Congressional reluctance as foreign
participation in SDI had already been attacked in Congress as an effort to "buy" the
friendship of other countries through potentially lucrative contracts. During the 99th
Congress, Senator John Glenn proposed the most restrictive legislation, limiting foreign
participation to situations where competitive domestic firms could not be identified for
specific contracts. While this action is still pending, other legislative measures against
Japan's participation have passed. In September 1987, the Senate passed an
amendment to the Defense Department Authorization Bill proposed by Senator Sam
Nunn. restricting foreign participation unless allies were willing to pay a significant
share of SDI-related contracts.
78Takase Shoji, "The Problem of Participating," Japan Quarterly 33 (July-
September 1986): 3, p. 244-51.
79The LDP has attempted to pass legislation for provisions pertaining to
classified information on several occasions. During the latest attempt in June 1985, the
LDP presented an anti-espionage bill to the Diet, but the bill met with strong
opposition from minority parties and the press, and died six months later. Under the
current plan to secure SDI information, the Secrets Protection Law, passed in
conjunction with the MDA Agreement in 1954, will be put into effect to ensure
appropriate security for military technology.
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The Senate's vote on the Defense Department Authorization Bill served to
reemphasized Congressional sentiments of unfair defense-burden sharing by its allies.
In light of mounting US legislative pressure focussed on Japan's defense spending and
trade practices, Japan took initiatives to improve its defense capabilities. The 1987
Japan Defense Agency's White Paper released in August cited the Soviet Union's
military buildup as the primary reason for improving the country's defenses primarily
through additions to its naval and air fleets. The paper called for over-the-horizon
radar, airborne early-warning aircraft (P-3's), mid-air refueling tankers, advanced
intercepter aircraft, Patriot surface-to-air missiles to replace outdated Nike missiles, and
the Aegis shipboard air defense missile system to be incorporated in Japan's defense
organizations. 80 Although the FY 88 defense budget surpassed the old limit by only
.004 percent, the initiative had symbolic significance which manifested Japan's
commitment to the NDPO and maintenance of adequate defense capabilities in light of
US Congressional pressure to spend more on defense.
As Nakasone left office, the transfer of leadership to Takeshita Noboru
brought a contrasting, more traditional leadership style to the office of Prime Minister.
Rising to power in support of key figures rather than command of issues, Takeshita's
greatest talent lay in his ability to meld opposing views, a virtue essential in Japan's
political nature of consensus decision making. Despite this contrast in leadership style,
little in the way of policy changes should be expected. As leader of a nation with
growing international responsibilities and tensions with the United States, it will be
difficult for Takeshita to implement security policies with any significant contrast to
those of his predecessor. This has become evident in defense matters as Takeshita
maintained support for defense budgeting. During a December 1987 session of the
Budget Committee in the Diet's lower house, Takeshita pledged to continue defense
spending in order to maintain defense capabilities despite the US-Soviet treaty to scrap
medium and shorter range missiles. He was joined by his new Defense Agency
Director General, Kawara Tsutomu (Miyazawa faction), who remained committed to
strengthening defense capabilities in accordance to the NDPO. 81 Takeshita's cabinet
followed up with approval of a 5.2 percent increase in Japan's defense budget which
will enable the Defense Agency to meet approximately 60 percent of its procurement
80Japan Defense Agency, Defense White Paper- 1987, trans. The Japan Times
(Tokyo, Japan: The Japan Times, 1987), 59-125.
^KYODO, December 1987, "Takeshita To Continue Nakasone Defense Policy,"
FBIS, East Asia, 10 Dec 87, p.4.
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goals outlined in the FY 1986-90 five-year program by the end of FY 1988. The
program is in its third year and procurement goals are on schedule, representing
Takeshita's commitment to the NDPO. In addition to Takeshita's commitment to the
NDPO. Tokyo plans to increase its host nation support for US military bases. Japan's
FY87 budget for host nation support provided for 40 percent of the S6 billion cost of
maintaining US forces at over 100 military facilities and 50 percent of the local labor
cost allowances and benefits for 21,300 Japanese employees. Tokyo plans to assume
100 percent of these labor cost by 1990. For FY88, the defense budget includes Y320
billion (S2.6 billion at Y124:S1) for 55,000 US personnel, amounting to more than
S46,500 per person. 82
2. Japan- People's Republic of China Relations
Apart from the central importance of the US security tie, relations with the
People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union have been primary foreign
policy concerns for Tokyo. Japan's relations with the two communist powers were
difficult as Sino-Soviet relations were strong, however as the relationship deteriorated,
a new policy dilemma formed for Japanese officials. Competition for Japanese
relations between the two communist powers gave Japan a stronger bargaining
position while also presenting a precarious political situation.
Japan's "equidistant diplomacy" and economic strength played an important
role in attracting both communist nations as the PRC underwent its "Four
Modernizations" and the Soviet Union sought foreign capital and advanced technology
for its Siberian development projects with hopes of bolstering the overall Soviet
economy. Both the PRC and Soviet Union hoped to improve relations with Japan for
its assistance in recovering the economic failures of socialism. The Sino-American
rapprochement paved the way for increased Japanese economic interaction and, as a
result, the PRC enjoyed a significant advantage over the Soviets for improved relations
with Tokyo. This advantage finally materialized in a long-term, S20 billion trade
agreement (covering the period 1978 to 1985) on February 16, 1978.83
The Sino-Japanese economic partnership has proved to be profitable to both
nations and beneficial to the security of Western allies. The trade agreement increased
China's oil exports to Japan from seven million to 15 million tons in exchange for
Japanese industrial hardware valued at S10 billion. As a result, PRC exports to Japan
82JEI, JEl Report No. 19A, May 13, 1988, p. 8.
83Hong N. Kim. "Sino-Japanese Economic Relations Since 1978,"
Perspective: ^9 (Fall-Winter 1985) 2, p. 155.
63
reached 5.3 billion in 1981 marking the first surplus current account with Japan in 17
years. Crude oil and coal exports comprised over half of China's exports to Japan
bringing a surplus of over 200 million that year.84 Superior technology, industrial
expertise, capital assets, and close proximity to the China mainland were factors which
made Japan an attractive source for fueling China's modernization.
In security matters, Tokyo and Beijing began to see Soviet behavior in a
similar light as both capitals condemned the invasion of Afghanistan and the Soviet
backed Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Rising Soviet military presence in Asia
has contributed to closer PRC-Japan relations as these nations became increasingly
concerned with the Soviet threat.
Although Japan has reaped economic benefits with the PRC, close economic
cooperation with China also serves to draw Beijing closer to the side of Western
powers, thus serving the security interests of the West. The West may avoid the
disaster of a renewed Sino-Soviet bloc if Japan continues to share the common view of
the Soviet Union as the greatest potential threat; maintains its economic strength,
attractive to China's modernization plans; and nurtures a mutually beneficial Sino-
Japanese relationship.
Together the US and Japan have made efforts to strengthen relations with
Beijing and thereby improve the chances for peace and security in Northeast Asia.
Since Secretary of Defense Weinberger's first visit to Beijing in September 1983, the US
has eased the ban of high technology exports to China established by the Coordinating
Committee on Export Controls (COCOM) in 1949. As a result, US sales of high
performance UH-60 "Blackhawk" helicopters and technology transfers related to
explosive ordinance have been completed. Negotiations for a port visit were completed
and in the wake of Weinberger's second visit in October 1986, US warships stopped in
Qingdao for the first Chinese port call during communist rule. Sino-Japanese security-
cooperation have also made considerable progress in light of the fact that Japanese
officials are currently considering a military exchange with the PRC, something
unthinkable by both countries a decade ago.85
84Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian Security- 1982 (NY, New York:
Brassey's Defense Publisher, 1982), p. 85-7.
"East Asia Becoming Fluid and Sino-US Military Cooperation," Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, 8 Oct 86, p. 2, as found in American Embassy Translations, Tokyo, Japan.
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With the commencement of Sino-American and Sino-Japanese
rapprochement, Soviet military presence in the Pacific region have grown bringing
increased tensions. Soviet global behavior, highlighted by the 1979 invasion of
Afghanistan and shoot-down of Korean airliner flight 007 on September 1, 1983,
reinforced Japanese perceptions of the communist power as an unpredictable force in
international relations. In addition to Japan's historical distrust of the Soviet Union,
the northern territories issue continues to obstruct improved relations as Japan
demands return of the islands sine qua non a Soviet peace treaty.
3. Japan-Soviet Union Relations
Moscow's anticipation of China's normalization of relations with the US and
Japan, created a fear for the possible formation of a US-China-Japan coalition of
forces against the Soviet Union. As a result, in 1978, Moscow began to bolster its
military forces in Asia by creating an independent theater command for its Far East
forces at Ulan Ude in the Siberian Military District while expanding its Pacific fleet.
This military buildup in East Asia poses an ominous threat to Japan and the whole of
Northeast Asia. Soviet military capabilities in Asia are extremely disparate vis a vis
Japan's limited Self-Defense Forces. Since 1978, the Soviet Union has deployed
approximately a third of its entire force in East Asia. Over 50 divisions are deployed
along the Sino-Soviet border and Northeast Asia, with approximately 1700 tactical
aircraft. 86 Logistical tasks to support the military have been aided since the completion
of the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) in September 1984. SS-20 intermediate range
missiles have been deployed in the region at the rate of two launchers per month since
the late 1970s. In September 1985, 144 SS-20 missiles were known to be deployed in
the region. 87
With the fall of Saigon in April 1975 and the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of
November 1978, the Soviet Union gained access to a warm water military port in Asia
and have since expanded facilities and combatants in Vietnam. At Cam Ranh Bay, the
Soviet Union has deployed the largest number of Soviet forces outside its national
boundaries with the exception of those involved in the invasion of Afghanistan.
According to Admiral James A. Lyons Jr., US Navy Commander in Chief of the US
86Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power (Washington, DC: US
Government Printing Office, March 1986), p. 139.
87
Ichiro Takizawa, "National Security and Technology Transfer," Economic and
Pacific Security: The 1986 Pacific Symposium (Washington, DC: National Defense
University Press, 1987), p. 30-1.
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Pacific Fleet, facilities at Cam Ranh Bay have quadrupled since US departure in 1975
and at any given day 20 to 30 Soviet combatants, 3 to 5 submarines, and a squadron of
fighters, strike bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles are present
at the installation. 88
Even more controversial to the Japanese is the Soviet buildup of military
forces on the disputed northern territories. Airfields have been expanded on Etorofu to
accommodate Soviet MiG-23's and Tokyo sources suspect Soviet SSC-1 GLCM's on
the island. SSC-1 GLCM's on Etorofu would be capable of reaching Japanese bases
on Hokkaido and the northern part of Honshu with its 450 mile range.
The Soviet Pacific Fleet also bears an ominous presence in the region. Two of
the Kiev class aircraft carriers, the Minsk and the Novorossiysk are deployed in the
Pacific. The Soviet Pacific Fleet also mans approximately half of the 300 submarines
in the Soviet navy, 70 of which are nuclear powered. 89
Tokyo has little leverage in altering this situation. Although Tokyo is unable
to reduce the Soviet military presence in East Asia, the ominous threat posed by these
forces have served to heighten Tokyo's security consciousness and work to the benefit
of Tokyo-Beijing-Washington relations. The Soviet military buildup in East Asia,
Moscow's decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979, and incidents such as the Korean
KAL flight 007 shoot-down on September 1983, have all served to reinforce the US-
Japan security relationship. Although the Japanese had mixed views prior to these
incidents, Soviet behavior has influenced many Japanese toward the American
perception of the Soviet threat.90
On December 9, 1987, a Soviet TU-16 Badger reconnaissance plane violated
Japanese territorial airspace evoking a strong reaction by Air Self-Defense Force
(ASDF) intercepters for which the Japanese press showed an unusual level of support.
As the Soviet reconnaissance plan flew over Kadena, Okinawa, it was met by three
ASDF F4EJ fighters which flew side by side with the TU-16 while another fighter
covered the Soviet aircraft from above. After several minutes of signalling the intruder
by radio and airframe signals to leave Japanese territory, the ASDF pilots fired several
88Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, Senate Hearing
100-258, Part I FY 88, 100th Congress 1st Session, p. 416-23.
*9Kim, p. 155.
Hiroshi Kimura, "The Soviet Military Buildup: Its Impact on Japan and its
Aims," The Soviet Far East Military Buildup ed. by Robert H. Solomon and Masataka
Kosaka (Dover: Auburn House, 1986), p. 108.
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hundred warning shots. The Soviet plane then left the area and again violated
Japanese airspace over Kagoshima prefecture. Although the incident evoked the first
shots fired by ASDF pilots against a foreign plane, the reaction in several Japanese
press reports revealed support for its Self-Defense Forces and greater suspicion for
Soviet activities. 91 In view of the KAL 007 incident and Soviet sensitivity in protecting
its territorial airspace, the incident involving a Soviet reconnaissance bomber equipped
with sophisticated navigational gear served to heighten Japanese suspicion of Soviet
behavior and closer US-Japan security relations.
As a result of Soviet military increases in the Pacific region, even Beijing has
endorsed the US-Japan Security Treaty and encouraged Tokyo to increase its military
efforts in response to Soviet hegemonism. Although Japan has little hope of reducing
the Soviet arsenal. Tokyo's economic might and foreign policy of controlling the flow
of economic cooperation serve to regulate tensions between the two nations since
Soviet desires for Japanese technology and capital remain high.
B. ECONOMIC FACTORS
In 1974, Japan reacted to the greatest economic challenge since its recovery from
world war: the 1973 oil embargo. Manufacturing employment fell an annual average
of 1.8 precent from 1974 to 1979 while industrial production also declined and failed to
regain 1973 production levels until 1978. A reduction in crude oil supplies threatened
several aspects of the economy, suggesting similar declines in domestic demand,
research and development investments, gross capital formation and exports. In fact,
performance in all of these areas did not decline as oil supplies were reduced.
Although Japan reacted quickly to avoid economic disaster, the second oil crisis in
1979 convinced Japanese officials that a comprehensive security policy was necessary
to protect Japanese economic, political and social interests. As a result, the concept of
"Comprehensive Security" evolved within the framework of Article 9 of the
Constitution; the first and second United States-Japan security treaties; creation of the
Self-Defense Forces; resumption of normal relations with the USSR; enunciation of the
three nuclear principles of no production, possession, or introduction of nuclear
91
"Soviet Bomber Flew Over Kadena Air Base," Ryukyu Shimpo, December 10,
1987, p. 1, as found in FBIS East Asia, December 11, 1987, p. 2. "USSR Urged To
Tell Truth On Airspace Violation," The Yomiuri Shimbun, December 12, 1987, p. 11.
"Soviet Air Intrusion Viewed As 'Disturbing,'" Asahi Shimbun, December 11, 1987, p.
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weapons; normalization of relations with the PRC; and reaction to the oil shocks of
1973 and 1979.92
Japan's perceptions and policies in global affairs were increasingly influenced by
economic and technical issues impinging on its political and military spheres. In April
1979, after the second oil shock, rising pressure from the US and Europe over trade
imbalances, strident criticism from the US due to its perception of Japan's "free ride" in
security matters, and significant changes in the nature of Sino-Japanese relations,
Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira directed a task force to conduct a study on
comprehensive national security. The results of the task force headed by Masamichi
Inoki, former head of Japan's Defense Academy, were submitted to Acting Prime
Minister Ito in July 1980, shortly after Ohira's death in office.
The report acknowledged the passing of Pax Americana and responsibilities
Japan must accept as an economic leader and ally of the United States. Moreover, the
report insisted that "with Japan accounting for 10 percent of the world's total GNP, it
is vital that Japan accept commensurate international responsibilities and endeavor to
protect the free political, economic, and social systems."93
According to Inoki's report, Japan's security was not only a measure of its
military power, "but also by economic, technological, food resource and social stability
indexes, and additionally, by the level of mutual trust and friendship between countries
concerned." Prosperity and stability were reemphasized as vital interests, while war,
political instability and poverty were inimical to Japan's national goals. It was
apparent that military power was least effective in combating these conditions, and as a
result, Japan's economic strength in terms of its capital assets, scientific and
technological developments, and economic cooperation became primary assets in
national security affairs. The two oil shocks proved that purchasing power alone was
not adequate to ensure uninterrupted supplies of strategic materials. Comprehensive
security therefore relied heavily on other economic assets to enhance its international
influence and national security posture. Capital and technology which emerged as a
result of economic prosperity and research investments, became force multipliers
bolstering Japan's strength in national security affairs. Exports assumed a
92
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commanding position in the economy as a means of capital formation during economic
crisis.
Economic policy also reacted to the shock of oil reductions by stressing the need
to reduce its dependence on foreign oil and raw materials by transforming its economy
from one based primarily on smokestack industries to an economy expanding into high
technology. In 1979, MITI's Visions for the 1980 s established such a policy,
emphasizing the necessity for domestic creativity in technology and calling for greater
research and development investments rather than depending on foreign sources for
technical innovations.
As a result, Japan's heavy industries, particularly export-oriented heavy
industries, have been on a decline. "Sunset" industries such as mining, shipbuilding,
and petrochemicals have been shrinking as biotechnology, fiber optics, robotics and
computer industries assume greater importance in Japan's economic growth. High-
technology products have not only helped reduce energy consumption, but also
enhanced Japan's ability to increase exports.
By raising exports and capital formation, Japan was able to avert catastrophic
recession, however it also increased trade tensions with the United States and other
trade partners. When the US trade deficit climbed to over S106 billion in 1984, the
world's leading democratic economies agreed in September 1985 to collectively take
steps to reduce the value of US currency (see Appendix E). By lowering the dollar's
value compared to the yen as agreed in the Plaza Accord,94 (as well as other
currencies, ie. the deutsche mark), US goods would become less expensive in yen terms
and. theoretically, reverse the trend of US current accounts.
Although the yemdollar exchange rate fell drastically after the agreement, the
desired effect of shrinking the US trade deficit vis a vis Japan has not yet taken place.
Instead, the Japanese surplus current account from the US increased to S45.59 billion
in 1985, S7.04 billion more than the previous year. Meanwhile the yen's appreciation
had other side effects in Japan.
The realigned currency accelerated an effect which had plagued many of the
other industrialized nations: hollowization of domestic industries (sangyo kudokan).
Hollowization occurs as capital and production leave the domestic economy for more
94 Finance ministers and central bank governors of the G-5 met on September 22,
1985 at the Plaza Hotel in New York to support noninflationary domestic demand and
market-opening policies to ensure continued economic expansion. In pursuit of these
goals, an agreement to realign currencies to current economic realities was reached,
often refered to as the Plaza Accord.
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profitable returns overseas. As Japanese exports became less competitive, industries
relocated their production facilities to circumvent trade barriers, import quotas, and
other import restrictions imposed by trading partners. The yen's rapid appreciation
after September 1985 accelerated this effect as labor markets and investment
instruments abroad became more attractive.95
Hollowization manifested by the yen's rapid appreciation threatened Japan's
concept of lifetime-employment as the problem of unemployment surfaced for the first
time since postwar recovery. Heavy industries, the engines of Japan's economic rise,
underwent exceptional strains as sectors such as shipbuilding and steel (the largest of
the free world) jettisoned lifetime-employment to cut costs.96
The free-market oriented Reagan Administration has maintained a monetary
strategy as a broad solution for US trade disparities, while aggressively pursuing
product-by-product negotiations with Japan covering areas such as citrus and beef
trade barriers and microchip dumping in the United States and other countries. As the
administration assumes this policy however, pressure for protectionist legislation
continues to grow in Congress; claiming unfair trade practices, "Japan bashers" have
been eager to retaliate with protectionist trade legislation. Japan has been criticized by
free-market strategists and frustrated congressmen alike for not spurring its domestic
demand in response to cheaper US imports realized by the newly realigned currency
rates.
Cognizant of the disaster threatened by protectionist legislation, Prime Minister
Nakasone was compelled to assuage US pressures, while addressing the domestic
problems of hollowization. Prior to visiting Washington in April 1986, Nakasone
directed an advisory committee (later called the Advisory Group on Economic
Structure Adjustment for International Harmony) headed by former Bank of Japan
Governor Maekawa Haruo, to present guidelines for a policy which would restructure
Japan's economy from one based on exports for growth, to an economy driven
primarily by domestic demand. To present the image of Japan as a responsible
economic leader and to better address the concerns of deficit ridden nations, Nakasone
himself ensured that the report reflected a positive response to the hostile international
situation facing the Japanese economy.97
95Kishimoto Shigenobu, "On the Progressive Hollowing of Industry," Japan
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The Maekawa report established three economic goals for Japan: first to reduce
the nation's current account surplus to a level consistent with "international harmony;"
second, to enhance the quality of the nation's standard of living; and third, assume
leadership by contributing to the international community in scientific, technological,
cultural, and academic fields. According to the report, these goals should be founded
in the spirit of free-markets, a global perspective, and continuous long-term efforts.
Specific recommendations to achieve these goals were forwarded by the commission
and are outlined below:
• Growth led by Domestic Demand. The report called for Japan to strive for
economic growth led by domestic demand. The plan to restructure Japan's
economy requires a reorientation of priorities to urban developments and
increased private consumption. Particular attention is placed on increasing
disposable income and reducing work hours. Tax reform should be
implemented to eliminate incentives for saving and reduce taxes to provide
greater disposable income. These recommendations are designed to improve the
nation's standard of living while increasing domestic spending.
• Formation of A Harmonious Industrial Structure. The industrial sectors should
be encouraged to pursue technological research and development and improve
service sectors in support of leisure time. Direct overseas investments should be
promoted, particularly in trade deficit nations. Foreign investments in Japan
should be encouraged through exchanges of technology and cooperation with
"third-country markets." Agricultural policies must be coordinated with
industrialization. This should be done by importing non-basic farm products
and selective production of agricultural goods in Japan. In the spirit of "free-
market economy," Japan should make its agricultural market more accessible to
other countries by lifting trade barriers.
• Improve Market Access and Encourage Import of Manufactured Goods. In
coordination with overseas investments, Japan should open its markets to
foreign manufactured goods in support of the free-market principle. In
conjunction with this, anti-trust and counterfeit product laws should be strictly
enforced. The report also encouraged economic cooperation and private sector
technology transfer with developing countries as Japanese markets become
more accessible.
• Stabilize and Sustain Appropriate Exchange Rates. International coordination of
monetary policies should be sought to maintain stable current account levels.
The report also recommended policies to support easy access to fmances for
growing industries.
9
"Karel G. van Wolferen, "The Japan Problem," Foreign Affairs: 15 (Winter
1986 87)2, p. 296-7.
• Contribute to the World Economy Commensurate to International Status. The
Maekawa Report urged Japan to take a leadership position in the world
economy by importing from less developed nations and offering technology and
investment to developing countries. Japanese assistance to alleviate debt
problems in these countries should be made in the form of lower interest loans
and continued support of multilateral development banks.
• Fiscal and Monetary Policy Management. Finally, the report recommended
formation of a fiscal policy to support economic and social balance as Japan's
standard of living appreciates. Furthermore the report called for tax reforms to
eliminate preferential tax treatment for personal savings.
Several aspects of this outline echo principles already established in Japan's
economic policy. The significance of scientific technological research and development
to the economy, promotion of direct overseas investment, contributions to developing
countries and Japan's responsibilities to assume global economic leadership
commensurate with its international status have all been iterated by Tokyo before.
The outline however suggests that Japan must also assume radically new
characteristics. Accelerating domestic demand by promoting private consumption and
imposing savings disincentives are perhaps the most stunning proposal, however most
pleasing to trade deficit nations.
Although the Maekawa guidelines were well received by most Americans as an
initiative to correct trade imbalances, many Japanese leaders were quick to criticize the
plan and denied that it was in fact a policy adopted by Tokyo. For the sake of
international economic harmony, the report called for significant changes to Japan's
social, economic, and political institutions which appear in many cases detrimental to
Japan's economic well-being and security. By calling for the Japanese to consume
more, while working and saving less, the report seemed to want the Japanese to make
drastic cultural adjustments.
Although Tokyo was slow to commit itself to Maekawa recommendations,
monetary conditions manifested by the yen's continued appreciation made exports
difficult, forcing Tokyo to look inward for economic expansion. Stimulating its
domestic economy however, has not brought full economic harmony with the United
States. Economic tensions have gained momentum as US trade deficits grew and
Washington's policymakers watch its strategically important high-tech and heavy
industries wither under Japanese competition. Unlike Japan, several American
industrial sectors are essential to US military superiority and therefore vital strategic
assets. As America's iron, steel, and automobile industries have struggled and lost
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ground under the weight of managerial ineptness and rising labor costs, foreign
competition in these strategically important sectors compounded economic tensions
with Japan. Current trends indicate continued competition as Japan's futuristic goals
lay in high-tech industries.
The following sections of this chapter will discuss developments in terms of
Japan's domestic demands, use of capital assets, exports, and research and
development investments as comprehensive security incorporated these areas into its
national security policies.
I. Domestic Demand
a. Demands for Energy
The global economy until November 1973 enjoyed and became accustomed
to stable supplies of inexpensive crude petroleum. With the Arab imposed oil
embargo, it was natural to expect a significant slow-down, if not recession of Japan's
petroleum fueled industries and the overall economy. Although industrial production
and manufacturing employment fell in the aftermath of the first oil shock, exports.
capital formation and research and development efforts accelerated to maintain the
momentum of Japan's economic growth. While crude oil imports declined at an
annual average of 2.6 percent from 19"3 to 1985 (an overall drop of 32.4 percent),
Japanese attitudes toward conservation, alternate-source development, and import
practices, even in the face of a global oil glut, have changed to improve its posture in
energy security.
Since the Japanese fiscal year extends from April of the given year through
March of the following year, the second half of Pi' 1973 (October 1973 through March
1974) underwent the peak of the oil crisis.98 Although FY 73 experienced the most
severe effects of the oil crisis, it was during this period that exports rapidly increased to
lead overall economic growth. In FY 73, exports increased 16.9 percent over the
previous year while GNP rose 21.8 percent, the largest increase since 1961. In the
following fiscal year, exports experienced a record increase of 60.3 percent, while GNP
grew 19.1 percent. Japan maintained a strong economy and improved its security
posture by reducing risks inherent in foreign energy dependence. Although Japan's
economy managed to avoid a severe recession, the second oil crisis marked the end of
double digit economic growth, which actually proved beneficial as it enabled industries
: lian-li Wu. Japan's Search for Oil: A Case Study on Economic Xationalism and
International Security (Stanford. CA: Hoover Press. 1977), p. 28.
to overcome environmental difficulties manifested by the rapid growth years of the
1960s.
Japanese reactions to the oil shocks formed short, medium and long-term
solutions to its energy problems which were later incorporated in its concept of
comprehensive security. Conservation, diversification of foreign energy sources,
stockpiling, and alternate source methods became principles of Japan's energy security
policies. Immediate reaction to the reduction of oil supplies called for energy
conservation measures to secure available resources. The intermediate response called
for diversification of foreign sources to reduce the severity of dependence, since much
of Japan's oil supplies came from politically unstable areas.
Prior to the 1973 oil shock, energy supplies depended heavily on oil from
the Middle East; 80.7 percent of its imported oil came from the Middle East, while
Saudi Arabia and Iran together supplied 54 percent of Japan's foreign oil supplies."
The oil crises of the 1970s and outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War formed an environment
in which adequate oil supplies could no longer be assumed. As a result, Japan adopted
a policy of diversifying energy imports, thereby reducing the risk of overdependence on
a given region for oil supplies. Diversification expanded oil sources in Asia, specifically
in Indonesia, the PRC, and Malaysia, reducing transportation costs and deliver}' time.
By 1986, Asian sources for oil comprised 17.5 percent of Japan's total oil imports, with
Indonesia as the largest supplier in the region (see Table 9).
In 1986, disagreement among members of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), caused a breakdown in the once powerful cartel, spurring
national competition for global oil markets. As a result, oil prices nearly halved from
previous highs of over S30 per barrel. Estimates of world oil reserves have continued
to climb since 1986, and in January 1988, the Oil and Gas Journal estimated the year's
global reserves up 27 percent from 1987. This increase represents an additional 190
billion barrels bringing the world total to 887.35 billion barrels. Based on current use
of 20 billion annually, the increase represents enough new oil to satisfy global needs for
an additional nine years. 100
Although current oil supplies appear to be abundant, the lessons of two oil
crises have not been easily forgotten as Japan continues to adopt measures to ease the
problems of foreign oil dependence. As oil supplies ballooned, Japan recognized its
"Wu, p. 28.
100James Tanner, "World Oil Reserves Rose 27% in Year as Producer Nations
Boosted Estimates," The Wall Street Journal, February 9, 1988, p. 34.
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TABLE 9
JAPAN'S CRUDE OIL IMPORTS B\ AREA

















































Asia 237 18.1 248 13.4 216 17.3 214 17.5
North and South
America 62 4.7 65 4.8 56 4.5 74 6.1
UK 1 0.1
Africa 16 1.2 9 0.7 16 1.3 7 0.6
Communist
Bloc 69 5.3 81 6.0 82 6.6 83 6.8
TOTAL 1,307 100.0 1,350 100.0 1,247 100.0 1,223 100.0
Source: JEI: JEI Repo rt No. 22B, June 12, 198"/
importance as an oil customer, reducing purchases from Saudi Arabia and Iran to 20
percent and turning to smaller countries such as Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and non-
OPEC Oman. Buying more than 50 percent of the oil exported by these countries,
Japan enjoys an improved bargaining position since these suppliers lack the huge
storage facilities available in larger oil exporting countries. 101 By shifting its purchases
to smaller producers, Japan has turned the tables of dependency by making these oil
producers dependent on Japan, rather than Japan dependent on one oil supplier.
In addition to diversifying oil sources and improving its bargaining
position, Japan has massed reserves in an oil stockpile equal to 140 days of domestic
consumption. Japanese officials are hopeful that this stockpile is sufficient to
withstand any shut-off of Mideast oil before the Gulf States are forced to continue oil
exports for vital foreign currencies. In addition to crude oil stockpiles, the government
in 1983, instituted a stockpiling program comprised of state, private and cooperative
101 Bernard Wysoki Jr., "How Japan Has Made its Oil Supplies Bow to its Energy
Needs," The Wall Street Journal 2 June 1987, p. 1.
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joint efforts to maintain a 12 day supply of rare, strategic industrial metals. By 1986,
stockpiles of seven strategic industrial metals equaled 26.6 days of consumption, with
hopes of reaching a 60 day stockpile in the near future. Although these developments
indicate a concern for strategic metal supplies, it also represents Japan's lack of
economic security prior to the two oil crises. In comparison, the US has maintained a
stockpile of 94 metals equalling 3 years of consumption since 1939; France has
maintained a 30 metal stockpile of 2 months consumption since 1973. 102
Long-term measures to address energy security include research efforts to
diversify primary energy supplies. Plans to derive energy from alternate sources began
in 1974 with the government sponsored "Sunshine Project." The project developed
from the basic research stage and now operates experimental pilot plants. Placing
efforts in five areas of energy development, the Sunshine Project aims to diversify
energy sources by expanding its supplies from the sun; geothermal sources; coal
liquification; hydrogen electrolysis; and a fifth area encompassing general studies in
other systems such as wind power and power generation from marine temperature
differences. The Sunshine Project is Japan's main effort in energy related research and
development with an FY 1986 budget of 42,963 million yen. 103
Greater emphasis on nuclear energy also helped diversify Japan's primary
energy supplies and reduce its dependence on foreign crude oil. Representing only .6
percent of the primary energy supplies in 1973, nuclear power currently provides 15
percent of primary energy supplies ranking Japan the third most nuclear powered
nation after the US and Soviet Union. 104
The "Moonlight Project" is Japan's second largest energy research project,
pursuing large-scale energy conservation technologies. It's current goals are to develop
more efficient turbine engines, large scale batteries, and technologies related to heat
storage.
In addition to government sponsored projects, Japan's demand for energy
supplies have changed as a result of initiatives by private enterprises. Investments in
energy conservation technologies and an industrial shift away from high-energy
1U2
"Stockpiling of Rare Metals by State and Private Circles," Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, September 22, 1986.
103April 1986, "FY 86 MITI Technology Related Policies," Kogyo Gijusu, as
found in FBIS, Japan Report, Science and Technology, October 17,1986, p 71.
104CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics - 1986, (Washington, DC: Government
Printing, September 1986), p. 143.
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consumption (particularly in the material industries) toward knowledge-intensive
processing industries made significant contributions to reducing oil imports. The post-
oil crisis economy moved to incorporate technology in manufacturing techniques and
while experiencing the birth of high-technology industries. The transformation of
heavy-industries and emergence of high-tech sectors pushed for smaller, lighter, thinner
and faster methods and products. New technologies melded the techniques of electrical
and mechanical engineering by exploiting rapid advances in semiconductor
technologies, while making industries more efficient and competitive in the global
economy. 10 -
b. Demands for Food
Major oil price increases in 1973 and 1978 significantly effected the price of
other commodities, however these increases had little effect on the volume of food
imported by Japan. Japan's demand for foreign food supplies continued at a rate
similar to private consumption despite higher food prices which followed rocketing oil
prices. Although Japan's population growth is relatively low (an annual average of .92
percent from 1973 to 1985), the demand for foreign food supplies will be a problem of
increasing concern. Japanese individual food consumption has continued to grow,
placing greater emphasis on food imports and other means of providing nourishment in
a land limited in agricultural resources.
Food security continues to be formed in the shadow of post-World War II
memories and the "prison of hunger." Limitations of the agricultural terrain and
dependence on foreign sources for food, particularly feed grains, constantly remind
Japanese officials of its dilemma over security versus economy; while domestic
production offers advantages in food security, the comparative advantage of importing
cheaper food products is certainly more economic. The issue of food imports versus
domestic production, however, is complicated by other factors. Policies in agricultural
production and food imports have ostensibly favored food security rather than
vigorously exercising the comparative advantage of food imports produced at lower
costs. At the root of Japan's agricultural production and food import policies are
political influences vital to the pro-American LDP rule.
The domestic political environment has played a unique role in
manipulating Japan's food production and imports. Due to electoral zoning, the ruling
LDP's support is founded in rural sectors where a portion of Japan's population has
enjoyed concentrated electoral power. Although farmers comprise only 5 percent of
^L'chino, p. 238.
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Japan's population, because of weighted legislative apportionment and heavy turnout
at the polls, farmers exercise 25 percent of the voting power. Additionally, farmers
enjoy popular support by most Japanese who sincerely believe Japan food supplies are
vulnerable. 106 The power wielded by farmers is especially manifested in agricultural
subsidies and protectionist trade policies implemented by the LDP. Representing the
agricultural sectors are powerful farm cooperatives that use "food security" as their
banner for continued price subsidies and food import protection. In 1986, Japanese
food prices were the highest in the world as the government paid over S60 million in
subsidies and trade barriers blocked imports of less expensive food products. Although
Japan enjoys self- sufficiency in its national staple, the cost of this distinction is
reflected in the price paid by Japanese consumers; rice in 1986 was eight times more
expensive in Japan than in the US. 107
Japanese food consumption per individual has grown from a 1969-1971
average of 2705 calories per day, to 2858 calories per day for the period 1981 to 1983.
A greater percentage of animal products in the overall diet contributed to a large
portion of this increase, as urban Japanese are eating less rice every year. Since 1960,
rice consumption has dropped 34 percent and is expected to fall an additional 12
percent by the end of the decade as the Japanese diet becomes more Western, heavy on
meat, fats, and dairy products. 108 Although Japan's food consumption per individual is
greater than most Asian diets, compared to other industrialized countries, the Japanese
diet is much smaller (see Table 10). 109 Continued increases in animal products and
overall individual food consumption is therefore likely as Japan maintains a prosperous
economy. While estimates for beef imports in 1987 have been 214,000 tons, Japanese
government experts predict that Japan's 122 million people will eat about 850,000 tons
of beef in 1995, up about 57.4 percent from the 540,000 tons consumed in 1985. 110
l06Damon Darlin, "Japan Firmly Resists US pressure On Rice," The Wall Street
Journal, November 12, 1986, p. 39.
107Damon Darlin, "Japanese Farmers Exploit Phobia On Food Scarcity to Curb
Imports," The Wall Street Journal, June 2, 1987, p. 22.
108Damon Darlin, "Powerful Bloc: Japanese Farmers Use Political Clout to Win
Protection, Subsidies," The Wall Street Journal, December 4, 1986, p. 1.
109Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, 1985 FAO Production
Yearbook: 39 (Rome, Italy: FAO Organization of the UN, 1986), p. 271-2.
110Damon Darlin, "US and Japan Are At Impass In Beef Quarrel," The Wall
Street Journal, February 8, 1988, p. 23.
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The vulnerabilities of Japan's food supplies became apparent after the oil
crises of the seventies. Reduction of oil supplies from the Middle East raised food
prices since oil was essential to domestic agricultural production for machines,
insecticides, and fertilizers. Foreign food supplies were also vulnerable since Japan's
purchasing power was subject to several factors, particularly world-wide food shortages
caused by climatic conditions in food producing countries and competitive forces in the
international market. Political influences in foreign food supplies became evident as
the United States, Japan's largest food supplier, imposed economic sanctions against
the Soviet Union in response to the latter's invasion of Afghanistan. Although Japan's
relationship with the United States is vastly different from the Soviet Union, the reality
of food supplies as a political weapon became evident to Japan. In contrast to foreign
oil supplies however, the bulk of Japan's foreign food supplies come from politically
stable areas, primarily the United States and Australia.
TABLE 10
CALORIES PER CAPITA PER DAY



























































































Although the United States provides the crux of Japan's food imports, the
battle against Japanese import quotas on agricultural products has been a symbolic
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fight fueling trade tensions. During negotiations over orange and beef trade in March
1984, Japanese farm cooperatives successfully protected their trade as US negotiators
acquiesced to Japanese insistance over import quotas. However, rising trade tensions
manifested by a growing US trade deficit have forced US trade negotiators to
strengthen their demands for the elimination of Japanese import quotas. In July 1986,
after two years of negotiating for liberalizations in agricultural imports, the US
requested the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff Organization (GATT) to form
an impartial multinational panel to decide the legitimacy of Japanese import quotas in
accordance with the international trade pact prohibiting quantitative import
restrictions. Although Japanese officials assiduously negotiated for a compromise to
preclude a GATT judgement, the Reagan Administration stood firm on its all or
nothing position.
In December 1987, GATT issued its decision, ruling Japanese import
quotas on 10 groups of processed agricultural commodities and food products in
violation of international agreements. Prime Minister Takeshita in turn, blocked
adoption of the report in part, saying Japan was willing to liberalize eight of the
categories outlined by the GATT decision.
As expiration of the current beef and citrus agreement passed on March 31,
1988, and US trade retaliation is threatened as a result of Japan's failure to comply
with the GATT decision, the conflict illustrates Tokyo's subservience to farm
cooperatives and America's growing frustration with Japan's import barriers. Since
liberalization of the 12 categories demanded by the US would add only S250 million to
the SI 8 billion US agricultural exports to Japan, 111 resolution of this conflict has
potential for small gains in the vein of US profits, and tremendous political upheaval in
Japan if the LDP alienates its domestic support. There is however, tremendous US
support by an international organization which Japan must consider. Since it is
heavily dependent on international transactions, Japan must attempt to maintain some
semblance of fair trade. Although Japan has been accused of being an "economic
animal" eager to force exports on any available market and protective of its own,
negative judgement by an international body such as GATT places much more
pressure on Japan to reconsider specific trade policies, while somewhat reducing
domestic pressure on LDP leaders.
MEI, JEI Report No. 47B, December 18, 1987, p. 9.
Japan's efforts to bolster its food supplies have turned to scientific research
and development, specifically in bio-engineering technology. A relatively new field of
research, bio-technology has not yet achieved the level of success as energy related
research and development, however several advances have already been made to
supplement Japan's food supplies. Among these bio-technology projects is an
experiment concerning chromosome manipulation and hormone treatments to hybrid
large salmon and tuna that return to their original hatcheries for harvest. Through
bio-technology the Japanese hope to raise their overall level of domestic food supplies
and food security for future generations. 112 However, as long as agricultural policies
continue to subsidize domestic production and consumers tolerate inflated food prices,
Japan will maintain its policy to ostensibly serve the interests of food security and erect
trade barriers against foreign food supplies, contributing to US-Japan trade tensions.
c. Domestic Demand in US-Japan Relations
As economic tensions developed between the US and Japan, Americans
focussed their criticism on Japanese trade barriers and blamed Japanese trade officials
for intentionally placing restraints on Japanese domestic spending. With conclusion of
the Plaza Accord to realign currency rates in September 1985, the yen's appreciation vis
a vis other currencies made foreign goods less expensive for Japanese consumers and,
as a result, more expensive for Japanese exports in overseas markets. Due to this
change, the Japanese government's 1986 estimates of economic performance for the
following year forecasted external demand to fall -0.5 percent while domestic demand
was expected to rise 4.0 percent, resulting in a real GNP growth forecast of only 3.5
percent. Despite the currency realignment and Nakasone's "buy foreign" campaigns
however. US exports to Japan failed to make significant increases which many US
exporters and government officials anticipated.
The Plaza Accord had various unexpected effects on Japanese trade as
several nations had different outcomes. Although the yen appreciated over 35 percent
in the 12 month period from September 1985 to October 1986, US exports to Japan
increased 7.2 only percent. The Pacific's Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC's) also
made disappointing increases as exports to Japan increased only 9.7 percent for Korea,
5.6 percent for Singapore, and 15.1 percent for Hong Kong. Nervousness on the part
of PRC officials over growing trade deficits and economic fragility resulted in a
slowdown of its economic reforms, and lower trade statistics as exports to Japan
112Stephen Voder, "Japan's Fishing Industry Putting Hopes On New Laboratory-
Created 'Superfish,'" The Wall Street Journal February 11, 1987, p.30.
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dropped 2.1 percent. As the yen continued to appreciate, the subsequent 12 months
from September 1986 to August 1987 showed significant improvement in Asian exports
to Japan, while US exports made even slower gains. As the yen dropped an additional
5.2 percent to 146 yen to the dollar, Korea with its currency pegged to the US,
improved its exports to Japan by over 50 percent. Although smaller in volume
compared to Korea, Hong Kong's exports to Japan climbed 52.2 percent, Singapore
14.4 percent and the PRC, 7.2 percent (see Table 12). 113 While currency realignment
eventually improved Japan's demand for foreign goods, to the disappointment of US
trade officials and exporters, the most drastic increases in Japanese demand came from
neighboring Asian nations.
TABLE 12
US, KOREA, SINGAPORE, HONG KONG, AND PRC EXPORTS TO
JAPAN BEFORE AND AFTER THE PLAZA ACCORD: SEPTEMBER
1985
(millions of dollars and percent change)
US Korea Singapore Hong Kong PRC
Sep '84-Aug '85 26,461 4,196 1,461 794 6,189
Sep '85-Aug '86 28,354 4,603 1,543 914 6,058
Change 1,893 407 82 120 -131% Change 7.2 9.7 5.6 15.1 -2.1
Sep '86-Aug '87 29,710 6,948 1,765 1,391 6,495
Change 6 1,356 2,345 222 477 437% Change 4.8 50.9 14.4 52.2 7.2
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (Monthly), applicable issues.
A fundamental aspect of Japan's growing imports is the percentage of
manufactured goods being bought by the Japanese, up 33.8 percent in 1987. In
contrast to earlier import patterns, the rising yen has made manufactured products
more attractive. Although several European nations and the NIC's have been able to
take advantage of this newly formed Japanese market, US manufacturers have had less
success in selling their goods to Japan. European exports of manufactured goods have
increased 26.7 percent in 1987 with luxury goods responsible for much of this increase.
While the European Community took advantage of Japanese newly found affluence,
113
Figures calculated from monthly trade statistics from applicable monthly
publications of IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (Washington, DC: IMF).
the XIC's. using the momentum of Japanese production displacement overseas, have
increased their exports to Japan in areas of cheap consumer goods such as digital
watches. Exports of manufactured goods from South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia rose 61.1 percent in 1987.
In contrast to these sharp increases in exports, US exports of manufactured
goods to Japan have appealed to a smaller market, and therefore have not shown
similar increases. While manufactured goods comprised 78 percent of total US exports
in 1986, these goods constituted only 57 percent of total US exports to Japan, the
remainder of which was primarily commodities such as coal, lumber, and agricultural
goods. US exports of manufactured goods however, did increase 18.1 percent in 1987
and the bulk of this demand came from high-tech factories requiring precision
machines. According to a study conducted by Japan's External Trade Organization
(JETRO), American manufactures enjoy increases in industrial chemicals, tractors,
telecommunications equipment, and medical equipment. 114 Therefore, due to the
competition of lower priced consumer goods from other countries exporting to Japan,
US exports have not realized the gains suggested by currency realignments.
The Maekawa Advisory Group hoped to relieve global trade tensions
against Japan while raising the Japanese standard of living by increasing domestic
consumption. In addition to a strengthening yen, the Maekawa proposal aimed to give
Japanese consumers additional incentives to spend rather than maintain their
traditionally high savings rates. By abolishing the muruyu (system for not taxing
savings), and reducing work hours, the Maekawa Advisory Group hoped to achieve its
goal of improving the standard of living for Japanese while better integrating its
economy with the global community under more harmonious conditions. Additionally,
to address the problem of industrial hollowization, the advisory group encouraged a
domestic transition to high-technology-oriented industries and sectors better able to
meet domestic demands as labor-intensive and export oriented industries moved
overseas to take advantage of cheaper labor costs and manufacturing facilities in the
countries where export markets have already been established. According to Maekawa
Haruo, the most painful aspect of monetary realignment and restructuring for Japan,
will be during the first five years of industrial modifications, since high unemployment
will result as laborers are required to develop new skills. In a society of low labor
114Daniel Sneider, "Japan's Markets Opening-Especially for US Competitors,"
The Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 1988, p. 9-10.
mobility, the Japanese will be required to endure exceptional social and economic
hardships. 115
With the slowdown of export growth manifested by the yen's appreciation,
the Japanese government took actions to stimulate domestic demand. Following the
G-7 meeting to stabilize currency rates conducted in Louve, France, Japan reduced its
discount rate to a postwar low of 2.5 percent in February 1987. By reducing the
discount rate, other interests rates soon followed, assuring Japanese enterprises
investment capital while giving a boost to the overall economic expansion. In addition
to this initiative, the LDP announced its plan to stimulate domestic demand on April 7,
1987. 116 The plan called for a supplementary fiscal stimulus package focussed on
public works projects and stepped up housing construction. Later passed by the Diet,
the package established a 6 trillion yen (S48 billion at 125 yen:S1.00) supplementary
budget for public works and also reduced personal income taxes by 1.5 trillion yen (SI
2
billion).
Following these initiatives, housing starts increased 23 percent in 1987.
Since this has been a dormant sector of the economy, government officials believe this
is only a temporary surge and therefore project 1988 construction to level off to a 1.9
percent increase. The overall increase in domestic demand however, must be attributed
to a combination of government initiatives and the global economic environment which
triggered growth in Japan's largest area of domestic demand: private consumption.
Occupying over 50 percent of Japan's economy, consumer spending climbed due to the
drop in interest rates and income taxes, and the yen's appreciation (see Table 11).
Similar to initiatives implemented by Ikeda Hayato in 1957, the Japanese
government of 1987 injected funds into its economy as currency realignments made
export growth difficult. By forming an environment conducive to spending, Japan's
economy realized continued growth through greater domestic demand, reducing
pressure from the US and other trade deficit nations. As the US Federal Reserve
Board Chairman, Alan Greenspan praised Japanese policies before the congressional
Joint Economic Committee on March 15, 1988 stating: "One can scarcely argue they
haven't done an adequate job of stimulating the economy." 117 The increase in domestic
115
"Structural Adjustment and Employment Problems; Urges Improvement of
Livelihood Centered Around Internal Demand," Nihon Keizai Shimbun, January 5,
1987, as found in American Embassy Translations, Tokyo, Japan.
116
"LDP Outlines New Economic Bolster Package," Kyodo, April 7, 1987, as
found in FBIS, East Asia, April 7, 1987, p. C-5.
demand, elimination of tax credits for personal savings, and government spending, raise
questions with regard to the finance of deficit spending. The high level of Japanese
savings has helped finance deficit spending by the US and Japanese governments,
American consumers and Japanese companies both in Japan and overseas. As the
Japanese are encouraged to save less and spend more, these institutions will be
required to search for other capital sources or change their spending and investment
methods. In addition to the problem of debt financing, the abundance of Japanese
capital realized through high savings rates, occupies a significant role in enhancing
comprehensive security.
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2. Capital
As Japan overcame the economic difficulties precipitated by the energy crises,
the economy continued to grow, albeit a slower rate than experienced during the
1960s. Steady growth continued the prosperous trend as capital formation grew and
Japan expanded its economic influence overseas as a financial creditor. The Japanese
savings rate maintained high levels providing resources for capital formation. By
increasing the size of its capital stock, Japan not only enhanced its domestic productive
capacity, but also its ability to influence overseas areas via development assistance, and
both direct and indirect overseas investments. Along with its increasing contributions
11 Alan Murray, "Fed Chairman Warns Congress on Rapid Growth," The Wall
Street Journal, March 16, 1988, p. 2.
of Official Development Assistance (ODA), Japan began placing much of its direct
foreign investments in developing countries. During the 1980's however, Japanese
capital investments began to increasingly find their way to developed countries,
particularly the United States. In 1985 Japan became the world's largest creditor
nation, a status which not only holds economic prestige, but also reveals the magnitude
of its economic influence in overall international affairs. Achievements of this status
manifests Japan's commitment to its concept of comprehensive security.
a. Domestic Capital
For the reasons outlined in the previous chapter, Japan continued to
maintain saving rates much higher than other developed countries through the 1970's
and 80's. While the OECD average for gross savings as a percentage of GDP was 21.4
percent from 1975 to 1985, Japan's average during the same period was 31.4. The
United States and West Germany averaged only 18.5 and 21.6 percent respectively.
Japanese households were the primary source for savings as an average 18.9 percent of
Japanese disposable income from 1975 to 1985 was committed to savings. Again, the
US and West Germany trailed Japan as Americans saved an average of only 6.4
percent and West Germans 12.7 percent. 118
This section examines Japan's role as an international supplier of capital
assets and how capital investments contribute to Japan's national security. Japan
continued to develop its concept of economic cooperation and aid in the 1960's and
70's to nurture overseas markets for exports and ensure good relations with its
resource-bearing neighbors in Southeast Asia. Both private flows and government
ODA funds have been utilized toward this end. While maintaining this strategy toward
developing countries, particularly the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), Japan has expanded its influence through direct and indirect foreign
investments to developed countries.
b. Economic Assistance and Aid
As a result of the oil shocks, Japan's economic aid program matured to
assume a greater role in international affairs. The reduction of oil supplies from the
Middle East threatened vital interests in Japan while manifesting the vulnerabilities of
global interdependence. Economic aid expanded to address the vulnerabilities of
interdependence in the politically unstable Middle East.
118JEI, JEI Report 17A, May 1, 1987, p. 5.
Until 19S0, Japan's economic assistance and aid programs were
implemented for economic goals, tying aid projects with Japanese exports and natural
resource acquisitions. With the advent of comprehensive security however strength in
areas other than military might took on greater importance. With science, technology
and human resources, economic strength became a vital force in securing political and
economic interests. Even before Japan officially embraced the concept of
comprehensive security in 1980, economic assistance and aid were implemented to
address security issues as well as economic goals and humanitarian needs.
Since as early as 1973, Tokyo's aid flows began to reflect a new philosophy
rooted in its growing economic interdependence, economic prosperity, technical
achievements, and position as a Western ally. Although the 1973 oil shock stimulated
a change in aid philosophy evident in other areas such as disbursement, change in the
quantity of ODA contributions are not obvious until 1978.
While Japan's ODA during the 1960's and early seventies focussed on
regional economic links established by reparation arrangements, the 1973 oil crisis
made Japan's far reaching global interdependence evident to all Japanese. Tokyo's
perspective of disbursing aid took on greater importance as relations with the Middle
East and other areas became very special. 119 Shaken by the 1973 embargo, aid became
instrumental in "resource diplomacy" which sought new sources of energy and mineral
resources, while bolstering relations with established suppliers. 120 Although Asian
countnes, particularly members of ASEAN, continued to receive the crux of Japanese
aid after the oil embargo, Tokyo recognized the need to establish better relations with
areas beyond Asia.
In addition to resource diplomacy, to protect Japanese national interests,
Japan's position as a wealthy partner in Western security interests also influenced the
framework for Japan's economic aid policy. Lacking capital, managerial skills, and
technical resources, Less Developed Countries (LDC's) typically struggle with political
and economic instability leaving these nations vulnerable to communist influence.
Seen as an alternative to defense spending, many Japanese prefer foreign aid
expenditures, as it better reflects the image of Japan as a world leader for peace.
119
Rix, p. 234.
120 \Villiam L. Brooks and Robert M. Orr Jr., "Japan's Economic Assistance,"
Asian Survey: 25 (Mar 1985) 3, p. 326.
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Characteristic of this sentiment, Takashi Hosomi, chairman of the Overseas Economic
Cooperative Fund (Japan's largest aid agency) has stated:
Japan is determined not to have strong military forces ... as a rather successful
industrial country, we should contribute to the total peace of the world by-
concentrating on this development problem ... Economic stability and prosperity
are at the core of peace. 121
By merging economic diplomacy and security concerns to crucial regions, Tokyo hopes
to maintain a level of political, social and economic resiliency to avoid conditions
leading to internal disorder, disputes, or external intervention. 122
Under these conditions, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo announced Japan
would accept a greater role in providing assistance which began a series of aid-doubling
programs to developing countries. In 1977, Fukuda promised to increase contributions
by more than doubling Japan's ODA aid in the following five years, explaining a
significant increase in 1977. In a May 1978 meeting with President Carter, Fukuda
pledged that Japan would accelerate its effort to double foreign aid by achieving this
goal in three to four years. 123 Japan easily achieved its goal, increasing ODA
contributions from SI.4 billion in 1977 to an aggregate $3.3 billion in 1980 (see Figure
4.1).
Since 1980, Japan has undergone two additional aid-doubling programs. In
1981 Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko announced a goal to double aid contributions once
again by 1985. However, plagued by a depreciating yen and fiscal austerity inherited
by a domestic economic slow-down, Japan's ODA contributions reached an aggregate
of S18.1 billion in 1985, S2.3 billion short of its intended goal. Despite this setback, a
Third Medium Term Target was established in September 1985 to disburse more than
S40 billion over the 1986-92 period and double the amount of ODA in the final year
over the sum spent in 1985. Due to the yen's appreciation since 1985, Japan has rolled
back its goal to double 1985's contribution to 1990. Additionally, spending plans for
FY 1988 call for 1.35 trillion yen in ODA, or S10.8 billion with the dollar at 125 yen,
surpassing the US FY 88 aid appropriations by approximately 20 percent and
becoming the largest donor in budgetary terms. Despite these figures, Japan's aid
spending is often criticized for its contributions compared to GNP and the quality of
121
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Figure 4.1 Japans ODA Contributions 1976-1987.
its aid. As a percentage of GNP, a statistic used to measure a country's ability to
contribute. Japan ranks low among other members of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC). In 1986 when it contributed S5.39 billion, Japan ranked 14th in
the field of 18 donors, at .29 percent. The group's average was .35 percent with the
US's .23 percent of GNP ranking last. Moreover, compared to other DAC members,
Japan gives away less and lends more to developing countries with grants comprising
78 percent of its development assistance; fourteen members, including the US had
grants exceeding 96 percent. A reason for Japan's lower percentage of grants is that a
vast majority (over 65 percent, see Figure 4.2) of its aid goes to middle-income
countries in Asia, primarily ASEAN, which, in many areas, do not qualify for grant
assistance. Should these "Asian developing countries continue to outperform the rest
of the developing world, the Asian share of assistance could fall to 60 percent before
long and Africa's could rise to 20 percent, thereby raising the grant element." In
addition to these problem areas, monetary conditions have made Japanese loans
expensive as the yen continues to appreciate and currencies of several developing
countries decline in appreciation. 124
As Japan adopted comprehensive security in 1980, economic aid assumed a
more strategic role in global relations as aid flows were approved to areas of the
Western alliance bordering conflict areas. Among nations receiving aid under this
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Figure 4.2 Japan's ODA Distribution- 1986.
category in 1980 were Turkey, Pakistan and Thailand. Since 1980, the number of
countries receiving aid from Japan for their strategic importance has grown to include
Egypt, Jamaica, the Republic of Korea, Oman, Sudan, Zimbabwe, North Yemen,
Kenya, the PRC and the Philippines. In addition to expanding aid flows for security
reasons, Japan has also withheld aid as a diplomatic sanction, most notably to
Vietnam. 125
In addition to using capital as a foreign policy instrument, Japan's desire to
fulfill a greater international role due to its economic wealth is a current theme in its
national interest. Japan hopes to assume international responsibilities commensurate
to its economic strength and enhance its image as a global leader through ODA
contributions toward the advancement of 'basic human needs' in developing countries.
Through these contributions, Japan hopes to help bridge the gap in North-South social
and economic needs while gaining international prestige as an international leader,
working toward human development and peace.
Prime Minister Suzuki formally introduced the human needs dimension to
aid contribution in a January 1981 speech in Bangkok. There, he outlined four sectors
to address human needs development:
;5JEI, JEI Report 39A, October 24, 1986, p.7.
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1. Rural and agricultural development which included infrastructure projects such
as irrigation, drainage, road, electrification and communications improvements.
2. Development of new and renewable energy programs.
3. Human resource development which included education to develop skills and
greater application of technical assistance.
4. Promotion of small and medium sized businesses to spur overall economic
growth and development.
Although resource diplomacy and security continued to form the backbone
of Japan's aid policies, contributions to areas for 'basic need' reasons also flowed from
Japan. Bangladesh, an area of extreme poverty and little political or economic interest
to Japan, ranked seventh in 1985 among countries receiving aid from Japan with S121
million in bilateral assistance.
Perhaps the best example of Japan's use of aid and other economic assets
toward security goals however, is the current plan set forth by Tokyo to address
tension in the Persian Gulf. With the attack on the USS Stark in May 1987, Iran's
initiative to utilize shore-based anti-ship missiles, and the US decision to deploy forces
to protect oil tankers navigating the Gulf, Japan was afforded the opportunity to
contribute as a responsible international leader. As a major beneficiary of maintaining
free access to the Gulf, Japan was eager to move, and the US (much less dependent on
oil from the region), was anxious to see Japanese participation.
In light of constitutional restrictions regarding military deployment,
Nakasone hoped to utilize the nation's economic strength and Tokyo's diplomatic
access to both Tehran and Baghdad in hopes of maintaining constant flows of
resources through the Gulf and an eventual settlement between the nations at war. On
September 21, 1987, Nakasone met with Reagan to outline Japan's contribution to the
cost of maintaining free navigation in the Gulf by proposing assistance in the following
areas:
• Installation of a precision navigation system to help ships' captains to more
accurately plot courses through waters swept of mines and other hazards with
greater confidence. The British made Decca precision navigation system
consists of 20 to 30 stations to be located among the member of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and the
United Arab Emirates). The United States has already begun discussing such a
system with council members and Japan's contribution of equipment and funds
are planned to total S10 million.
• Tokyo officials have pledged S10 million toward peace efforts by the United
Nations.
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• Economic aid contributions are planned in an effort to bring relief to nations of
the region and with hopes of bringing Iran and Iraq to a negotiated settlement.
Export-Import Bank loans of S200 million are already committed to Oman, and
S300 million in credits and Export-Import loans to Jordan. Although specific
aid proposals have not yet been established for either Iran or Iran, Tokyo has
promised to contribute to the reconstruction effort.
• To offset US expenses committed to the Gulf effort, Japan intends to increase
financial support of US military bases in Japan. An increase of 6.2 percent has
already been planned, however Tokyo hopes to settle arrangements with the US
for additional increases in time for the FY 1988 budget. 126
Japanese officials have been negotiating with nations in the Gulf, particularly members
of the Gulf Cooperation Council since October 1987 to establish the Decca
navigational system. However, Iran has opposed the proposal and since the UAE and
Qatar have close relations with Iran, they have withheld cooperation. 127 Two Japanese
oil tankers were hit by Iranian fire only a few days after the proposals were discussed
between Japanese and Iranian officials in Tehran. While Nakasone's initiatives
demonstrate Japan's efforts of using capital and diplomatic assets toward its
comprehensive security policy, setbacks such as the UAE and Qatar reluctance to
cooperate and attacks on Japanese oil tankers reflect the difficulty with which Japan
hopes to seize international responsibility through such a policy.
c. US-Japan Capital Flows
The Carter and Reagan administrations formed contrasting economic
environments which greatly influenced foreign investments in the United States. While
Japanese investments during the Carter years had relatively little effect on US-Japan
relations, windfall yen investments during the Reagan administration have caused
nervousness among Americans as competition for private and government securities
developed. Although Japanese investments in government bonds are largely
responsible for funding the government's deficit spending, government officials and
private corporations became uneasy as Japanese takeovers of US corporations
appeared as foreign control of strategically important industries.
The US economy during the Carter years suffered the deepest recession
since World War II making US investments relatively unattractive to foreign capital
compared to later years. The "misery index," an index of unemployment plus inflation
126JEI, JEI Report No. 39B, October 6, 1987, p. 2.
"Proposal on Navigational System for Persian Gulf," December 8, 1987,
Yomiuri Shimbun, as found in FBIS East Asia, December 10, 1987, p.2.
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indexes, reached a peak of 20.6 percent at the end of the Carter years, compared to 1
1
percent in Reagan's seventh year in office. 128
Since November 1982, the United States has experienced the largest
peacetime expansion in US history by taming inflation and reducing the nation's
unemployment. While lower inflation and unemployment brought protracted economic
growth, this process brought unprecedented deficits in two accounts: the national
budget and current accounts of traded goods and services. While the government and
consumers spent more than they could actually afford, Japan's net flow of long term
capital investments to the US have increased over the years, providing much of the
balance of US over-consumption (see Table 13). In 1986, Japan poured S65.7 billion
into the United States, almost half of Japan's S131.5 billion total overseas investment
for the year. The figure is also significant compared to the bilateral current account
since Japanese investments in the United States actually exceeded the S53.8 billion US
trade deficit of that vear.
TABLE 13
JAPAN'S NET LONG TERM CAPITAL INVESTMENTS TO THE U.S.
(in millions of dollars)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Long-Term Capital -1,700 -5,541 -14,814 -33,163 -65,700
Direct Invests. -1,423 -1,041 -3,180 -2,043 -7,774
Trade Credits -788 -190 -195 -587 -334
Loans -243 -329 -477 -716 -690
Securities + 1,248 -3,943 -10,591 -29,874 -56,944
Other -494 -38 -371 + 57 -908
Note: Credits (+ ) indicate net inflows and debits (-) indicate net outflows.
Source: JEI, US-Japan Economic Relations Yearbook 1984-1985
(Washington. DC: JEI. 1986), p. 135; and JEI, JEI Report No. 29B, Julv
31, 1987,
w
p. 3-6, for 1986 statistics.
To fight inflation, the Federal Reserve and subsequently private banks
tightened credit in the late 1970s, while the government generated budget deficits as a
result of tax cuts and an inability to reduce government spending. Although the 1980
128Alan Murray and Ellen Hume, "Reagan's Fiscal Policy May Blight the Future
Despite Current Gains," The Wall Street Journal, 17 Nov 87, p.l.
debt was large at S737.7 billion, the debt grew to over SI. 813 trillion in 1986. In
1980, repayment of the national debt represented 9 percent of the total budget, growing
to 14 percent in 1987. 130 As interest rates climbed, drawing investments from various
foreign sources, so did the dollar, making US exports more expensive overseas and
foreign goods cheaper in the US. As a result, US trade deficits grew. By 1987, the US
trade deficit reached S171 billion, over four times the 1980 deficit of S36.2 billion. 131
As already noted, the G-5 nations agreed in 1985 to collectively reduce the
dollar's value in currency markets, however the rising trend in US trade and budget
deficits have continued. Moreover, overseas investments by Japan have grown making
Japan the largest creditor nation in the world, a distinction once held by the US, now
the world's largest deficit nation. 132 As US consumers continued to purchase foreign
goods and tried to maintain a standard of living at higher costs, personal savings rates
dropped from 7.1 percent in 1980 to 3.9 in 1986. The combination of high interest
rates, rising government deficits, and lower domestic savings created an environment
attractive to foreign investors. As the US economy became addicted to foreign capital,
Japanese direct investments canvassed the nation.
Overall Japanese direct foreign investments have doubled every four years
since March 1982 with the US as its prime location. In 1986, Japanese investment in
the US reached S10.2 billion with approximately S2.1 billion for the construction or
acquisition of US production and assembly facilities, primarily by export- oriented
corporations. Approximately SI billion of this investment was committed to industrial
and consumer electronics production facilities with the remaining Sl.l billion to
automotive equipment, chemicals and metals production plants. Japan's service
industries also took advantage of the stronger yen as these corporations invested in
American banking, finance, and insurance sectors with approximately S2 billion. The
most attractive investment in America for 1986 however, was real estate as Japanese
investors poured S3.6 billion into US land and structures. 133
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook- 1 987, p. 701.
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"Reagan Plan For '89 is Less Confrontational, Seeks Spending Rise For
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131JEI, JEI Report No. 34A, September A, 1987, p. 34.
132David Hale, "Protectionist Pressures: US as Debtor, A Threat to World
Trade," The New York Times, September 22, 1985, p. 2F.
133JEI, JEI Report No. 25B, July 2, 1987, p. 8-12.
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Yen indirect investments in the US were welcomed as Japan invested in
securities such as government and private bonds which paid for the bulk of government
and private deficit-spending. As the US became more attractive to Japanese investors
however, US tensions rose as Japanese control over US industries grew with yen direct
investments.
In early 1987 one of Japan's largest and most progressive electronics
corporations. Fujitsu Ltd., submitted for US approval plans to buy 80 percent of the
US based Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation. The company that had developed the
"planar process" for manufacturing integrated circuits in the fifties, was owned by
Schlumberger, a New York-based oil and electronics corporations controlled by French
interests. Fujitsu hoped to establish a production base and improve semiconductor
sales in the US, an industry that US Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige feared
Japan already dominated through unfair trade practices. While Baldrige opposed the
merger based on trade friction, he was later joined by Secretary of Defense Weinberger
who opposed the merger for reasons based on national security. Since Fairchild was a
major supplier of semiconductor products to the Department of Defense, Weinberger
viewed Japanese control over the corporation as a threat to national security. 134
Rising cabinet pressure against the acquisition caused Fujitsu to withdraw
its S200 million plan for Fairchild in March 1987, however the incident contributed to
economic tensions between the two nations. Explanations as to why the acquisition
threatened US security centered on the following points:
1 It will result in leaving part of the semi-conductor industry, which is supporting
the modernization of weapons, to foreign capital.
2 The greater part of the semi-conductor manufacturers in the US are full-time
petty and small enterprises, and cases of Japanese enterprises' taking over US
semi-conductor corporations may occur, one after another, touched ofT by the
Fairchild acquisition.
3 There is a possibility of American computer manufacturers' raising suddenly
the level of their reliance on Japanese or Japanese-affiliated semi-conductor
manufacturers. 135
134Brenton R. Schlender, "Fujitsu Drops Plans to Acquire US Chip Maker, The
Wall Streei Journal, Mar 17, 1987, p. 3.
135
"'Investment Protectionism' in US; Fujitsu Gives Up Buying Up Fairchild;
Abuse of 'Security' Feared; Big Barrier to Japanese Enterprises," Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
19 March 1987, p. 3, as found in American Embassy Translations, Tokyo, Japan.
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Although national security is clearly a just reason for opposing foreign acquisition of a
strategically sensitive industry, (in light of the "national-defense clause" which provides
for such protection) 136 Japanese officials were stunned that US cabinet members
opposed Japanese acquisitions of a US based corporation already under foreign
control, creating Japanese fear of "investment protectionism" in the United States.
Although many US policymakers have taken a defensive stance against the
rising level of Japanese investments in America as in Fujitsu's attempted purchase of
Fairchild, there are several advantages to yen investments which make such
apprehension unwarrented. Japan is an allied nation with strong economic and
security ties with the United States. Although the issue of equal burden sharing is
continually raised, the US and Japan share common security interests as allies,
manifested by the MST. Moreover, both nations seek security gains in the economic
arena through joint Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) development. As both
economies continue to develop, the growth of multinational corporations and economic
transactions are inevitable and the US and Japanese economies will become even
stronger by the interdependence realized through trade, overseas investment and
technology transfers. As already noted, yen investments have helped the US economy
continue its current economic expansion by providing investment capital to US
enterprises while also financing private and government deficit spending through
indirect investments such as purchases of government and corporate bonds as well as
direct investments through corporate stocks and real estate. Finally, Japanese direct
investments which affords foreign control of companies located in the US are still
subject to central and local government laws and directives, which should assure
"investment protectionists" of a US stake in foreign controlled companies. Protection
against foreign or domestic attempts to monopolize or overwhelm specific industries
therefore, already exists in present anti-trust laws which overseas investors must
adhere. In the most severe situations, should Japanese security or economic relations
with the US make drastic changes, the US maintains the ability to freeze foreign assets
as exercised recently against Iran and Panama. Although conditions forcing the US to
freeze Japanese assets would indeed reflect grim US-Japan relations, the fact that
measures to protect national interests from predatory foreign investments are available,
discounts the argument for investment protectionist policies against Japan.
Ub l9AS National Security Act, Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act,
and the 1977 International Economic Emergency Economic Authority Act.
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Despite Fujitsu's setback, Japanese investments in the US have grown,
giving Japan a huge stake in the welfare of the American economy, while supporting
US economic growth. As the US budget deficit climbed to SI. 8 trillion in 1987, the
flow of Japanese capital into US Treasury bonds and corporate securities has kept US
interest rates low, sustaining economic expansion. Due to the level of these
investments coupled with nearly 40 percent of its export market at stake in the US,
Japan is committed to sustaining the value of its dollar investments and avoiding a
serious US recession that would decrease the value of its investments as well as its
ability to export goods to the US market place. The analogy 'if America sneezes,
Japan catches pneumonia,' is even more applicable as the two economies become more
integrated through overseas capital investments. Due to this continued trend toward
interdependent economies, Japanese officials and business leaders acknowledge the fact
that a healthy US economy is as important to the Japanese as it is for Americans. 137
d. Security Implications of Japan-PRC Capital Flows
Although Japan's aid flows have expanded to distant areas, Asia continues
to be Japan's primary recipient of development assistance, and in recent years, the
PRC has become Japan's number one aid recipient (see Figure 4.3). The 1978 Sino-
Japanese trade agreement established a fundamental link between the two countries
which functions to the benefit of Western allies. To nurture Sino-Japanese ties, a 320
billion yen (SI. 5 billion) loan was provided in 1979 for modernization projects. In
March of 1984, Japan committed a second load package of 470 billion yen (S2.08
billion) for modernization projects planned for 1984 to 1990. Since 1982, the PRC has
been Japan's number one ODA recipient; in 1985 the PRC received S388 billion, over
10 percent of Japan's total ODA disbursements.
In addition to ODA credits, Japan's Export-Import Bank has extended over
S2 billion from 1979 to 1984 to the PRC for coal and oil resource development.
Included in these efforts are joint venture energy resource projects, such as the ofT
shore oil project between China's Bohai Oil Corp. and Japan's Chengbei Oil
Development Corporation. 138
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Figure 4.3 Japan's Top 15 Aid Recipients- 1986.
China's loans from foreign investors have rocketed in recent years. Total
foreign capital (which includes ODA, and other direct and indirect forms of
investments) in 1983 reached S9.61 billion, while estimates for 1986 indicate that
overseas investments will be between S25 and S26 billion. 139 In the current Five-Year
Plan ending in 1990, Beijing has indicated its modernization programs will seek
approximately S40 billion in loans from the international market. 140 At the cost of
lending at lower interest rates, Japan has been extremely aggressive to ensure much of
China's demand for foreign capital comes from Japanese sources. While US banks
typically refuse to lend China at a minimum of .25 percent above the London
Interbank offered rate, Japanese banks often lend below this rate. 141
Profits and access to the China market are certainly significant aspects of
Japan's interest in the PRC, however China's urgent need for capital to finance its
modernization projects and Japanese capital flows have established a symbiotic
relationship with security implications. Both Beijing and Tokyo share a common
139
"China's Appetite For Hard Currency Could Be Boom for Commercial
Banks," The Wall Street Journal, 8 May 1987, p. 16.
140
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141
"Japan Winning Race in China," Nicholas Dikristof, The New York Times, 29
April 1987.
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strategic interest in containing the Soviet Union. In addressing this threat, Japan
clearly wants to enlist China's support in addition to that of the United States.
Additionally, it is obvious to Tokyo and other Asian countries that a stable,
modernizing China can contribute to overall peace and stability East Asia. Japanese
capital flows to the PRC therefore maintain an economic link yielding returns in the
form of security, clearly an investment formula within the designs of comprehensive
security. While the PRC enjoys capital flows due to its diplomatic progress with the
West, status as a "developing nation, and its ability to make ideological compromises
for economic practicality, Soviet progress toward gaining Japanese technology and
capital assets have been at a near stand still.
e. Security Implications of Japan-Soviet Capital Flows
The Soviet Union hopes to attract Japanese capital and technology to help
finance its efforts toward economic recover}'. The dismal performance of the Soviet
centrally planned economy is evident in a comparison of previous five-year plans and
results. Targets established by the Soviet Union's 1976-1980 Five-Year Plan sought 5
percent annual growth in Gross National Product. 142 Acknowledging a sluggish
economy with declining growth, Moscow lowered its growth target in the 1981-1986
Plan. Soviet planners sought a modest 4 percent annual growth, however even this
figure proved to be excessively optimistic as the Soviet economy achieved only 2.0
percent growth. Moscow's most recent Five-Year Plan for 1986-1990 reduced its target
even further with a growth target of only 3.5 to 4.0 percent per year (see Table 14).
The Soviet Union's 12th Five-Year Plan for 1986-1990 placed special
emphasis on improving labor productivity and product quality as the primary means of
reactivating its ailing economy. To be successful, Moscow is cognizant of the fact that
it must import high technology equipment and plants at a time when foreign currency
reserves are low due to falling exports precipitated by a slump in oil prices. Soviet
economic shortfalls are therefore a combination of high technology and capital assets.
Development of Eastern Siberia is an integral aspect of Moscow's overall
plan to reactivate its economy. Moscow hopes to exploit the resources in Soviet East
Asia by industrializing the region. Led by Party Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev,
Moscow aims to exploit the region's natural resources by focussing on six concerns:
development of ocean resources; utilization of the region's extremely rich natural
resources for locally produced finished products; excavation of fuel resources, such as
gas, coal, and oil; improved production infrastructure; upgrade all aspects of
142CIA, p. 64.
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production with the latest technology; and development of export - import trade
facilities to include production cooperation and joint enterprises. 143 Although Eastern
Siberia has tremendous potential for Soviet economic expansion, foreign investment in
the Soviet Union remains low for several reasons. Among the most significant is cost
effectiveness. While the region is abundant in mineral and energy resources, current
commodity prices make these resources too expensive to excavate and process. 144
The United States, even beyond the nadir of Cold War relations, has
worked to minimize Japan's economic progress toward excavating Soviet minerals. In
light of Soviet actions in Afghanistan and martial law imposed in Poland, Reagan
declared an embargo on oil and natural gas development equipment on June 18, 1982
against the Soviet Union. Since Japan and the Soviet Union were engaged in joint
development of Sakhalin oil and natural gas, Tokyo quickly requested exemption from
the embargo, but was refused. Although Washington later lifted the embargo in
December, the incident left ill feelings between Japan and the US. 145 Since Europe and
the United States have no interest in this affair, rapprochement with Japan has been
aggressively, however clumsily, pursued. Moscow has attempted to attract Japanese
143Mikhail Gorbachev, 28 July Speech in Vladivostok as found in FBIS: USSR
National Affairs Vol. Ill, 29 July 1986, p. R5-R7.
144
Leifer, p. 47.
145Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian Security- 1983, p. 39-40.
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investment by relaxing joint venture laws and exchange of mineral resources realized
through Siberian development 146 while avoiding a significant obstacle to improved
Japan-Soviet relations: Soviet control of the northern territories.
Tokyo's apprehensions about actively investing in the Soviet Union are a
combination of economic, political, and security concerns. Economically, Japanese
experience in Siberian development projects have proved to be high risk investments.
Difficult negotiations have resulted in few accomplishments and often, as in the case of
the Tyumen oil project and Moscow's decision to build the Baikal-Amur Mainline,
much frustration. The decision to build the BAM also had political implications as the
PRC, concerned that the transportation line threatened its border, influenced Japan's
decision to not participate in the project.
Japan was also concerned with security implications of becoming too
dependent on the Soviet Union for its strategic resources. Particularly after the
experience of two oil shocks, unpredictable Soviet behavior in overall global affairs,
and Soviet refusal to negotiate a settlement over the northern territories, resource
dependency on the Soviet Union is clearly detrimental to Japan's comprehensive
security concerns. The potential for Japanese profits or influencing Soviet behavior
through capital investment remain relatively low while risks are high. Although many
Japanese businesses are willing to accept high risks for profit, Tokyo successfully acts
as the conscience of Japanese businesses by discouraging private investments in the
Soviet Union.
3. Exports
Japan averted catastrophic recession after the 1973 oil embargo by making
adjustments to economic practices. With the exception of energy conservation
measures, the most obvious and dramatic adjustment was an increase in exports and
greater dependence on foreign markets. Japanese exports increased 60 percent in 1974
over the previous year, as exports assumed a greater percentage of the nation's
economic growth. Many of these exports went to the United States which renewed
trade tensions between the two countries.
Exports gradually assumed a greater portion of Japan's economy as domestic
demand lagged behind. While exports as a percentage of GNP averaged 10.6 percent
from 1961 to 1973, this figure increased to 13 percent for the period 1973 to 1979 and
15 percent for 1980 to 1985 (see Figure 4.4). In contrast to these figures, US exports
146
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comprised an average of only 6.6 percent and 6.5 percent for the same periods. As
Japan's exports became the fundamental instrument for continued prosperity, US-
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Figure 4.4 Japan's Domestic Demand and Export Percentages of GNP- 1973-85.
Although domestic demand played a central role in postwar economic
recovery, the economic miracle and Japan's ability to overcome global economic crises
is centered around economic growth manifested by rising exports. In addition to
dependence on foreign markets, dependence on other nations for raw materials and fuel
presents a situation where Japan can afford few enemies. As a result, Japan's
omnidirectional foreign policy adopted in the 1950s in support of the Yoshida
Doctrine, continues to have a strong influence in current foreign affairs. Particularly
since the Arab- Israeli War and OPEC's decision to curtail oil supplies to nations not
supportive of the Arab cause, Japan has carefully positioned itself in the international
political arena to maintain good relations with all nations while comfortably
conducting trade with practically every marketplace of the world. Highlighting the
significance of trade, Japan attempts to separate political issues from those of
economic ones, thereby attempting to legitimize trade with nations inimical to the
Western alliance.
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Japan's continued dependence on the US for its economic growth is
manifested in its reliance on the American marketplace for its exports. Japanese
exports to the US comprised an average 33.2 percent of Japan's total exports from
1982 to 1986. The significance of the US market to Japan is even more impressive
when contrasted with Japan's other trading partners. In 1986, Japan's best customers
after the US were West Germany and South Korea, both purchasing only 5 percent of
Japan's total exports. The United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, France, West
Germany and Italy combined imported only 18 percent, while Southeast Asia
(comprised of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei,
Philippines, Indonesia and India for this comparison) represent 20 percent of Japan's
foreign customers. Dependence on communist countries for Japanese exports totalled
only 6.7 percent or S14.1 billion with exports to the Soviet Union equal to S3. 2 billion
(1.5 percent of Japan's total). More than twice the volume of that sent to the Soviet
Union, the PRC comprised 4.7 percent of Japan's foreign demand, equalling S9.8
billion.
14
' Although Japan's exports to the PRC in 1986 were only slightly greater than
its exports to Taiwan, the PRC's vast population and recent push for economic
modernization suggest a tremendous long-term potential for absorbing Japan's
economic growth, particularly in light of growing trade tensions and protectionist fears
with other trade partners.
As Japanese exports surged after the first oil crisis, trade frictions developed
with other industrialized nations. By 1980, US-Japan trade tensions were high as the
US experienced its own economic difficulties precipitated by the second oil crisis of
1979. Japanese initiatives to reduce tensions included export restraints as a temporary
measure to help US industries recover from economic difficulties; most notable is the
voluntary restraint on auto exports imposed by MITI in 1981 and still in effect,
limiting auto exports to the US to 2.3 million units. The US policy to resolve trade
tensions has been a product-by-product, "retail" approach to open foreign markets.
While this approach requires several negotiators, meetings and often discussions over
minute details, it serves to focus efforts in problem areas while limiting the detrimental
effects of retaliation, should such tactics be necessary. By focussing on specific areas
such as agricultural goods, construction projects, computer microchips, and tobacco
products, the US limits the scope of its tensions with Japan while separating these
problems from areas where good relations are firmly established. Although the surge
of exports to the US in the wake of the two oil crises relieved economic pressures in
l7
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Japan, economic conditions of the 1980s reminded the Japanese of their dependence
on a healthy US economy.
Poor economic conditions in the US had detrimental effects on Japan. The
US's performance in real economic growth from 1980 to 1983 was poor as yearly GNP
growth rates were -1.5, 1.9, -2.5, and 3.5 percent. While 1984's real GNP growth figure
jumped to 6.5 percent, Japanese exports to the US rocketed as the current account
balance reached a deficit of S 106.49 billion dollars, over twice the previous year. 148 Of
the SI 06.49 billion trade deficit bore by the United States, Japan alone claimed $40.59
billion. As US economic growth staggered to 2.3 in 1985, Japanese exports to the US
also fell by approximately 3 percent. Monetary policy once again surfaced in
international economic relations similar to US initiatives in 1971, as leaders of the
world's five largest industrialized democracies known as the Group of Five (or G-5) -
United States, Japan, West Germany, France, and Great Britain - met in late
September 1985. The industrial nations agreed that a concerted effort to lower the
dollar's value was necessary to narrow the US trade deficit and invigorate the global
economy. Following the agreement, the dollar fell sharply against the yen and other
currencies making US goods more competitive by reducing their cost in foreign
currencies.
The meeting marked a drastic change in Japan's economic performance.
While the yen maintained a 240 to 250 level for the first half of 1985, economic growth
was active, however after the decision to realign currency rates, the yen rapidly
appreciated bringing stagnation to Japan's economy. Immediately before the G-5
meeting, the yemdollar level was 240:1. By the following month, the yen appreciated
over 16 percent to 200 yen, and in two years, the yen had appreciated 68 percent to
143. Exacerbating this trend, continued global US trade deficits triggered a stock
market crash on October 19, 1987, waning confidence in the US economy and driving
the dollar to a record low of 128 yen to the dollar in December of that year.
The strengthening yen battered Japan's export-oriented industries as export
products to the United States became proportionately more expensive vis a vis the yen's
appreciation. To maintain profits, several industries grudgingly raised wholesale prices
at rates slower than the yen's appreciation. 149 In spite of higher costs in dollar terms,
demand for Japanese products remained high as exports increased by over 4 percent in
U
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19S5. largely due to Japanese price increases rather then rises in volume. Japanese
demand for foreign products in 1985 however, dropped by almost 3 percent causing
Japan's trade surplus to widen further.
Although the yen's appreciation finally drew exports down in 1986, the G-5's
plans of reducing Japan's trade surplus seemed to backfire as the stronger yen and
falling oil prices increased Japan's surplus figure. From 1980 to 1985, oil prices
burdened industrial nations as prices hovered between S28 and S32 per barrel. In late
1985, Saudi Arabian oil suppliers broke ranks with OPEC and unilaterally raised
production, dragging 1986 global oil prices down to approximately SI 5 per barrel.
Since oil transactions are based on dollar equivalents, the stronger yen purchased more
oil, reducing the level of Japanese imports to its lowest level since 1978. Rather than
reducing trade imbalances, the stronger yen produced a phenomenon known to
economists as the J-curve, creating larger dollar transactions with smaller trade volume,
pushing Japanese surpluses even higher. 150
In view of these developments, the group of industrialized nations (joined by
Canada and Italy to form the G-7), met in Louve, France to reach an agreement in
stabilizing exchange rates through government intervention in February 1987. By
using foreign currency reserves and adjusting federal discount rates (interest rates
applied by central banks for money lent to large private banks), the G-7 nations agreed
to prop up and stabilize the dollar.
The failure of monetary policies to reduce the US trade deficit brought strident
criticism from Congress. The Democratic majority of the 100th Congress began its
first session by reintroducing the 1986 trade bill HR 4800, as HR 3 on its first day.
Although the White House had consistently vetoed protectionist legislation, the
Democratic majority hoped that the growing trade deficit and rising tensions between
the US and its trade partners (particularly Japan, the Republic of Korea, Federal
Republic of Germany, and Taiwan) would contribute to greater support for the bill.
Among the several measures included in the omnibus trade bill are required disclosure
of foreign investments in the US (John Bryant, D., Texas), Federal Reserve Board
restriction from granting primary dealer status to foreign firms if US companies do not
have equal access to purchases of government debt instruments in the dealer's home
countries (Charles Schumer, D., NY), and provisions directing the US Trade
Representative to initiate a Section 301 investigation (Section 301 of the 1974 Trade
Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian Security- 1986 (NY, New
York: Brassey's Defense Publisher, 1986), p. 168-9.
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Bill) of restrictions on US architectural, engineering, construction and consulting
services in Japan. Perhaps the most threatening aspect of the bill, however, was an
amendment proposed by Representative Richard Gephardt (D., MO.) requiring the
international Trade Commission to identify countries with "unwarranted" trade
surpluses to the President. The President would then be required to take actions to
reduce that nation's surplus by at least 10 percent until unfair trade practices have
stopped or trade imbalances reach a tolerable level. According to the amendment, a
nation had an "unwarranted" surplus if its export to import ratio with the US exceeded
175 percent, its total US trade was greater than S7 billion, its bilateral surplus was
greater than S3 billion (with the exception of petroleum), and had a global trade
surplus. 151 In effect, the Gephardt Amendment called for an end to the standing
"retail" trade policy by introducing a retaliatory trade policy based on "wholesale"
measures of bilateral trade flows and patterns of trade barriers. 152
t
The Republican response headed by Senator Robert Dole (R., Kansas) and
House Representative Robert Michel (R. IL), came on February 19, 1987 when the
respective minority leaders proposed S 539 and HR 115, identical bills taking a more
focussed view of trade problems than HR 3. It identified five areas key to improving
US competitiveness: increased protection for intellectual property rights; legal and
regulatory reforms; and "improving the international economic environment" through
trade law reform. Although the House has passed the HR 3 trade bill in April along
with a Senate revision, the Republican supported trade bill is still being considered in
Congress. The Senate amended HR 3 maintained restrictive presidential authority in
the case of unfair trade practices, the Senate bill did not include the 10 percent
requirement to reduce bilateral trade deficits, giving greater discretion to the executive
office. In light of the Toshiba-Kongsberg incident, the Senate bill also included a two
to five year ban on Toshiba imports as sanctions against the Japanese company.
To ease pressures from Congress and the semiconductor industry, President
Reagan imposed a 100 percent retaliatory tariff on Japanese semiconductor exports
after Japan's computer chip manufacturers continued to violate a July 1986
semiconductor agreement to stop unfair trade practices (primarily dumping) in the US
and other countries. 153 Although this sanction relieved some protectionist pressure by
151JEI, JEI Report No. J9A, May 15, 1987, p. 1-6.
152Walter S. Mossberg, "Trade Policy Dilemma: Wholesale or Retail," The Wall
Street Journal, March 14, 1988, p. 1.
153Brenton R. Schlender, "US Chip Firms Ask Reagan to Penalize Japanese
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taking a tougher stance on unfair trade issues, advocates of these measures have kept
HR 3 alive in Congress and on the presidential campaign trail as a threat to nations
dependent on the US market.
Controversy over HR 3 typifies the attitudes in Congress over trade
legislation. While adverse trade statistics served to fuel Japan-bashing reactionaries
and their pursuit for retaliatory measures, other perspectives in Congress have prefered
a more practical approach to trade problems by avoiding punitive measures and opting
for a more focussed approach to trade disparities. As the the global economy becomes
more integrated and multinational corporations and cooperatives play a more
significant role in investment, production, and trade, monthly trade statistics ranking
current account surpluses and deficits will assume less importance in economic and
security policymaking. 154
Although both houses passed an amended version of HR 3, the bill faces an
inevitable presidential veto. Despite its demise, the omnibus trade bill served an
important role in US policymaking. With Richard Gephardt's poor showing as a
presidential candidate, the results of his campaign demonstrate a lack of national
support for his protectionist stance. Due to Gephardt's poor support, his amendment
was dropped from the bill and the exercise served to quiet Japan-bashers and defuse
protectionist sentiments in Congress. Even more important, defeat of a retaliatory bill
based on general trade indicators, prevented economic conditions injurious to Japan's
vital economy and therefore Western security in Asia.
4. Science and Technology
As already noted in previous sections, the application of advanced technology
in Japan has contributed to its economic growth in areas such as energy efficiency;
expansion of food supplies; industrial efficiency; and product improvement, particularly
in export goods to better compete in international markets. Until the late seventies,
Japanese domestic research and development efforts were minimal and most
technologies required to boost industrial efficiency and Japan's overall economy came
from industrialized countries, primarily the United States. Two decades ago, Japan's
position in technology reflected its developing country status as its technology trade
ratio (receipts compared with payments for patent royalties, licenses, etc.) was 1:47 and
Japanese researchers numbered a mere 25 for every 10,000 members of the work force,
Makers, Threatening Accord," The Wall Street Journal, February 10, 1987, p. 2.
154 Kenichi Ohmae, Beyond National Borders: Reflections on Japan and the World
(Homewood, IL: Dow Jones-Irwin, 1987), p. 21-42.
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compared to 64 researchers per 10,000 in the United States. 155 In addition to these
statistics reflecting Japan's relatively modest position in technology trade and research
efforts, Japan, until 1973, has made few gains as a developer of original technologies
and has been more adept at implementing good ideas toward consumer goods. In an
article of The Economist featuring Japanese and US high-technology, Stanford
University's Daniel Okimoto lists several reason's for Japan's lack of technological
originality:
• As an industrial latecomer, Japan has always been trying to catch up.
• The Japanese tendency towards group conformity has made it difficult to win a
hearing at home for radical ideas.
• Research in Japanese universities is bureaucratic, starved of cash and dominated
by old men.
• The venture-capital market is almost non-existant.
• Lifetime employment, along with a rigid seniority system, stifles innovation
inside industry.
• The traditional heavy gearing (high debt-to-equity ratio) of much of Japanese
industry has made firms think twice about taking risks. 156
Although these reasons were applicable in the past, economic developments in currency
realignments, deregulation of Tokyo's financial markets, and capital formation have
created a new, if not necessary environment for greater initiative in domestic research
and development efforts. Since 1974, Japan's economy has shown signs of economic
maturity which have signalled the need to address new economic challenges and grasp
additional responsibilities.
Among the most significant signs of Japan's economic maturity indicating new
challenges is the slower rate of economic growth compared to its two previous decades.
In Japan: Facing Economic Maturity, Edward J. Lincoln acknowledges the significant
effects of the two oil crises on Japan's economic slowdown, however notes that Japan's
performance relative to other industrial nations has also dropped. 157 In line with his
central theme, Japan since the mid-1970s has been a nation in the midst of economic
maturity and, as a result, has essentially caught up with the leading industrialized
nations of the world in several areas, most notably technology. The traditional low-
155 T
^Lynn, p. 418.
156Nicholas Valery, "High-Technology: Japan and the United States: A Survey,"
The Economist, August 23, 1986, p. S5.
15 Edward J. Lincoln, Japan: Facing Economic Maturity (Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institute, 1988), p. 39-68.
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risk approach of importing technologies developed by other nations, then applying
foreign know-how to out-produce and out-price other countries for market shares is
slowly coming to an end. As a maturing nation, importing advanced technology to
boost economic growth will become increasingly difficult as Japan nears technological
parity with its industrialized partners.
Although importing technology to improve production has been by no means
inexpensive, until recently Japanese industries have been able to avoid the more
expensive costs of domestic research and development that advanced nation's on the
leading edge of technology find necessary to maintain competitiveness. While these
costs have become extremely high, the rates of return on investment are typically low.
Despite these high costs, Japanese industries have recently accepted the necessity to
conduct domestic research and development. Although progress toward developing
endogenous technologies has been slow, recent developments indicate Japan is actively
preparing for its technological future, while potentially creating a new field for US-
Japan competition, if not tensions.
Even as the yen reached new highs and Japanese manufacturing export
industries were among the first to feel the economic pressure, private company research
and development expenditures continued to rank high in their budgets. The steel
industry which underwent exceptional hardship since the yen's climb, is maintaining
research and development spending in the face of cheaper steel produced in countries
such as Korea and Brazil realized through currency realignments. Nippon Kokan,
Japan's second largest steel company, increased research and development spending 15
percent in 1986 while Kobe Steel and Kawasaki Steel have stubbornly maintained
spending levels from the previous year. While these companies acknowledge the fact
that Japan's steel industry will never regain production levels of the seventies, Japan's
steel industry represent the attitude of "sunset industries" which are developing
technologies for their transition to new fields. Kobe Steel researchers, for example, are
studying biotechnology, water processing and alcohol production; Kawasaki Steel has
committed 60 percent of its over 400 researchers to non-steel areas such as laser
development, semi-conductors, solar cells, and synthetic materials. The attitude of
committing assets to research and development is common among sunset industries
weakened by Japan's hollowization, as well as thriving industrial sectors. According to
managing director of Japan's prosperous Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, "When
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things get rough, the trend here is to focus even more on research ... that's one of our
weapons against the high yen." 158
Japan ranks among the top as a nation committed to research and
development. In 1985 Japan ranked third in total research investments, behind the US
and Soviet Union, spending 7.894 trillion yen (S54.7 billion), 60 percent of what the US
spent in the same year (see Appendix F). As a percentage of GNP, Japanese
investments surpassed the US with 2.77 percent compared to 2.72 of the US. 159 To
economize its scientific assets, policymakers have taken the the initiative to coordinate
efforts of the government's research assets by consolidating scientists and research
facilities, hoping to achieve more rapid technological gains.
In 1980, the Japanese government under the direction of MITI, the Ministry
of Construction, the National Land Agency, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry,
and Fisheries completed a long-range plan to establish a center for government
research and development laboratories. Conceived in September 1961 by members of
the Ikeda Cabinet, the plan called for establishing a science city outside the
increasingly congested metropolis of Tokyo, to pool the research assets of the
government agencies. Although the concept was formed as early as the 1960's,
progress toward establishing the science city, or "City of Brains" as it is popularly
called, has been hampered by several problems, not least of which have been resistance
to acquire precious land from angry farmers and reluctance on the part of researchers
to move to a relatively undeveloped area where star-gazing served as the primary use of
leisure time.
After investing over S5.5 billion in government funds, Tsukuba City has
become the high-tech research capital of Japan with its laboratories taking on an
almost religious aura because of their importance for Japan's economic future.
Although the project was initially planned only for government research facilities, the
city, located only thirty-five miles northeast of Tokyo, now supports over 11,500
researchers in 46 government institutes and seven private research institutes, as well as
two universities. From these facilities, advanced technologies are being developed to
propel Japan's new industries into high-tech fields. Research and development are
currently being conducted in futuristic areas such as superconductivity, a fifth
1 Stephen K. Yoder, "Japan's Troubled Industries Stress Research and
Development," The Wall Street Journal, 25 March 1987, p. 28.
159
"Japan Allots a Greater share of GNP To Research Spending than US Does,"
The Wall Street Journal, 24 December 1986, p. 14.
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generation supercomputer with artificial thought capabilities for high speed information
processing, advanced robotics also with artificial intelligence capabilities,
biotechnology methods for advanced medicines and food production, fine ceramics to
relieve dependence on natural resources, and artificial energy production techniques to
ease Japan's reliance on foreign energy sources. 160
As Japan bolsters its ability to conduct basic research, its scientific and
economic community have maintained strong academic ties with the United States,
acknowledging the fact that Japan still looks to the West for basic innovations that
drive technology. Many Japanese companies send their promising engineers to
engineering schools and science centers to help maintain Japan's research pace with
leading-edge technology developments, but more important, to learn how American
scientists create new technologies. Japanese visitors are typically more interested in
how American scientists conduct research, rather than specific technologies developed
in projects. Companies committed to basic research have been especially attracted to
the Massachusettes Institute of Technology and University of California at Berkeley, as
these universities have become popular finishing schools for Japanese researchers. 161
Although it trails the US in basic research achievements, Japanese industries
have been extremely successful in applying new technologies to profitable products
such as steel, automobiles, consumer electronics and cheap microchips. In each of
these sectors. Japan's successes have been at the expense of their US counterpart who
have often failed to make timely use of the latest technologies toward marketable
products. As a result, the US dominance in technology trade has dwindled from S23.6
billion in 1980 to S5 billion in 1984. As Japan continues to gain ground in applied
technologies and commits assets to improve domestic research and development, Japan
hopes its next dominant sector will be the high-tech industries.
With the experience gained by the Tsukuba project and studying the
development of other science centers such as California's Silicon Valley and North
Carolina's Research Triangle, Japan launched its Technopolis program in 1980.
Although the aim of this program is to develop science centers throughout Japan, in
contrast to Tsukuba's research center, the Technopolis program is designed to establish
19 cities where government, private enterprises and universities will focus their assets in
cooperative research efforts (see Figure 4.5). Also, the Technopolis program relies
160Tatsuno, p. 93-112.
161 David Stipp, "Japan's Top Engineers and Scientists Receive Extra Training at
MIT," The Wall Street Journal, January 23, 1987, p. 1.
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more on private corporations and municipal funds with the aid of government tax
incentives as Tokyo continues to exercise fiscal austerity in the face of rising deficits.
By collecting efforts from these three areas, policymakers hope Japan will make more
rapid technological gains with immediate application in high-tech industries while
relieving the congestion in major metropolitan areas, particularly Tokyo and Osaka.
Although the Technopolis centers will be dispersed throughout the country, planners
intend to integrate these centers through advanced communications systems currently
being developed by Japan's recently privatized Nippon Telephone and Telegraph
(NTT).
As Japan makes its commitment to creating advanced technologies through
research and development, these efforts will make contributions to Japan's national
interest and concept of national security by bolstering its economic assets. While
making these gains, the high-tech field has also been a source of both tensions and
potential mutual security burden-sharing with the United States. Tensions in the field
of high-technology have developed in several areas as sophisticated Japanese products
have become more competitive in global markets. Friction in the electronics field was
manifested by the US Semiconductor Industry Association's (SIA) complaint of
Japanese computer chip-dumping in accordance with the Article 301 provision of the
1974 Trade Act. The complaint, filed in June 1985, led to a 100 percent tariff against
S300 million worth of Japanese chips imposed by President Reagan in April 1987.
In an area of even greater technological sophistication, the FSX project was
to lay the technological foundation of a more competitive aircraft industry by
developing and producing Japan's own jet fighter for the 1990s. Instead, the program
fell under the weight of the Toshiba incident and pending omnibus trade bill. On
October 2, 1987, Japan's Defense Agency Director Kurihara Yuko announced Japan's
intent to co-license either General Dynamic Corporation's F-16 or the McDonnell
Douglas Corporation's F-15. The decision to forgo development of Japan's domestic
FSX was obviously a measure to reduce tensions as George Packard notes:
It was significant that Senator John Danforth (R., MO.), a leading advocate of
tougher trade measures against Japan, also hails from the state which is home to
both McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics. The Japanese understood,
correctly that a decision to go it alone would have produced a firestorm on
Capital Hill. They would have been charged with exacerbating the US trade
deficit. The political and military alliance would have become hopelessly
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Figure 4.5 Proposed Technopolis Sites.
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been strengthened, and the Toshiba sanctions would almost certainly have
become law. 162
The potential for Japanese research and development to contribute to mutual
defense and reduce criticism of a 'free ride' exists, however such contributions have not
yet been realized. Out-spent, out-manned and out-gunned by the Soviet Union, the
Western strategy headed by the US is to rely on superior technological capability to
produce the force multiplier effects that maintain Western deterrence, or if necessary,
affords the ability to fight out numbered and win. 163 The "Competitive Strategy" and
Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI) emphasizes the need to pool research and
development efforts by Western allies to achieve the necessary level of advanced
technology for military weapons.
In January 1983, Japan agreed to provide the United States, defense related
technology on a case-by-case basis, however little progress has been in this area. Over
three years later, only two defense-related technology transfers were discussed. The
first transfer discussed, was Toshiba Corporation's missile tracking and guiding
technology to the US Army, and second Ishikawa-Harima Heavy Industries' "armed
tanker" building technology to the US Navy. 164 But as of May 1988, only two defense
related technology transfers have been completed, both related to upgrading weapons
systems on US Navy ships. The avenues in which Japan can make significant
contributions in defense related technology toward mutual security have expanded with
Japan's decision to participate in the research and development stage of SDI.
Additionally, Tokyo's decision to co-license production of the F-16 and undergo
development to upgrade the aircraft creates another avenue for Japanese researchers to
contribute to mutual security in the vein of CDI.
As with the Strategic Defense Initiative, Japanese researchers are willing to
participate in CDI research, however their participation is not just a contrivance for
military security, but also a catalyst for bringing spectacular scientific breakthroughs
and industrial advances. 165 As its research assets become more sophisticated, Japan's
162Packard, 356-7.
Defense Department Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinburger
on the FY 88 Budget and FY 88-92 Defense Programs (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Plant, 1987), p 245-251.
164
"Armed Tanker Technology to be provided to US," Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
August 21, 1986, p. 1.
165Takase Shoji, "What 'Star Wars' means to Japan," Japan Quarterly: 32
ability to make valuable contributions to mutual security in an economic vein can
increase with cooperation, or deteriorate under the weight of bilateral tensions. US
and Japanese attempts to establish a more cooperative arrangement would not only
improve economic relations, but also enhance the posture of mutual security.
(July September 1985) 3, p. 244.
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V. CONCLUSION
The research for this study has analyzed the development of the security
environment in the Pacific Asian region since World War II and the factors in the
concomitant growth of Japan's economy. It supports the original hypothesis that the
Japanese are convinced that the maintenance of a satisfactory security situation
requires peace and stability which is as dependent on Japan's economic strength as
upon the military might of the United States.
This thesis has examined the nature of Japan's domestic demands, exports,
capital formation and science and technology as they developed since the close of
world war. In the aftermath of war, while its economy was in ruin, American
economic and security policies accommodated Japan's dependence on the United
States. Now however, Japan is no longer a developing nation on the brink of
starvation, and through the economic foundation established during the late 1950s and
1960s, Japan has managed to overcome major threats, becoming stronger after
surmounting each challenge. With an economy that has amassed huge capital assets
and technological skills, Japan's presence in global affairs wields tremendous influence
with the United States which has become dependent on foreign investments, with
communist nations hoping to restart economic development, and with developing
nations seeking economic assistance and stability. While the Soviet Union undergoes
its professed economic and political reforms, Moscow looks to Japan as a potential
source of capital and technology to boost its economy. Although Soviet leaders
remain hopeful in securing foreign investments, Japanese apprehensions over the
symbolic northern territories, and more significantly unpredictable global behaviour
and fading prospects of profitable returns have made investment opportunities in the
PRC more attractive.
Japan occupies a significant role in the economic development of Asia and
therefore its stability. Recently, it has also fulfilled a role in linking a communist giant
to the West. This role is not new to Japan as it has been a principle actor in nurturing
the economically successful Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC's) of the Pacific.
Through its abundant assets in capital, technology, and managerial skills,
comprehensive security has made contributions to mutual security in ways a stronger
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defense force could not achieve. As the financial center of Asia, Japan's interests in
supporting an economically viable and stable region capable of conducting
international commerce have served US interests as well. In contrast to its relations
with the NIC s. Japan's ties with the PRC fulfills a security role in East-West relations
as Beijing's closest tie to the West realized through the 1978 trade agreement, followed
by large capital flows. Underlying this economic strength however, is Japan's
relationship with the United States. The strains between the two are increasingly
evident.
The US-Japan relationship is still strong in spite of tensions in trade, technology,
investment and pressures upon Japan for heavier defense expenditures. Although
heavily dependent on trade, Tokyo often takes an overprotective view of its own
domestic markets. Despite the Japanese government making tremendous progress in
leading sunset industries toward futuristic high-tech sectors, it continues to subsidize an
inefficient agricultural sector at the expense of high prices and greater tensions with the
United States. The US feels it must maintain its product-by-product policy of
addressing trade disputes with Japan, either bilaterally or in an international forum
such as GATT. Japan appears more willing to accept an international role
commensurate with its economic strength, yet so fraught with security responsiblities.
Japan's economy now relies more on advanced technology to meet its challenges
in areas such as resource dependency, export competitiveness, and economic slowdown
manifested by a shrinking heavy-industry sector. As Japan's research and development
fields advance to the cutting edge, the relationship among the group of leading
technology nations can bolster security efforts for the West through cooperation, or
compound economic tensions among friendly nations where trade and investment
imbalances have already caused uneasy partnerships.
A fundamental question is whether the two countries are satisfied with the
asymmetrical relationship which casts Japan as the junior partner in the present
security arrangement. The report on Comprehensive Security suggests that Japan is
not a junior partner, but contributes equally to security through economic means. In
the American view, Japan's position as an economic superpower is of much lower risk
than that of the United States. If Japan truely wants to fulfill a global role
commensurate with its economic position, it must assume more responsibility as a
provider of the means of deterrence and defense.
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At the same time, Japan appreciates the depth of its Asian neighbors fear of a
reborn militaristic, ultra-nationalistic Japan. The United States and Japan together
must work to avoid the reappearance of the nightmares that haunted Greater East Asia
on the eve of World War II. As powerful allies, United States and Japan together
must continue to work to find the optimum mix of economic strength and military'
power on the part of both that will guarantee peace, stability and potential progress




TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN
Following is the text of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security signed at
Washington, DC on January 19, I960, ratified by the US Senate on June 22, I960,
ratified by the President of the United States on June 22, I960, and ratified by Japan on
June 21, I960. Ratifications were exchanged at Tokyo on June 23, 1960, proclaimed by
the President of United States on June 27, I960, and entered into force on June 23,
I960. 166
The United States of America and Japan,
Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing
between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the
rule of law,
Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to
promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all government,
Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,
Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of
international peace and security in the Far East,
Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security.
Therefore agree as follows:
Article I
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle
any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any states, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
166 United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol II
(Washington. DC: US Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 1632-5.
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The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to
strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace
and security may be discharged more effectively.
Article II
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and
friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing
about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are
founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to
eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic
collaboration between them.
Article III
The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to
their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.
Article IV
The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation
of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or
international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.
Article V
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories
under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional provisions and processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with
the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain
international peace and security.
Article VI
For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of
international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is
granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.
The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed
forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the
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Administrative Agreement under Article II of the Security Treaty between the United
States of America and Japan, signed at Tokyo on February' 28, 1952, as amended, and
by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.
Article VII
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way
the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the
responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and
security.
Article VIII
This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on
the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them
in Tokyo. *
Article IX
The Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed at
the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into
force of this Treaty.
Article X
This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of the
United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United
Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international
peace and security in the Japan area.
However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give
notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the
Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.
In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.
Done in duplicate at Washington in the English and Japanese languages, both
equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: FOR JAPAN:
Christian A. Herter Kishi Nobusuke
Douglas MacArthur 2nd Fujiyama Aiichiro





PEACE TREATY BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC
OF CHINA
Following is the text (unofficial translation) of the peace treaty signed August 12,
1978, by representatives ofJapan and the People's Republic of China.
Japan and the People's Republic of China, recalling with satisfaction that since
the government of Japan and the government of the People's Republic of China issued
a joint communique in (Peking) on September 29, 1972, the friendly relations between
the two governments and the peoples of the two countries have developed greatly on a
new basis.
Confirming that the above mentioned joint communique constitutes the basis of
the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries and that the principles
enunciated in the joint communique should be strictly observed.
Confirming that the principles of the charter of the United Nations should be
fully respected.
Hoping to contribute to peace and stability in Asia and in the world.
For the purpose of solidifying and developing the relations of peace and
friendship between the two countries,
Have resolved to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship and for that purpose
have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:
Japan: Minister for Foreign
Affairs Sunao Sonoda
People's Republic of China: Minister of Foreign
Affairs Huang Hua
Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good
and due form, have agreed as follows:




1. The contracting parties shall develop relations of perpetual peace and
friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect
for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in
each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existance.
2. The contracting parties confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing
principles and the principles of the charter of the United Nations, they shall in their
mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use of
threat of force.
Article II
The contracting parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the
Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any
other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
Article III
The contracting parties shall, in the good-neighborly and friendly spirit and in
conformity with the principles of equality and mutual benefit and non-interference in
each other's internal affairs, endeavor to further develop economic and cultural
relations between the two countries and to promote exchanges between the peoples of
the two countries.
Article IV
The present treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting party
regarding its. relations with third countries.
Article V
1. The present treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of
the exchange of instruments of ratification which shall take place at Tokyo. The
present treaty shall remain in force for ten years and thereafter shall continue to be in
force until terminated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2.
2. Either contracting party may, by giving one year's written notice to the other
contracting party, terminate the present treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period
or at anv time thereafter. . .
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APPENDIX C
COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA
Following is the text (unofficial translation) of the communique signed September
29, 1972, by Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan and Premier Chou En-lai of the
People's Republic of China.
16*
At the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the State Council of the People's
Republic of China, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan visited the People's
Republic of China from September 25-30, 1972. Accompanying Prime Minister Kakuei
Tanaka were Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu
Nikaido and other Government officials.
Chairman Mao Tse-tung met Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on September 27.
The two sides had an earnest and friendly conversation.
Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei had an earnest and frank
exchange of views with Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and Foreign Minister
Masayoshi Ohira, all along in a friendly atmosphere, on various matters between the
two countries and other matters of interest to both sides, with the normalization of
relations between China and Japan as the focal point, and the two sides agreed to issue
the following joint statement of the two Governments:
China and Japan are neighboring countries separated only by a strip of water,
and there was a long history of traditional friendship between them. The two peoples
ardently wish to end the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the
two countries. The termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations
between China and Japan - the realization of such wishes of the two peoples will open
a new page in the annals of relations between the two countries.
The Japanese side is keenly aware of Japan's responsibility for causing enormous
damages in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself.
The Japanese side reaffirms its position that in seeking to realize the normalization of
relations between Japan and China, it proceeds from the stand of fully understanding
Congressional Quarterly, Historic Documents: 1972 (Washington, DC:
Congressional Quarterly, 1973), p. 828-30.
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the three principles for the restoration of diplomatic relations put forward by the
Government of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its
welcome for this.
Although the social systems of China and Japan are different, the two countries
should and can establish peaceful and friendly relations. The normalization of relations
and the development of good-neighborly and friendly relations between the two
countries are in the inerests of the two peoples, and will also contribute to the
relaxation of tension in Asia and the safeguarding of world peace.
(1) The abnormal state of affairs which has hitherto existed between the People's
Republic of China and Japan is declared terminated on the date of publication of this
statement.
(2) The Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People's
Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.
(3) The Government of the People's Republic of China reaffirms that Taiwan is
an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The
Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of
China and adheres to its stand of complying with Article 8 of the Potsdam
Proclamation.
(4) The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of
Japan have decided upon the establishment of diplomatic relations as from September
29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to adopt all necessary measures for the
establishment and the performance of functions of embassies in each other's capitals in
accordance with international law and practice and exchange ambassadors as speedily
as possible.
(5) The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the
interest of the friendship between the peoples of China and Japan, it renounces its
demand for war indemnities from Japan.
(6) The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of
Japan agree to establish durable relations of peace and friendship between the two
countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity, mutual non-aggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs,
equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.
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In keeping with the foregoing principles and the principles of the United Nations
Charter, the governments of the two countries affirm that in their mutual relations, all
disputes shall be settled by peaceful means without resorting to the use or threat of
force.
(7) The normalization of relations between China and Japan is not directed
against third countries. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the
Asia-Pacific region and each country is opposed to efforts by any other country or
group of countries to establish such hegemony.
(8) To consolidate and develop the peaceful and friendly relations between the
two countries, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government
of Japan agree to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion of a treaty of peace and
friendship.
(9) In order to further develop the relations between the two countries and
broaden the exchange of visits, the Government of the People's Republic of China and
the Government of Japan agree to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion of
agreements on trade, navigation, aviation, fishery, etc., in accordance with the needs
and taking into consideration the existing nongovernmental agreements.
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APPENDIX D
AGREEMENT FOR JOINT US-JAPAN SDI RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT
The following text is the US-Japan agreement for joint participation during the research
and development phase of the Strategic Defense Initiative, signed July 21, 1987.
The government of Japan and the government of the United States of America,
desiring to provide the basis for Japanese participation, in response to the invitation by
the Secretary of Defense of the United States of America of March 27, 1985 and based
upon the views expressed in the statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan of
September 9, 1986, in research in the Strategic Defense Initiative, which aims at
enhancing stability and deterrence being carried out by the government of the United
States of America, have agreed as follows:
1. It is the intention of both governments to facilitate participation by entities of
Japan on the basis of equitable and genuine competition.
2. Subject to compliance with applicable laws, regulations and international
obligations of each government, the government of Japan and the government
of the United States of America will endeavor to permit entities of Japan and
the United States of America who wish to participate in research in the
Strategic Defense Initiative to compete on equal terms for contracts awarded
within the scope of this agreement.
3. In order that classified information, furnished for or generated in the
performance of work pursuant to specific contractual arrangements for research
in the Strategic Defense Initiative (hereinafter referred to as "specific
contractual arrangements"), be protected, both governments will take all
necessary and appropriate measures within the framework of domestic laws of
each country and agreements between Japan and the United States of America.
4. Fair and equitable treatment will be accorded to information generated by
entities of Japan and the United States of America in the performance of work
pursuant to specific contractual arrangements, as well as to information
generated by them prior to or independently form such contractual
performance.
5. Concerning the transfer of information related to the work pursuant to specific
contractual arrangements, the government of Japan and the government of the
United States of America will draw upon the Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreement between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo
on March 8, 1954. as appropriate, and this agreement.
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Arrangements necessary to implement this agreement will be agreed upon
between the competent authorities of both governments. This agreement as
implemented by these arrangements will constitute the basis for Japanese
participation in research in the Strategic Defense Initiative.
This agreement will be implemented in accordance with applicable laws,
regulations and international obligations of each government, including for the
government of the United States of America, those assumed under the treaty
between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, signed at Moscow
on May 26, 1972, and for both governments, those assumed under the Charter
of the United Nations.
The two governments will, upon the request of either of them, consult regarding
any matter relating to the implementation of this agreement.
This agreement will enter into force on signature and will remain in force until




G-5 STATEMENT ISSUED: PLAZA ACCORD
The following are excerpts from the statement issued on September 22, 1985 by the
finance ministers and central bank governors of Britain, France, Japan, the United States
and West Germany}
Policy Intentions
The finance ministers and governors affirmed that each of their countries remains
firmly committed to its international responsibilities and obligations as leading
industrial nations. They also share special responsibilities to ensure the mutual
consistency of their individual policies. The ministers agreed that establishing more
widely strong, noninflationary domestic growth and open markets will be a key factor
in ensuring that the current expansion continues in a more balanced fashion, and they
committed themselves to policies toward that end. In countries where the budget
deficit is too high, further measures to reduce the deficit substantially are urgently
required.
Ministers and governors agreed that it was essential that protectionist pressures
be resisted.
Ministers recognized the importance of providing access to their markets for
LDC (lesser developed countries) exports as those countries continue their essential
adjustment efforts, and saw this as an important additional reason to avoid
protectionist policies. They welcomed the GATT preparatory meeting scheduled for
late September and expressed their hope that it will reach a broad consensus on subject
matter and modalities for a new GATT round.
In this context, they recalled and reaffirmed the statement in the Bonn Economic
Declaration on the debt situation: Sustained growth in world trade, lower interest
rates, open markets, and continued financing in amounts and on terms appropriate to
each individual case are essential to enable developing countries to achieve sound
growth and overcome their economic and fmancial difficulties.
169 The New York Times, September 23, 1985, p. 12D.
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The ministers agreed that they would monitor progress in achieving a sustained
noninflationary expansion and intensify their individual and cooperative efibrts to
accomplish this objective. To that end, they affirmed the statements of policy
intentions by each of their countries.
Conclusions
The ministers of finance and central bank governors agreed that recent economic
developments and policy changes, when combined with the specific policy intentions
described in the statements, provide a sound basis for continued and a more balanced
expansion with low inflation. They agreed on the importance of these improvements
for redressing the large and growing external imbalances that have developed in that
connection, they noted that further market- opening measures will be important to
resisting protectionism.
The ministers and governors agreed that exchange rates should play a role in
adjusting external imbalances. In order to do this, exchange rates could better reflect
fundamental economic conditions than has been the case. They believe that agreed
policy actions must be implemented and reinforced to improve the fundamentals
further, and that inview of the present and prospective changes in fundamentals, some
further orderly appreciation of the main nondollar currencies against the dollar is
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Private Research Colleges/ Total
Companies Institutes Universities
73307 26804 48696 148807
93107 34008 52485 179600
121965 41950 69741 233656
149266 49815 90012 289093
1S0004 53829 107130 340963
243900 64700 129600 438200
252359 72593 183643 508595
292177 82540 201914 576631
378970 94078 229436 702484
504351 114673 258463 877487
628352 137068 299233 1064650
823300 166400 365900 1355600
895020 213911 423441 1532370
1044930 268260 478684 1791870
1301930 339747 574163 2215840
1589050 409394 717585 2716030
1684850 449928 839798 2974570
1882230 504438 934016 3320690
2109500 529522 1012300 3651320
2291000 603788 1151070 4045860
2664913 660391 1282451 4607755
3142260 763918 1340070 5246250
3630000 907000 1446000 5983000
4039000 939000 1540000 6518000
4560000 971000 1650000 7181000
5136600 1033100 1724200 7893900
Source: Office of the Prime Minister, Japanese Statistical Yearbooks.
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APPENDIX G
JAPAN'S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE CONTRIBUTIONS:
1960-1985
(millions of dollars)
Year ODA Technical Private
Assistance Funds
1960 145.0 3.0 101.0
1961 221.4 2.4 160.0
1962 167.8 3.4 118.0
1963 140.4 4.5 138.0
1964 115.7 5.8 188.1
1965 243.7 6.0 241.8
1966 285.3 7.6 253.5
1967 390.6 11.0 464.7
1968 356.2 13.7 351.5
1969 435.6 19.0 541.7
1970 458.0 21.6 669.4
1971 510.7 27.2 975.6
1972 611.1 35.6 1252.3
1973 1011.0 57.2 3647.5
1974 1126.2 63.5 1038.5
1975 1147.7 87.2 1352.4
1976 1104.9 108.1 1548.9
1977 1424.4 147.8 2487.9
1978 2215.4 221.2 6335.5
1979 2637.5 241.9 4689.0
1980 3353.0 327.0 1958.0
1981 3171.0 378.0 6011.0
1982 3023.0 393.0 2929.0
1983 3761.0 458.0 2918.0
1984 4319.0 521.0 9968.0
1985 3797.0 549.0 9332.0
Source: Office of the Prime Minister, Japanese Statistical Yearbooks.
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